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TERRORISM, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND ORGANISED CRIME - SECURITY POLICY CHALLENGES OF NON-STATE ACTORS' USE OF VIOLENCE - Proceedings from an International Seminar in Oslo

LIA Brynjar, ANDRESEN Rolf-Inge Vogt (eds)

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Jan Erik Torp
Director of Research

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8) ABSTRACT This report contains five papers presented at the seminar <i>Terrorism - Past, Present and Future</i> (Oslo, September 2000). Annika Hansen discusses whether the use of force in peace operations leads to more international terrorism. She examines the case of Kosovo and concludes that the use of force has been accompanied by very few significant international terrorist attacks, but warns that the possibility of retaliatory terrorist action-outside of the conflict area-persists. Tore Bjørge focuses on the violent and ideological dimensions of transnational right-wing extremism. Youth gangs play an important part in the violence of right-wing movements. Bjørge suggests several strategies to reduce the size of these groups. Rolf-Inge Vogt Andrésen explores the role of Russian organised crime in the violence and terror that has afflicted Russia during the last decade. He concludes that the violence perpetrated by organised crime represents the far most common form of terrorist violence in the Russian Federation today. Bruce Hoffman stresses the duality of today's terrorism - it reflects both enormous change and remarkable continuity. The new breed of terrorists may seem more fanatical or irrational than before, but they still seem to be operationally conservative. Future terrorist use of CBRN weapons to achieve mass casualties or destruction may be far less certain than is now commonly assumed. This should have implications for anti-terrorism policies. Brynjar Lia argues that the changes in societal conditions brought about by globalisation will effect the occurrence of terrorism. He explores different ways in which globalisation impacts on the causes of terrorism and presents three main forecasts for future terrorism.		
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1 INTRODUCTION

This report is the sixth publication by the *Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare Project* at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment.¹ An outline of the entire project and some initial theoretical work were done in our *Analytical Framework for the Study of Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare*, published in September 1999. Subsequent publications have dealt with the societal causes for terrorism and political violence, the impact of globalisation on future patterns of terrorism, as well as the relevance of civil infrastructure in terrorist target selection strategies.² The overall aim of the research project is to produce academic studies on terrorism, which may assist policy-makers and practitioners in mapping out and assessing non-conventional security challenges, especially non-state actors' use of violence.

The present report is a result of an international seminar organised by the *Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare Project* on the occasion of Dr Bruce Hoffman's visit to the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment in late September 2000. The seminar, entitled "Terrorism: Past, Present and Future" was held at Oslo Military Society, 27 September 2000. The following chapters reflect the presentations at the conference. The speakers included Dr Hoffman of the RAND Corporation, Dr Tore Bjørgo, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, and three researchers from the *Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare Project* – Dr Annika S Hansen, Mr Rolf-Inge Vogt Andrésen and Mr Brynjar Lia. The contributions from the *Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare* project are summaries of research reports. Footnotes and references in those papers have therefore been kept to a minimum.³ The last chapter offers concluding remarks from the editors on some of the most pertinent points that were made at the seminar and that should have a more direct policy relevance.

¹ The official title is FFISYS Research Project No. 776 "Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare: Emerging Security Challenges After the Cold War (TERRA)." The project began in March 1999 and will be concluded by June 2001.

² For other studies completed in the project period, see B Lia & A S Hansen, *An Analytical Framework for the Study of Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare*, FFI-RAPPORT 99/04218; B Lia & A S Hansen, *Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism: Patterns and Predictions*, FFI-RAPPORT 2000/01704; B Lia & K H-W Skjølberg, *Why Terrorism Occurs - A Survey of Theories and Hypotheses on the Causes of Terrorism*, FFI-RAPPORT-2000/02769; B Lia, *Er sivil infrastruktur sannsynlige mål for terrorgrupper i fremtid? Terrorisme som tryggingpolitisk utfordring i Norge*, FFI-RAPPORT 2000/01703; B Lia & R-I V Andrésen, *Asymmetri .. asymmetrisk krigføring .. asymmetriske trugsmål - Bruken av asymmetri-omgrepet i tryggingpolitisk og militærteoretisk litteratur*, FFI-RAPPORT 2000/01718; B Lia, "Mot farlegare formar for terrorisme," *Internasjonal politikk* 58 (3) september 2000; K H-W Skjølberg, "Etnisk mangfold, legitimitet og konflikt. Mønstre i vesteuropeisk separatisme 1950-95," *Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift* august 2000.

³ The reports in question are *Does More 'Muscular' Peacekeeping Entail More International Terrorism?* (forthcoming), *Russian Organised Crime – Domestic and International Implications* (forthcoming), and *Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism: Patterns and Predictions* (FFI-RAPPORT 2000/01704).

2 MUSCULAR PEACEKEEPING AND TERRORISM – THE EXAMPLE OF KOSOVO

ANNIKA S HANSEN

It is a truth universally acknowledged that using force in peace operations *must* lead to more international terrorism. That raising the level of violence not only entails violent retaliation *within* a conflict area, but that it brings with it the export of terrorism *abroad*. In the Norwegian context, this would mean that the participation of Norwegian soldiers in muscular peacekeeping operations would lead to more terrorist attacks and political violence *in* Norway. But is it truly so?

Today, I will suggest differed ways in which conflict may be exported and lead to international terrorism and I will use the conflict in Kosovo – in the period 1998 to mid-2000 – as an example. Then, I will continue with the example and present to you the extent to which the conflict did in fact trigger international terrorism. Hopefully, my presentation will provide more insight into the policy implications of our involvement in these types of muscular peacekeeping operations.

Different conflict areas will of course be predisposed towards international terrorism to different degrees.⁴ A major difficulty lies in distinguishing between those factors that – on the one hand – are *inherent* to the conflict and those that are determined by the *nature* of the external military intervention – on the other. The answer as to which is the most influential can only be empirical.

Throughout what follows it is important to keep in mind the three major stages of international intervention in Kosovo. I will not discuss the missions directly, but simply reiterate them, as I assume you are familiar with the most important features of each. First, there was the OSCE-led unarmed observer mission, the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) deployed from mid-October 1998 until January 1999. Then, the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia from March to June 1999. And since June 1999, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

2.1 Outside Links and Terrorism Spillover

Aside from the parties that might *themselves* stage a terrorist attack abroad, there are three major links from a conflict area to the outside world. First, there are diaspora communities. Second, there are transnational criminal networks. Third, there are usually several external groups that sympathise with one of the parties to the conflict for a variety of reasons. I will discuss each in turn. Another aspect that I will *not* touch upon in this context is the interaction between the different Balkan theatres. There are significant immediate regional implications, but they have little bearing on the export of terrorism outside of the conflict region.

⁴ For example, while the Middle East conflict was a major source of terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s, conflicts in the Caucasus and Asia have emerged as major exporters of terrorism during the 1990s.

1) *Diasporas* can play three central roles, first and foremost, raising money, then, building awareness and political support, and finally, recruiting manpower for the armed struggle.⁵

When Yugoslav authorities cracked down on Kosovo in 1989, a shadow government was constructed that included local administration, a national assembly and a President, schools, legal and police organs. In order to finance the venture, a tax system was also established by which all Kosovo Albanians – at home and abroad – were to pay a 3% levy on all earnings. When disenchantment with the non-violent track set in, in late 1995/early 1996 the funds began to be redirected into what was called the Homeland Calling Fund which was to finance the ‘anticipated war of liberation,’ or in short the KLA.

Both Serb and Kosovo-Albanian diaspora communities promoted their cause and tried to build political support by voicing their concerns abroad. The internet was an effective and non-territorial tool that was used. But the more relevant tool in the present context were demonstration and attacks on embassies and headquarters of international organisations. Particularly exposed were the US representations.⁶ Attacks ranged from relatively peaceful protests to firebombs and grenades. A shift took place in late 1998: before that time, protest actions were mostly carried out by Kosovo-Albanians, such as a series of bomb attacks in Macedonia and peaceful protests at NATO headquarters in Brussels. In early 1999, however, and this is certainly connected to the more forceful stance of the international community and the resulting NATO bombings, demonstrators almost exclusively supported the Serb side.

Diasporas also played a role in recruitment. The core of the KLA came from a few clans in Kosovo and the organisation numbered no more than a few hundred until the mid-1990s. In line with increasing Yugoslav repression, the KLA mushroomed and a significant contribution came from diaspora communities. Many Western European governments were also repatriating refugees from Kosovo many of whom returned to join the KLA. The flow of people into the conflict area also comprised a minor share of mercenaries from a host of countries.⁷ Many were recruited through the diaspora communities, but most of the mercenaries were not Albanian.

In addition to demonstrations of varying intensity, the type of incidents witnessed abroad in or in connection with the diaspora communities was infighting and assassinations. Most often the targets were Kosovo-Albanian leaders in exile in Germany or Switzerland.

2) *Transnational organised crime*: You will hear more about the link between terrorism and organised crime in the course of the morning; I would merely like to point to an important aspect which is the way in which criminal activities, in particular the arms and the drugs trade, have become an increasingly critical source of funding for a number of terrorist groups. Still, the association of a criminal organisation with a terrorist can be risky, in that the international spotlight might threaten the business.

⁵ Albanian diaspora world-wide has been particularly strong in Switzerland, Germany, (600,000) and North America (300,000).

⁶ In the case of Lebanon, it was the US but also French and Israeli embassies and consulates that made popular targets.

⁷ Albania proper, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, Britain, Canada, Germany, Holland, Sweden, Morocco, Chechnya.

In Kosovo, political, military, and economic power coincides to a large extent – although it is also fractured and often localised. This has made terrorism a less attractive strategy for promoting political objectives for two reasons. First, the officially disbanded KLA has – at present – achieved its major aim, namely *de facto* independence from FRY. Many of its former leaders and now regional commanders of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) have shored up personal positions of power. Therefore, there seems to be no need to pursue these aims further with a strategy of international terrorism, for which there is no tradition and which would only threaten international support and goodwill. Second, international terrorism and the export of political violence could be counterproductive and endanger the leaders' monopoly on power, as well as their role in transnational criminal networks and criminal co-operation arrangements.

3) Which brings us to the *sympathisers*. These can again be sub-divided into three categories: Brothers-in-faith, fellow secessionists, and left-wing-extremists.

Kosovo-Albanians enjoyed the sympathy of a host of countries in the Muslim world. In fact, the conflict in Kosovo was identified as a strand in the world-wide Jihad. Until early 1999, Muslim brothers-in-faith were vocal in their criticism of Western apathy, given the atrocities being committed against Muslims in Kosovo.⁸ Then, the NATO bombing placed the sympathisers in a bit of a bind, when they found themselves fighting on the same side as the United States and their Western allies. In light of the verbal assaults volleyed at 'the West,' it is maybe surprising that we did not witness any terrorist incidents on behalf of the Kosovo Albanian cause. The Serbs have sometimes attempted to play the 'Muslim-threat'-card against the West; also justifying their own heavy-handedness with the need to contain the influence of Islamic fundamentalists and their terrorist organisations. But throughout the period examined there were few signs of decisive involvement of foreign – in particular fundamentalist – forces in Kosovo and even fewer signs in mid-2000 that Kosovo-Albanians might establish close ties with terrorist organisations in the Muslim world.

Second, another wave of sympathy reached Kosovo from the Northern Caucasus. Although it is likely that there was indeed collaboration between the Chechen secessionists and the KLA, their contacts resemble a profitable business relationship more than a political co-operative effort in future international terrorism.

Last, but certainly not least, left-wing extremists latched onto the fight against imperialist transgressions by the West and NATO. They were motivated both by an affiliation with socialist Yugoslavia, but probably more so by an antipathy towards NATO and its policies.⁹ With hindsight the most ominous of these demonstrations were perhaps the violent protests of left-wing parties that accompanied President Bill Clinton's visit to Greece in November 1999. They continued a trend that had begun in April 1999 with a bomb attack in Athens directed at international companies which the terrorists regarded as supportive of the NATO campaign. They eventually culminated in the most serious incident of international terrorism associated with the use of force in Kosovo: the assassination of the Brigadier Stephen Saunders, Defence

⁸ The kind of support for the KLA that was called for and indeed provided, included training, equipment, personnel, and humanitarian aid.

⁹ NATO had been a favoured target of the euroterrorism of the 1980s, a loose coalition of leftwing radical organisations, such as the RAF, Action Directe, the Red Brigade and the Communist Combattant Cells.

Attaché at the British Embassy in Athens, on 8 June 2000. The left-wing November 17 group explained its choice of target as being based on Saunders' diplomatic role in securing Greek support for NATO's campaign in Kosovo.

Another aspect that is worth mentioning briefly in this context is information warfare. Outside of the immediate conflict area, attacks by Serbs on the information systems of NATO and NATO member states consisted of blocking email systems and scrambling websites. Attempts to hack into military networks, for example in Britain, generally failed. This is not to say that these kinds of attacks can be more sophisticated in the future. They are perhaps the most natural and effortless way in which to export a conflict. Moreover, cyber attacks were directed at information and the supply thereof rather than at civilian infrastructure which would have a far greater potential for collateral damage.

2.2 Concluding Remarks

I will briefly review the extent to which terrorism was exported in the case of Kosovo. With regard to the Diaspora, it appears that its most important function was not to export the conflict but to provide financial and human resources that flowed into the conflict area. Further, it appears that the host country for a diaspora community is more likely to be the stage rather than the target of an international terrorist attack. But even here we have seen relatively low scale attacks.

On the criminal networks, it is important to recognise that violent crime will always be associated with transnational organised crime. The same is true of the Kosovo-Albanian role in international drug trade. Although terrorism is almost always a crime, a crime is not necessarily terrorism. We have not witnessed any form of international terrorism related to the organised crime in Kosovo.

Only the left-wing extremist sympathisers have left a significant mark in relation to the Kosovo conflict. They were clearly influenced by NATO's use of force against Yugoslavia and its ideological implications.

To the extent that the use of force *has* affected the export of terrorism, its effect has not been immediate. The key lies in the way military force alters the perception of the intervening party in the eyes of the parties to the conflict. The impartial use of force is virtually impossible. As soon as the international community enters a conflict on behalf of one of the parties, it becomes a legitimate target for those who wish to affect the balance of power in-theatre.

In conclusion, I would like to say that although the use of force has been accompanied by very few significant international terrorist attacks in any of the cases reviewed here, the possibility of retaliatory terrorist action – outside of the conflict area – persists. This study suggests that the danger may not be as grave and the causality not as absolute and inescapable as it is often made out to be. Still, choosing to use force or to participate in a muscular peacekeeping operation remains a difficult decision and it is critical that one is aware of the implications for the perceived impartiality and legitimacy of the force.

3 NEO-NAZI TERRORISM AND RACIST YOUTH GANG VIOLENCE

TØRE BJØRGO

The rise of right-wing extremism and neo-Nazism has been described as a reaction against the forces of globalisation.¹⁰ However, these movements are also, paradoxically, among the most striking manifestations of globalisation processes. Anti-Semitic notions and ideologies have travelled from Europe to the USA, where these ideas have been transformed and acquired some distinct traits from American political culture, before being re-exported back to Europe. The skinhead movement, originating in England, is now to be found all over the world. Skinheads sport English DocMartens boots, American pilot jackets and Confederate flags, Celtic crosses, tattoos of Norse runes and Viking images, Swastika symbols (originating from India), and shouting *Sieg Heil* – and still they claim to be nationalists opposing cultural mixing! Few movements have made better use of the Internet than the extreme right. White Power music has become an international industry,¹¹ spreading a hateful message to audiences in many countries, and generating sizeable profits for the movement.

In the present paper, I will focus on the violent and ideological dimensions of this transnational movement, and towards the end, say something about approaches to intervene with these groups.

3.1 Nazi Terrorism

During the last couple of decades, terrorism from neo-Nazi and racist groups have emerged as an increasing threat. This has been particularly noticeable in North America and Europe. Some of these forms of terrorism have long traditions: violence against ethnic, racial, sexual and political minorities has been going on for decades and even centuries in some countries. Lynchings of blacks in the USA, and violence against gypsies, refugees and labour migrants in several European countries are almost part of the local lore. However, recent waves of immigration and asylum seekers have been met with alarming amounts of violence in some countries, prompting the political system and the public to respond – although sometimes rather hesitantly.

However, the public was mentally unprepared for a *new* form of right-wing terrorism that virtually exploded with the car bombing of the Federal office building in Oklahoma City in April 1995, killing 168 persons and wounding more than 500. In peaceful Sweden, neo-Nazis in 1999 murdered two police officers, assassinated a labour union activist, bombed a journalist and his son in their car, and in 1998, Nazis also sent a letter-bomb to the Swedish Minister of Justice. In Norway, the police have also intercepted preparations for a neo-Nazi Molotov attack on the private house of the Minister of Justice, and also made arrests in another case where neo-Nazis allegedly planned to attack on prominent persons.

In several other European countries, like Germany, Switzerland and Italy, neo-Nazis have recently increased their violence, which is still predominantly directed against immigrants,

¹⁰ See the bibliography on page 43 for literature references.

¹¹ The Swedish CD publisher *Nordland* was recently bought up by the American Nazi organization National Alliance as part of their multimedia empire.

left-wing anti-racists, homosexuals and other minorities. There have been only a few actual terrorist attacks on representatives of the political establishment in these countries.¹² However, the rhetoric that has been adopted by the neo-Nazis, and the threats they are making against politicians, police officers, academics, journalists and others, give reasons to expect a development in these other European countries similar to that which has taken place in the USA and Sweden.

This shift in the extreme right's targets of hatred and violence, from minorities and radical political opponents towards representatives of the government and the political establishment, was a trend that had been noticeable for years to observers following the ideological writings and behaviour of the far-right scene. American racial militants have gradually transformed old anti-Semitic ideas into a terrorist doctrine about the "racial war" against the "Zionist Occupation Government" (ZOG), and the "racial traitors" or the "ZOG agents".

European traditions of fascism have sometimes used terrorism with the aim of instigating a demand for a stronger state. This new form of terror, however, designated the state apparatus itself as the enemy, and as a main target for terrorist attacks. In this respect, the neo-Nazi militants start to resemble the European terrorists of the left as they operated during the 1970s and 80s.

3.2 Ideological Developments

These ideas gained increasing popularity not only among parts of the American far right. They were also increasingly adopted by neo-Nazis and other racial revolutionary groups in Europe. This ideological transfer took place from the late 1980s and even more so during the 1990s. At first, it appeared to be mere hate speech. However, some of these activists have recently gone from violent rhetoric to terrorist action.

An important and – in racist circles – highly influential representation of the ZOG ideology is presented in fictional form in the novel *The Turner Diaries*, written by the US Nazi leader William Pierce under the alias Andrew Macdonald (1980). This futuristic novel describes – in blood-dripping detail – the apocalyptic revenge taken on the so-called racial traitors after the white resistance movement has seized power in a coup. A subsequent novel by the same author, *Hunter* (1989), describes how an individual white man, the 'lone hunter', can wage his private war against powerful Jews, media people, politicians and others considered ZOG lackeys and racial traitors. The sinister thing about these novels is that they can serve in many capacities: as exciting entertainment, as propaganda for a racist worldview, as ideological instruction, as handbooks of terrorism, and as models of action for young activists in the militant neo-Nazi and racist sub-cultures.¹³ The book has been translated into German, French and Swedish, and is also available for free download on the Internet. One of the scenarios from *The Turner Diaries* served as the exact blueprint for the Oklahoma City bombing. Swedish neo-Nazis have also modelled some of their actions on these novels, and on the real-

¹² In September 2000 in Italy there was an attack on a university professor (he was of Jewish origin, but had converted to Catholicism), cf. *Republica*, 21 and 22 Sept. 2000; *Corriere della Sera* 22 Sept. 2000.

¹³ For a more detailed account of these books and their influence in militant racial sub-cultures, and about the ZOG ideology in general, see Barkun (1994); Bjørge (1993; 1995b); Kaplan (1995, 1997); Löow (1998); *Searchlight* (July 2000) No. 301, pp. 20-21.

life US terrorist organisation of the mid-1980s, *the Bruders Schweigen*, also called 'The Order', after models in *The Turner Diaries*.

Within the framework of the ZOG ideology, immigration is presented as a strategic weapon in the hands of the Jews in their ongoing race war against the Aryans. Through the Jews' 'malicious scheme of racial mixing' – and with the help of their liberal lackeys – ZOG disseminates perverting humanistic ideas of 'a common human race', tolerance and multi-cultural societies. This idea – that it is really the Jews who are behind the immigration problem and the wave of refugees – is fundamental to the way most neo-Nazis perceive the issue of immigration. These racial revolutionaries therefore claim that in the race war it is more important to fight the Jews and their obedient servants within politics, the bureaucracy and the media than going after the individual immigrant, who is seen as merely a small pawn in a large game. Back in 1992, the Swedish Nazi cell *Werwolf* declared in its magazine:

Let us once and for all state clearly that the primary targets of the national revolution are not refugee camps or individual niggers. Attacks on these are generally a waste of our resources. Attacks must be aimed at newspapers, politicians, journalists and the police/prosecuting authorities. They are the ones who constitute a great but not insurmountable obstacle in our fight for freedom. Far too long have these traitors escaped unpunished, despite their misadministration of Sweden, with mass immigration, increasing homosexuality, assaults on minors, giving Sweden away to the EU, etc.

After every article harassing national movements, heavy attacks must be aimed at the newspapers and journalists who are responsible. Everything from bomb threats to grievous bodily harm and murder. For every national soldier who is sentenced to imprisonment we shall extract bitter revenge. We shall attack judges, jurors, prosecutors, witnesses and policemen.¹⁴

Some years later, this scenario is gradually turning into reality in Sweden. Journalists have been bombed along with their children; political opponents were assassinated; and police officers were intimidated and even killed by Nazis. A survey conducted jointly by Sweden's four largest newspapers¹⁵ showed that in a number of cases, threats caused police officers, prosecutors, jurors and witnesses to withdraw from investigations and court-cases. As a result, criminal cases against extremists sometimes had to be dropped. Several journalists and politicians were intimidated into silence. Although the threats from the neo-Nazis and the MC gangs do not represent a threat to the stability of democracy in Sweden, these threats are certainly undermining several important aspects of the democratic process.

3.3 New Tactical Doctrines of Terrorism

The Turner Diaries promoted the idea of a large terrorist organization fighting a racial war against ZOG. This was also the model of action followed by the US terrorist organisation known as 'The Order', or '*Bruders Schweigen*', as they called themselves. This group carried out an extensive terrorist campaign in 1983-84, but was soon uncovered by the FBI, which

¹⁴ Cited from *Werwolf*, No. 9 (undated, 1992).

¹⁵ *Aftonbladet*, *Dagens Nyheter*, *Expressen*, and *Svenska Dagbladet*, publishing identical stories 30 Nov. 1999. The newspapers identified names, pictures and criminal records of 62 Nazis and MC criminals that allegedly represented a threat to Swedish democracy. Some criticised the selection for being somewhat arbitrary. Several leading extremists were omitted, whereas some of those included were no longer active.

managed to infiltrate the organisation. Twenty-four of its members were arrested, several jailed for life. Leading members, like David Lane and Richard Scutari, later concluded that their main error was that too many knew too much: “If The Order had functioned as small, autonomous units, preferably one-man units, they would still have been in action.”¹⁶ This was also the tactical doctrine espoused in a later ideological novel by Macdonald/Pierce, *Hunter* (1989). Another leading American militant, Louis R Beam, promoted the principle of ‘leaderless resistance’ in the struggle against ‘state tyranny’, and argued strongly against any form of structured organisations because such organisations are easily penetrated by state agencies. The demise of ‘The Order’ in the mid-1980s demonstrated to American militants the vulnerability of such large organisational structures. Beam’s doctrine boils down to saying: “You know who the enemy is, you know what you are against, so get out and start attacking. Act alone or in very small groups, without any central organisational structure that the authorities could uncover.”¹⁷

This was the doctrine followed by the British Nazi David Copeland who bombed gay bars and multicultural communities in London, April 1999, in a campaign that killed three people and injured more than 100. The perpetrator seems to have acted alone, but he had a background from neo-Nazi circles and was strongly influenced by both Nazi ideology and American racism, including *The Turner Diaries*.¹⁸

3.4 Racist Violence from Youth Gangs

These more spectacular acts of racist terrorism were committed by persons and groups guided by a racial ideology. However, most of the violent acts against immigrants and ethnic minorities have been carried out by teenagers – frequently belonging to skinhead gangs or informal groups of friends without much organisation, and only a skin-deep ideology. However, their mode of expression is often blatantly racist, even if what drives them may be a mixture of other motives – often a need to show off to their peers, a search for excitement and attention, and sometimes a wish to revenge negative experiences with immigrants or other ‘enemies’.

Cases of anti-immigrant bombings and arson have revealed strikingly similar patterns in the events leading up to the attack: a discussion among a group of friends during which hostile feelings against immigrants or asylum-seekers are expressed, an implicit contest among the participants to outdo each other in reckless proposals, a wish to ‘show off’, plus a good measure of alcohol to quell second thoughts. During the 1990s, one new element has been added to the situation commonly preceding violent sprees: listening to aggressive White Power music.

Violent actions may not just give prestige to individual perpetrators in relation to the rest of the group. When criminal youth gangs turn their violence and harassment towards unpopular groups of ‘foreigners’, the group as a whole often experiences a dramatic change in social

¹⁶ *Storm* No. 5-6, 1991, p. 7, my translation from Swedish, and No. 7-8, 1992, p. 17.

¹⁷ Cf. L.R. Beam, *Leaderless Resistance* (available from the www.Stormfront.org home page on the Internet), and *Searchlight* (Jan. 1994) p. 5.

¹⁸ For the background of the London bomber David Copeland, see *Searchlight* (July 2000) No. 301, pp. 11-21.

status in the eyes of the community. From being a bunch of *nobodies* the group members become *somebodies* – dangerous racists and neo-Nazis in the eyes of some, local heroes and patriots in the eyes of others.

There are several varieties of such racist youth gangs, both in terms of style, ideology, origin and composition. Let me briefly describe two common types. *Adolescent gangs* are predominantly composed of youths aged about 13 to 18, in other words mainly school-kids. Their main concerns typically focus on belonging to a group of mates, on status and identity, and on being protected from bullies, rival gangs and others who might be ‘out to get them’. They may come from a varied social background, including well-off middle-class families. However, many of them suffer from various types of problems in relation to school, parents, or mates. Psycho-social problems are common among members of some of these adolescent gangs. Some of the youths have been victims of bullying, or have themselves bullied others. Loneliness and social vulnerability have motivated many of these youths to seek community and protection in a racist gang.

The concerns of these adolescents are obviously quite different from those belonging to another main type of gang, consisting predominantly of *older youths* between the age of 17 and 25, or even older. Their problems are mainly socio-economic rather than psycho-social. In these gangs, the unemployment rate is high, and their educational level is low. The members usually come from a working-class background. Many of these gang members have acquired substantial criminal records. These young adults may be characterised in a socio-economic sense as marginalized individuals. Economic recessions tend to hit them hard. They see immigrants as competitors in the struggle over scarce economic resources, in contrast to the adolescent gangs described above, who mainly relate to immigrants as rival gangs or as physical threats to their security.

Usually, both types of racist youth groups consist of various mixtures of individual types with different orientations and motives. Typically, there is one or a few persons in the core that have an ideological orientation. Others are in the group because they like to fight; still others want to belong to a group with a dangerous and intimidating image for their own protection; and some are mainly there because the group provides friends and identity.

These racist or xenophobic youth gangs are important for several reasons. They commit a large amount of violence against minorities and rival youth groups. Many of these xenophobic youth gangs tend to get in contact with the more ideological neo-Nazi scene and gradually become more ideologically oriented. This development also takes place on the individual level – although most new recruits do *not* join racist groups because they are racists to begin with, they often *become* militant racists by gradually adopting the world-views and violent patterns of behaviour from the group. These youth gangs also represent an important pool of recruitment for more ideological Nazi groups, as well as for right-wing political parties. Reducing the size of these youth groups is therefore of great importance.

Most of those who have joined the racist scene do disengage sooner or later. Our goal should be that they quit *sooner* rather than later – before they hurt others; before they have internalised a racist worldview and a violent pattern of behaviour; before they have ruined their

own future by getting a criminal record and a Nazi stigma – and before they get involved with terrorism.

3.5 Policy Approaches

Strategies for reducing such racist groups and their violent activities should not be based on one approach only, but rather consist of a combination of methods and approaches. Most of these will have to be implemented on the local level. Some of these approaches become more effective if they are based on international co-operation. Some examples:

- Repression of illegal activities through police intelligence, investigation, arrest and punishment. International co-operation: intelligence can be shared, militants can be prevented from crossing borders, products that are illegal in some countries (Nazi or violence-inciting publications, CDs, etc) can be intercepted, investigation methods can be shared. Can the existing legislation and police training be described as adequate?
- Protecting victims of violence and racism.
- Addressing factors that lead youths to join racist gangs (eg social or economic marginalisation, fear of other youth gangs and bullies. Interventions must be based on analyses of what the local problems are.
- Reducing conflicts and spirals of violence between rival youth groups.
- Promoting individual disengagement from racist youth groups by reinforcing motivations and reducing obstacles to leaving.
- Provide attractive alternative opportunities to a continued life within the racist scene (the ‘carrot-and-stick’ approach).
- Breaking up gangs by reinforcing inherent tendencies of group dissolution (eg by undermining the status and authority of leaders, by isolating them from followers, by reducing the gang’s cohesiveness and power of attraction and promoting splits and internal conflicts).

By combining several such approaches to reduce these extremist youth groups, the total effect will be much greater than the effect of each method separately. I have seen it work.

4 THE THREAT FROM RUSSIAN ORGANISED CRIME

ROLF-INGE VOGT ANDRESEN

4.1 Introduction

This paper presents some preliminary findings from a study that has been conducted as part of the Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare Project at the FFI. The task has been to assess a

phenomenon that has been a focus of attention among perceived threats after the end of the Cold War – Russian Organised Crime (ROC). ‘Russian’ in this context is understood to include organised crime that is based in The Russian Federation.

The subject matter has become a focal point in security research for several reasons. Observers have found that organised crime is expanding all over the world. In some states and conflict areas there seems to be a trend towards convergence between organised crime and terrorists. The two co-operate more, and this is thought to create a synergy, making terrorists and organised crime a more severe threat. Some worst-case scenarios have evolved around the possibility that Russian criminal organisations would make a commodity of the Former Soviet Union’s most lethal weaponry, notably weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and that they would find buyers among terrorists and so-called rogue states. The nature and activities of ROC can affect Russia’s stability, which is pivotal to the security of all other states. These are among the reasons why a study of ROC can give better insight into the security environment that has emerged after the end of the Cold War.

4.2 The Rise in Organised Crime in Russia

The evidence of a massive rise in crime in post-Soviet Russia, including organised crime, is overwhelming. However, it is not easy to determine what could or should be referred to as ‘organised crime’. The term is not unambiguous in any country. Russian authorities have adopted their own definitions, which do not differ substantially from those of their Western counterparts. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs – the MVD – defines ‘organised crime’ as ”an organised community of criminals ranging in size from 50 to 1,000 persons, which is engaged in systematic criminal business and protects itself from the law with the help of corruption.” Officials from the MVD have also emphasised as characteristic that ”organised criminal groups engage in criminal activity with the aim of obtaining a fixed income; they have the capability of acting over prolonged periods of time; they have a clear-cut division of labour, well developed means of communication and an available system of secrecy and security.”

The rise in the activity that these definitions refer to has been such that organised crime has been made the number one priority by the MVD, according to its latest annual report. In 1990 the authorities in the Russian Republic had identified 785 criminal groups. December 1991 saw the collapse of the Soviet Union. The number of identified criminal groups rose to 4,352 in 1992. That rise was obviously too steep to be explained by intensified investigative efforts. The statistics substantiated the impression that observers of Russia had – that organised crime was booming. The number continued to increase and reached 9,000 in 1997, which is not far below today’s level. The growth of ROC during the last decade has been exceptional. This development has brought large parts of the Russian economy under criminal control. Many research institutions and experts have concluded that about two thirds of the economy is under the sway of crime syndicates. The MVD report for 1999 states that organised crime is still expanding in all spheres of the economy and is constantly attempting to establish control over the most profitable branches of production, trade and finance. Interregional and international integration of criminal structures is gaining momentum, and links with foreign criminal groups are being consolidated and expanded. Organised crime groups launder money through legal

commerce by purchasing real estate and investing capital in different sorts of business, at home as well as abroad. Organised crime has advanced further into the spheres of politics and is increasing its efforts to penetrate legislative and executive organs of state power to lobby its interests.

4.3 A Climate of Violence

The rise of organised crime has been accompanied by an equally steep rise in violence and terror in Russia. The number of premeditated murders and attempted murders in 1999 was 31,000, a 5.4% increase from 1998. The murder rate makes Russia one of the world's most violent societies. With 20 persons killed for every 100,000, it is three times that of the United States. The MVD concludes that the aggressiveness and brutality of crimes seems to have been "significantly strengthened". The growth has been noticeably above average in the number of crimes for profit, including crimes for profit with the use of violence. The MVD notes that the profit motive is becoming more and more important.

4.4 Terrorism in Russia

The fight for property and profit is the leitmotif of the last decade of Russian history. This conflict has shaped people's norms of behaviour and ways of thinking, it has motivated the formation of alliances in politics and elsewhere. It has created a society dominated by organised crime. And it explains most of the terrorism that has afflicted the new Russia. The majority of definitions of terrorism have until now emphasised the *political* or *social* motives for terrorist acts. However, if applied to Russia, such definitions would leave out most of the acts of violence that have been committed during the last decade, acts that in other respects qualify as terrorism. Organised crime's violence is premeditated, it frequently victimises not only adversaries, but also people who are not parties to criminal dealings. Organised crime uses violence as one of its main instruments to further its cause, to intimidate, to scare off competitors and those who might try to stop it. The terrorism of organised crime undermines structures and institutions that a democratic society is based on. **The terrorist threat in Russia is first and foremost a threat from organised crime.** There are several targets for criminal organisations: rivals, turncoats and informants, crusading journalists, officials who are investigating organised crime, recalcitrant bankers and businessmen, state institutions and personnel. Russian politicians have also been frequent targets of terrorism. These acts may look politically motivated. On 20 November 1998 Galina Starovoytova, one of Russia's most prominent liberals, was assassinated by unidentified assailants. This was seen by many as a politically motivated contract killing. But there is good reason to argue that this interpretation of the event clouds the main point – that Starovoytova was assassinated because she was seen as a potential threat to somebody's very material interests. There have been numerous cases like this in Russia during the last decade. Most of them have been low-profile murders on local and regional levels. Politicians and public officials have been killed because somebody had very strong economic incentives to have them removed. The profit motive may also lie behind the explosion that killed 8 people and injured 96 on Pushkin Square in Moscow 8 August this year. It was quickly blamed on Chechens fighting for independence from Russia. But the case is also being investigated as a crime with economic motives, as part of a mafia

feud. The Public Prosecutor's Office stated on 7 September that the latter is the most probable.

Politically motivated terrorism in Russia has so far occurred mostly as a result of ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus area. Chechnya is a special case. The Chechen separatists have carried out terrorist acts as part of their struggle with the federal Russian authorities. These acts have been committed both inside Chechnya and in the neighbouring republics. Chechens have also been accused of terrorist acts in the heart of Russia, notably the bombings of apartment buildings in Russian cities in the autumn of 1999, when hundreds of people were killed. However, Russian authorities have not yet presented any convincing evidence that Chechen separatists were behind these acts. The North Caucasus region would have been considered an exceptionally violent environment even without the Chechen war. In addition to rampant politically and economically motivated terrorism, the local tradition of blood feuds and vendettas make violence a frequent occurrence.

4.5 Russian Organised Crime in Search of New Sources of Income?

But more than anything, terrorism in Russia so far has been an outcome of the struggle for former state property, for the profits that a few very profitable branches of Russia's economy generate (namely oil, gas, minerals and other raw materials), and for control over various sorts of criminal business. Terrorism has been an instrument in internal rivalries between various criminal organisations.

And they have had huge spoils to fight for. In assessing the threat from ROC one has to keep in mind the unique nature of the opportunities for enrichment that Russia has offered. It is a fact that traditional mafia enterprise – extortion, racketeering, smuggling, prostitution and other 'vice industries' – is more developed in Russia than in most other countries. Still, ROC has amassed most of its fortune and built its strength by exploiting the same sources of income as all the prominent players in the Russian economy, including the so-called oligarchs. The bulk of their assets stems from rigged privatisation auctions, embezzlement of government funds and foreign aid, tax fraud and illegal export of raw materials. However, the economic conditions and policies that brought crime in Russia to its heights have changed, and organised crime's main sources of income may be drying up. Privatisation is close to completion, foreign credits are becoming increasingly hard for Russia to obtain, tax authorities have become more resolute, and the new leadership in the Kremlin has indicated that it will be tough on crime in more than words.

4.6 Russian Organised Crime Abroad

Russia's criminals will have to adjust to this, and this may lead to a marked increase in its transnational and international operations. This is not to say that it is merely a domestic Russian phenomenon. ROC has been operating abroad since Soviet times. Internationally ROC is involved in financial fraud, prostitution, smuggling of raw materials, weapons, stolen cars, tobacco, alcohol, drugs, antiques, precious metals and stones, in extortion and human trafficking. It is also a major player in the oil and real estate markets. ROC is thought to be active in more than 50 countries. Russian criminal organisations have exported enormous

sums from the Russian Federation. There is no doubt that ROC is transnational and has the resources to expand. Outside Russia it is powerfully entrenched in all the Former Soviet states, and it is heavily present in Eastern Europe and Israel.

4.7 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Still, ROC's international operations have been relatively modest compared to its immense strength at home. But as stated, there is reason to expect changes. Since its main sources of income inside Russia have been reduced, it seems that ROC, if growth is the aim, will have to expand in other spheres and other countries. Russian criminal organisations have at their disposal enormous assets from their looting of Russia, and whatever plans they may have, they have no lack of means to implement them. The need to create profit in new ways may make ROC take up business it has so far steered clear of. One such business deserves special mention for the concern it has raised – trade in weapons of mass destruction . The prospects that criminal elements in the FSU might seek to make profit from ex-Soviet arsenals of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons were among the worst-case scenarios in post-Cold War threat assessments. It was feared that these weapons, or the material and expertise needed to produce them, could end up in so-called rogue states or in the hands of terrorists. So far no actual cases of smuggling or trade in such weapons have been recorded. However, during the 1990s hundreds of thefts of radioactive substances occurred at nuclear institutes and enterprises and industrial institutions across the FSU. But in most cases this was not the work of organised crime. To Russia's professional criminals such trade has not been very tempting. The profits might turn out to be big, but not big enough to compensate for all the risks, from the physical risk of handling them to the risk of being caught in an act that security services all over the world are particularly alert about. The number of criminal nuclear transactions in the West has dropped perceptibly since the mid-1990s. It seems unlikely that organised crime's calculations of risks and profits have changed substantially since then. Trade in WMD is hardly among ROC's priorities at present.

The most conceivable scenario for ROC development is further expansion into traditional mafia enterprise. The earnings from these activities pose a growing challenge to legal authorities and law-abiding financial institutions. Money-laundering mechanisms are becoming ever more sophisticated. Russia and the majority of other former communist states are largely without any procedures to spot and stop attempts at money laundering, or they lack the will to do so. The danger that criminal organisations will take over significant parts of legal business all over the world with laundered money is becoming more acute.

4.8 Drug Trade

One particular branch of criminal enterprise is likely to attract particular attention from ROC, as it has from mafias everywhere. I have asked Russian journalists, researchers and representatives of the MVD what is likely to replace or, at any rate, supplement the dwindling sources of income that ROC fed on in the 90s. They all point towards the drug trade. Russia is becoming increasingly involved in this trade in various ways. Over the last five years the number of drug addicts in Russia has increased by almost 260%. The Russian Anti-Drug

Directorate states in a 1999 report that there has been "an avalanche growth" in smuggling. International drug traffickers have made Russia a target for expansion. The number of drug-related crimes has increased sharply. Well-organised groups with international links become more and more active in smuggling. A special concern is the smuggling of heroin from Afghanistan and Pakistan through Central Asia and Azerbaijan and on to Russia and further to the big drug markets in Europe and North America. This region is well-suited for smuggling. Borders in this area are porous, central authorities are weak, and criminal structures can operate almost without interference. Afghanistan is the number one heroin producer of the world, and results of drug seizures in Russia indicate that the Central Asian states have begun to play a leading role in smuggling to Russia and Europe. The amount of opium alone smuggled from Central Asia to or via Russia increased twofold from 1998 to 1999. Russian officials fear, with good reason, that this is only the beginning. The MVD and the UN Office for Drug Control anticipate that there will be a significant increase in drug smuggling through Russia to European countries, primarily of heroin from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Drug-dealing criminals with interregional and international links will intensify their activities and create a severe threat to the security of Russian society, according to the MVD.

4.9 Organised Crime as a Rival and Counterforce to State Structures and National Policies

ROC is already well established in this region and will try to get its share of the trade. This activity may also bring constellations of co-operation and partnerships that will undermine the political stability of the states in the area. Russia along with other CIS states have given top priority to the fight against what they consider the expansion of militant Islam. There is little doubt that the activities of the region's insurgents, be they Muslim fundamentalists or not, are partly financed by drug trade. In this trade it is likely that they will have mutual interests with organised crime. The two can operate to each other's benefit. Together they will form a formidable counterforce to the policies of national authorities.

It may also turn out to be an extreme example of how ROC can work against the policy of the state's legitimate authorities. That has been a growing problem for the Russian state ever since it acquired its independence in 1991. ROC has had its own agenda. It has more means to implement it, and state authorities are less capable of countering it than what is the case in most other countries. The ultimate fear is that ROC will succeed in its attempts at infiltrating state structures to the extent that these structures can no longer be trusted to represent legitimate authorities. This scenario has already become a reality on local and regional levels of the Russian state apparatus. ROC may assume authority and prerogatives that are normally the domain of the state; it may gain access to instruments of power that should be in the hands of state authorities alone, instruments that organised crime may use for its own purposes or pass on to others. State monopoly on the use and means of power may break down. This could have fatal consequences for Russia's stability.

5 NEW AND CONTINUING FORMS OF TERRORISM

BRUCE HOFFMAN

Terrorism today reflects both enormous change and remarkable continuity. New adversaries with new motivations and new rationales have indeed appeared in recent years to challenge some of our most basic assumptions about terrorists and terrorism. Their emergence, however, has not produced the anticipated changes in either terrorist weaponry or tactics that were predicted to follow in the wake of the Aum Shinrikyo's 1995 nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway. Instead, as has been the case for more than a century, the gun and the bomb remain the terrorists' main weapons of choice. Thus, as fanatical or irrational as even this new breed of terrorists may seem, like their more traditional counterparts, they have also remained operationally conservative: adhering to the same familiar and narrow tactical repertoire that they both have mastered and equally importantly believe maximizes their likelihood of success. For this reason, future terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons for purposes of achieving either mass casualties or destruction may be far less certain than is now commonly assumed.

5.1 The New Terrorism and Its Putative Implications

In the past, terrorism was practiced by a group of individuals belonging to an identifiable organization with a clear command and control apparatus who had a defined set of political, social or economic objectives. Radical leftist organizations such as the Japanese Red Army, Germany's Red Army Faction, Italy's Red Brigades as well as ethno-nationalist terrorist movements like the Abu Nidal Organization, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the Basque separatist group, ETA (Basque Fatherland and Liberty), reflected this stereotype of the traditional terrorist group. They issued communiqués taking credit for – and explaining – their actions, and however disagreeable or distasteful their aims and motivations were, their ideology and intentions were at least comprehensible.

Most significantly, however, these familiar terrorist groups engaged in highly selective and mostly discriminate acts of violence. They bombed various “symbolic” targets representing the source of their animus (embassies, banks, national airline carriers, etc.) or kidnapped and assassinated specific persons whom they blamed for economic exploitation or political repression generally in order to attract attention to themselves and their causes.

Finally, these groups were often numerically constrained. They mostly comprised relatively small numbers of persons. Neither the Japanese Red Army nor the Red Army Faction, for example, ever numbered more than 20 to 30 hard-core members. The Red Brigades were hardly larger, with a total of fewer than 50 to 75 dedicated terrorists. Even the IRA and ETA could only call on the violent services of perhaps some 200-400 activists while the feared Abu Nidal Organization was limited to in excess of some 500 men-at-arms at any given time.

In contrast to the stereotypical terrorist group of the past, this new generation of terrorists evidence several important organizational changes which in turn have affected their operations, decision-making and targeting. Rather than the pyramidal, hierarchical organizational structures that were dominant among terrorist organizations during the 1970s and 1980s,

terrorists are now increasingly part of far more amorphous, indistinct, and broader movements. These movements also tend to operate on a linear rather than hierarchical basis. Hence, instead of the classic cellular structure that was common to previous generations of terrorist organizations, some contemporary groups are more loosely connected or indirectly linked through networks comprised of both professional (e.g., full-time terrorists) and amateurs (hangers-on, supporters, sympathizers and would-be terrorists who may lack the expertise or experience of their more established counterparts).

The absence of any existing, publicly identified central command authority is significant in that it may remove any inhibitions on the terrorists' desire to inflict widespread, indiscriminate casualties. Individual networks thus could have greater freedom and independence in tactical decisions than traditional terrorist cells given the absence of some central command structure or physical headquarters otherwise available to victim states to target in retaliation. Accordingly, this particular trend in terrorism may represent a very different and potentially far more lethal threat than that posed by more familiar, traditional, terrorist adversaries. Further, the anonymity intrinsic to this type of operation coupled with the lack of a discernible organizational structure with a distinguishable command chain behind the attackers is deliberately designed to prevent easy identification and also facilitate the perpetrators' escape and evasion.

Finally, many terrorist movements today are also seen to have less easily defined aims or identified objectives. Some are motivated by unswerving hostility towards the West in general and the United States in particular or a desire for revenge and retaliation that is frequently fuelled by compelling religious imperatives and justifications rather than abstract political ideologies. Thus, in contrast to the intelligible demands of past familiar, predominantly secular terrorist groups who mostly claimed credit for and explained their violent acts, the most heinous and lethal attacks perpetrated by terrorists over the past decade – mostly those directed against civilians – have gone unclaimed.¹⁹ By maintaining their anonymity, terrorists may believe that they are able to capitalize further on the fear and alarm intrinsically generated by their violence.

This array of changes has in turn raised serious concerns about the continued relevance of much of the conventional wisdom on terrorism – particularly as it pertains to potential future terrorist use of CBRN weapons. In the past, most analyses of the possibility of mass indiscriminate killing involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear terrorism tended to discount it. Few terrorists, it was argued, know anything about the technical intricacies of either developing or then dispersing such weapons. Political, moral, and practical

¹⁹These include, among other incidents, the series of car bombings that convulsed Bombay in 1993, killing 317 persons; the huge truck bomb that destroyed a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in 1994, killing 96; the 1995 bomb that demolished the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, leaving 168 dead; the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; and the series of bombings of apartment buildings in Dagestan and Moscow last August and September. Indeed, the 1988 inflight bombing of Pan Am 103 is an especially notorious example. Although we know – as a result of what has been described as the "most extensive criminal investigation in history" – that the two Libyan government airline employees, who are currently being tried in The Hague, were identified and accused of placing the suitcase containing the bomb that eventually found its way onto the flight, no believable claim of responsibility has ever been issued. Hence, we still don't know why the aircraft was targeted or who ordered or commissioned the attack. For a more detailed study of this issue, see Bruce Hoffman, "Why Terrorists Don't Claim Credit," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 9, no. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 1-6.

considerations were also perceived as important restraints on terrorist use of such weapons of mass destruction.

Finally and most significantly, we assured ourselves that terrorists wanted more people watching than dead. Therefore we believed that terrorists arguably had little interest and still less to gain from killing wantonly and indiscriminately. While some of these arguments perhaps were still pertinent to most secular terrorists, incidents like the 1995 nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway by an apocalyptic Japanese religious sect, the bombing of New York City's World Trade Center Islamic extremists two years before and the bombing of a government office building in Oklahoma City by an American Christian white supremacist just a month after the Tokyo incident – coupled with other attacks perpetrated by religious-inspired terrorists throughout the world during the 1990s²⁰ – appeared to have rendered these arguments dangerously anachronistic. Upon closer examination, however, this has not proven to be so – despite fears, arguments and spending to the contrary.

First, this new era of terrorism – supposedly more lethal and bloody than before – that the new terrorists were thought surely to wreck, has yet to materialize. Indeed, despite the overall rise in terrorism's lethality reported by such authoritative sources as the U.S. State Department's annual *Global Patterns of Terrorism* publications,²¹ a total of 87 Americans were killed by terrorists overseas in a total 1,372 attacks perpetrated against U.S. targets overseas. By contrast, approximately six times as many Americans (571) perished in the 1,701 attacks recorded during the 1980s.²² There is no doubt that terrorism remains a threat to Americans traveling or working abroad, and whatever the number of killed and injured overseas it is incontestably tragic that any American should lose his or her life to violence or be wantonly harmed and injured simply because of the nationality of the passport they carry, the uniform they wear, or the job that they perform. But the fact remains that, so far as international terrorism is concerned, the world was a far more dangerous place for Americans in the 1980s, when on average 16 Americans were killed per terrorist attack on a U.S. target, than during the

²⁰ These include: the series of 13 near-simultaneous car and truck bombings that shook Bombay, India, in February 1993, killing 400 persons and injuring more than 1,000 others, in reprisal for the destruction of an Islamic shrine in that country; the December 1994 hijacking of an Air France passenger jet by Islamic terrorists belonging to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the attendant foiled plot to blow up themselves, the aircraft and the 283 passengers on board precisely when the plane was over Paris, thus causing the flaming wreckage to plunge into the crowded city below; the wave of bombings unleashed in France by the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) between July and October 1995, of metro trains, outdoor markets, cafes, schools and popular tourist spots, that killed eight persons and wounded more than 180 others; the assassination in November 1995 of Israeli Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin by a religious Jewish extremist and its attendant significance as the purported first step in a campaign of mass murder designed to disrupt the peace process; the Hamas suicide bombers who turned the tide of Israel's national elections with a string of bloody attacks that killed 60 persons between February and March 1996; the Egyptian Islamic militants who carried out a brutal machine-gun and hand grenade attack on a group of Western tourists outside their Cairo hotel in April 1996, with 18 persons killed; the June 1996 truck bombing of a U.S. Air Force barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, where 19 persons perished, by religious militants opposed to the reigning al-Saud regime; and, the massacre in November 1997 of 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians by terrorists belonging to the Gamat al-Islamiya (Islamic Group) at the Temple of Queen Hatsheput in Luxor, Egypt and, the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 that killed 257 and injured some 5,000 others.

²¹ Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1997*. Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of State Publication 10535, April 1998, pp. iii & 1.

²² Statistics compiled by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. State Department. See also Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of State Publication 10687, April 2000), p. 1.

1990s, when the supposedly more lethal ‘new terrorism’ on average claimed the lives of 3 persons per anti-U.S. attack.

Nor is the situation terribly different in the U.S. itself. The FBI lists a total of 220 domestic terrorist acts as having been perpetrated between 1980 and 1989; compared to a mere 29 incidents for the period 1990 to 1998 (the last year for which published data is available from the FBI). Admittedly, 176 persons were killed by terrorists in the U.S. during the 1990s: a figure nearly seven times the 1980s total of just 26 persons. However, this tragic death toll is the result of four out of only 29 terrorist incidents: and of the four incidents, it was one especially heinous act – the Murrah building bombing – which accounts for the overwhelming majority – 95 percent – of the total.²³ Again, there is no doubt that terrorism remains a threat to the lives and well-being of Americans in our own country, but *actual* terrorist incidents (as opposed to the hundreds of CBRN hoaxes that the FBI and other law enforcement and public safety agencies now routinely respond to²⁴) remain remarkably few, and those that cause fatalities still less.

None of the above, it should be emphasized, is meant to suggest that the U.S. should become complacent about the threat of terrorism (domestic or international) or in any way relax our vigilance either at home or abroad. Terrorism poses – and is likely to continue to pose – a serious threat to Americans and American interests both in this country and overseas. Nonetheless, it is equally clear that there has been a tendency to exaggerate the dimensions of the threat and the *strategic* impact that terrorist violence has actually wrought. And by overreacting and falling prey to a sense of acute fear and intimidation, we also disproportionately inflate the terrorists’ power in ways that are both counterproductive and often completely divorced from reality.²⁵ Terrorism is fundamentally psychological warfare and the fomenting of widespread fear and intimidation is therefore ineluctably the terrorists’ intent. Accordingly, by succumbing to their threats and braggadocio, and failing to distinguish their inflated rhetoric from genuine intentions, much less actual capabilities, we risk making hard policy choices and budgetary allocations based mostly on misperception and

²³ Statistics compiled from Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, Terrorism Section, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI Analysis Of Terrorist Incidents In The United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1984), p. 10; idem., Terrorism in the United States, 1982-1992 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1993), p. 8; Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, National Security Division, Terrorism in the United States 1997 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1998), pp. 22-23; and, idem., Terrorism in the United States 1998 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2000), pp. 3 & 6.

²⁴ See Statement for the record before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 28 January 1998, <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/98archives/threats.htm>; of FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, p. 6; Statement of Robert J. Burnham, Chief, Domestic Terrorism Section before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 19 May 1999, p.1 at <http://www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/bioleg3.htm>; and, Statement for the Record of Mrs. Barbara J. Martinez, Deputy Director, National Domestic Preparedness Office before the U.S. House of Representatives Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Emergency Management, 9 June 1999, p.1 at <http://www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/counterr.htm>.

²⁵ Our preoccupation with Osama bin Laden and attendant – however inadvertent – lionization of his stature and power is arguably such a case in point. Despite his vast wealth and alleged legions of minions, it is hardly likely that bin Laden could ever hope to vanquish the U.S. military, overthrow our government or achieve any fundamental political changes in American foreign or domestic policy. Yet, this single individual arguably is held in fear and accorded a stature far in excess of his specific capabilities and unique accumulation of financial resources or even what one human being could conceivably wield over a long established nation-state, much less the globe’s sole super power.

misunderstanding rather than on hard analysis built on empirical evidence. Indeed, the incorrect lessons derived from the Aum experience in general and the 1995 nerve gas attack in particular illustrate the dangers of responding emotionally and viscerally rather than soberly and calmly to such terrorist threats.²⁶

5.2 The Misunderstood Lessons of Aum

Even if the motives of terrorists are changing in such a way that they are becoming more lethal (despite the empirical evidence to the contrary cited above), and even if this in turn may lead them to contemplate ever more bloody and heinous acts that might lead to CBRN weapons use, these trends do not necessarily imply that terrorists *currently* possess (as it is frequently portrayed) either the requisite scientific knowledge or technical capabilities to implement their violent ambitions. In this respect, as easy as some argue that it may be for terrorists to culture anthrax spores or brew up a concoction of deadly nerve gas, the effective dissemination or dispersal of these viruses and poisons still presents serious technological hurdles that greatly inhibit their effective use. Indeed, the same Japanese religious sect that is most directly responsible for precipitating our current obsession with terrorism and CBRN weapons is precisely a case in point.

The Aum Shinrikyo, it must be said, was by no means a typical terrorist group. Rather than the handful of men and women, with limited training, technical capabilities and resources that has dominated our conception of the archetypal terrorist organization, Aum was unique. It was a religious movement with upwards of fifty thousand members and offices in New York, Germany, Australia and Sri Lanka in addition to Japan and Russia. Aum had assets estimated to be in the neighborhood of \$1 billion – and at least certainly in the hundred millions. It specifically recruited graduates with scientific and engineering degrees from Japan's leading universities and provided them with state of the art laboratories and lavish budgets with which to fund the group's variegated weapons R&D programs.²⁷ Indeed, when police raided the sect's laboratories following the nerve gas attack, for example, they found enough sarin to kill an estimated 4.2 million persons.²⁸ In addition, Aum had either already produced or had plans to develop other powerful nerve agents such as VX, tabun and soman; chemical weapons such as mustard gas and sodium cyanide; and deadly biological warfare pathogens that included anthrax, the highly contagious disease known as Q-fever²⁹ – and possibly the deadly Ebola

²⁶ Among the first and most important works to analyze incisively the true implications of Aum and the 1995 nerve gas attack are: David Rapoport, "Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse," *Georgetown National Security Studies Quarterly* (Summer 1999), pp. 49-67; Ehud Sprinzak, "The Great Superterrorism Scare," *Foreign Policy*, no. 112 (Fall 1998), pp. 110-125; and, Milton Leitenberg, "Aum Shinrikyo's Efforts to Produce Biological Weapons: A Case Study in the Serial Propagation of Misinformation," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 11, no. 4 (Winter 1999), forthcoming.

²⁷ Kaplan and Marshall, *The Cult at the End of the World*, pp. 199-122. As many as 80 scientific personnel were specifically detailed to work on the group's chemical weapons programs, according to one estimate; its biological weapons research, however, never employed more than perhaps 20 persons at most (telephone interviews by RAND research staff with Professor Anthony Tu, July 21, 1999, and Milton Leitenberg, July 16, 1999).

²⁸ Richard Lloyd Parry, "Sect's poisons 'could kill 4.2m'," *The Independent on Sunday* (London), 26 March 1995; and, Andrew Pollack, "Japanese Police Say They Found Germ-War Material at Cult Site," *New York Times*, 29 March 1995.

²⁹ Reuters, "Aum Cult gas Cache," *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), 13 December 1996. See also National (Japanese) Police Agency, "Aum Shinrikyo: An Alarming Report on the Terrorist Group's Organization and Activities," *Shoten* (Tokyo), no. 252 (1195), pp. 10-12; Kaplan and Marshall, *The Cult at the End of the World*,

virus as well.³⁰ Aum's most ambitious project, however, was doubtless its efforts to develop a nuclear capability. To this end, the group had purchased a 500,000 acre sheep station in a remote part of Western Australia. There, they hoped to mine uranium that was to be shipped back to Aum's laboratories in Japan where scientists using laser enrichment technology would convert it into weapons-grade nuclear material.³¹

The group had also assembled an impressive panoply of conventional weaponry. Aum is believed to have purchased large quantities of small arms from Russian sources and to have been in the market for advanced weaponry such as tanks, jet fighters, surface-to-surface rocket launchers, and even a tactical nuclear weapon. What is known is that Aum succeeded in obtaining a surplus twin-turbine Mi-17 helicopter – complete with chemical spray dispersal devices. The group also planned – and had gone as far as to acquire sophisticated robotic manufacturing devices – to produce at least a 1,000 knock-off versions of Russia's world-famous AK-47 assault rifle along with one million bullets. Finally, the sect had determined how to manufacture TNT and the central component of plastic explosives, RDX.³²

As the above inventory of armaments and technological and engineering accomplishments suggests, Aum was no ordinary terrorist group. However, despite the cult's considerable financial wealth, the technical expertise that it could call upon from its well-educated members and the vast resources and state-of-the-art equipment at their disposal, the group could not effect even a single truly successful chemical or biological attack. On at least nine occasions the group attempted to disseminate botulinum toxin (*Clostridium botulinum*) or anthrax (*Bacillus anthracis*) using aerosol means. Each time they failed – either because the botulinum agents they grew and enriched were not toxic, or the mechanical sprayers used to disseminate the anthrax spores became clogged and hence inoperative.³³ Even the more successful sarin attack on the Tokyo subway would be laughable if not for the tragic deaths of 12 persons and the physical and psychological harm caused to many more victims. For all its sophisticated research and development, the best means the group could find to disseminate the nerve gas was in plastic trash bags that had to be poked open with sharpened umbrella tips in order to release the noxious mixture.³⁴

Finally, the group's distinct lack of success in actually wrecking the mass destruction or mass casualties ascribed to these types of weapons, despite the considerable resources at its disposal, speaks volumes about the challenges facing any lesser-endowed terrorist organization. Indeed,

pp. 10, 95-97, 121-125, 151, 211-21 & 232.

³⁰ Following an outbreak of Ebola in Zaire in 1992, Asahara and 40 followers traveled to that country ostensibly on a humanitarian aid mission. Associated Press and Agence France-Presse, "Cult 'studied deadly Ebola virus,'" *New York Times*, 25 April 1995. See also Kaplan and Marshall, *The Cult at the End of the World*, pp. 96-97.

³¹ Kaplan and Marshall, *The Cult at the End of the World*, pp. 85, 126-133; 190-192 & 208; and, Sopko, "The Changing Proliferation Threat," p. 13.

³² See Kaplan and Marshall, *The Cult at the End of the World*, pp. 76, 88, 107-112, 151, & 190-193; James K. Campbell, "Excerpts From Research Study 'Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism: Proliferation by Non-State Actors,'" *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 9, no. 2 (Summer 1997), pp. 35-37; Ron Purver, "Chemical Terrorism In Japan," (unpublished paper by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Ottawa, Canada June 1995), p. 15; and National Police Agency, *Shoten* (252), "Aum Shinrikyo: An Alarming Report on the Terrorist Group's Organization and Activities," 1995, p. 10.

³³ Two attempts were made with anthrax and seven with botulinum toxin. W. Seth Carus, *Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20th Century* (Washington, DC: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, March 1999), p. 62.

³⁴ Brackett, *Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo*, pp. 126 & 129.

neither was mass destruction achieved nor mass casualties even inflicted. New research has revealed that of the five thousand persons who received medical treatment in the aftermath of the subway attack, the vast majority (73.9 percent) were suffering from shock, emotional upset or evidenced some psychosomatic symptom.³⁵ Accordingly, even the number of persons physically injured or affected by the attack is much lower than previously reported.³⁶

In sum, upon further examination and analysis, Aum's experience suggests – however counter-intuitively or contrary to popular belief – the immense technological difficulties faced by any non-state entity in attempting to weaponize and effectively disseminate chemical and biological weapons.³⁷ It also provides striking refutation of the argument voiced with increasing frequency in recent years of the ease with which such weapons can be fabricated and made operational. Public officials, journalists and analysts, for example, have repeatedly alleged that biological attacks in particular are relatively easy for terrorists to undertake. According to one state emergency management official, biological weapons “are available – and easy to makeOne does not need a degree in microbiology to make this work, being able to read is enough It's not like enriching uranium.”³⁸ Similarly, both the White House and senior FBI officials have argued that the information needed to develop chemical and biological weapons can be readily obtained from the Internet and other open sources.³⁹ Such claims do not square with the facts, given Aum's experience and its concerted, years-long R&D activities, or indeed with subsequent research that has examined this question of ease of alleged fabrication and dissemination.⁴⁰ Indeed, in the words of the national intelligence officer responsible for non proliferation issues and thus the country's senior intelligence analyst on this issue: “while popular culture can explore the potential BW threat, actually developing and using an effective biological weapon poses certain technological challenges.”⁴¹

³⁵ Anthony G, Macintyre, M.D., et al., “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Events with Contaminated Casualties – Planning For Health Care Facilities, *JAMA (Journal of the American Medical Association)*, no. 263 (January 2000), pp. 242-249.

³⁶ Leitenberg, “The Experience of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo Group and Biological Agents,” forthcoming.

³⁷ Indeed, this same point can also be made of the formidable hurdles faced by many established states in developing their own effective weapons programs in the same areas of chemical, biological and nuclear warfare.

³⁸ Quoted in Grant Sasek, “Officials in State Warn of Biological Terrorism,” *Helena Independent Record* (http://billingsgazette.com/region.990125_reg009.html).

³⁹ See, for example, the White House, “Fact Sheet on Combating Terrorism: Presidential Decision Directive 62,” May 22, 1968, accessed at <http://cns.mii.edu/research/cbw/pdd-62.htm>, which states that, “easier access to sophisticated technology means that the destructive power available to terrorists is greater than ever. Adversaries may thus be tempted to use unconventional tools, such as weapons of mass destruction, to target our cities and disrupt the operations of our government”; Statement for the record before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 28 January 1998, <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/98archives/threats.htm>; of FBI Director Louis J. Freeh: “The ease of manufacturing or obtaining biological and chemical agents is disturbing. Available public source material makes our law enforcement mission a continuous challenge.”; and, Statement of Robert J. Burnham, Chief, Domestic Terrorism Section before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 19 May 1999. <http://www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/bioleg3.htm>: “literature containing recipes and modes of dissemination are available through ‘how to’ literature and over the Internet.”

⁴⁰ See, for example, the more detailed analysis summarized in *First Annual Report to The President and The Congress of the Advisory Panel To Assess Domestic Response Capabilities For Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction: I. Assessing the Threat*, 15 December 1999 at <http://www.rand.org/organization/nsrd/terrpanel>, pp. 20-34.

⁴¹ U.S. Congress, “Statement by Special Assistant to the DCI for Nonproliferation John A. Lauder on the Worldwide Biological Warfare Threat,” House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 3 March 1999, http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/lauder_speech_030399.html

5.3 Policy Implications Regarding Future Possible CBRN Terrorism

The above analysis is not to suggest, however, that there either is no threat of terrorist use of CBRN, or that it is one that should be dismissed or discounted. Indeed, the difficulties now facing a terrorist, who may seek to use a CBRN weapon to achieve mass effects, could of course change dramatically, because of new discoveries, further advances in technology, or other material factors. What this paper has argued is that some public pronouncements and media depictions concerning the ease with which terrorists might wreak genuine mass destruction or inflict widespread casualties, do not always reflect the significant hurdles currently confronting any non-state entity seeking to employ such weapons. In this respect, it should be stressed that a limited terrorist attack involving not a WMD per se, but an unconventional chemical, biological, or radiological weapon on a deliberately small scale – either alone or as part of a series of smaller incidents occurring either simultaneously or sequentially in a given location – could have disproportionately enormous consequences, generating unprecedented fear and alarm, and thus serving the terrorists’ purpose just as well as a larger weapon or a more ambitious attack with massive casualties could have. Hence, the issue here may not be as much a ruthless terrorist’s use of some WMD designed to achieve mass casualties, as the calculated terrorist’s use of some unconventional weapon to achieve far-reaching psychological effects in a particular target audience. To focus on weapons of truly “mass destruction” may, therefore, be missing the point and sidestepping the potential, credible threats posed by terrorists in this regard. The most salient terrorist threat involving an unconventional weapon, accordingly, will likely not involve or even attempt the destruction of an entire city (as often proclaimed by fictional thriller writers and some government officials), but the far more deliberate and delicately planned use of a chemical, biological, or radiological agent for more discrete purposes.

Yet despite the empirical evidence regarding terrorism trends and patterns of activity (both domestic and international) and the correct lessons that should be drawn from the case of Aum, the U.S. remains singularly preoccupied with the threat of mass casualty terrorism based on planning for worst case scenarios. This is largely a result of a mindset that took root in the immediate aftermath of both the 1995 Tokyo nerve gas attack and the large number of casualties inflicted at Oklahoma City, and which has fundamentally shaped our thinking and perceptions of the terrorist threat ever since.⁴² Despite the evidence to the contrary that has emerged regarding Aum and its implications for subsequent terrorist CBRN ambitions and indeed the overall pattern of terrorist activity in the five years since the 1995 subway attack, no significant reassessment, reconsideration or revision of the CBRN terrorism threat profile established during the 1995-1996 time frame has yet to be undertaken.⁴³ Thus, a critical first step in assessing the threat as it exists today and is likely to evolve in the future should be to perform a new overall, net assessment of the terrorist threat not only internationally, but domestically as well. Based on that assessment – which will address conditions, circumstances and vulnerabilities of today and not from five years ago – a determination can be made

⁴² This point is made by John Parachini in “Combating Terrorism: Assessing the Threat” Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, 20 October 1999.

⁴³ Discussion with a senior national intelligence officer responsible for this issue, Washington, D.C., 10 January 2000.

whether the worst-case scenario threat assessment approach that has dominated current domestic planning and preparedness for potential acts of CBRN terrorism, is still appropriate.⁴⁴

The current narrow policy focus on lower-probability/higher-consequence threats, which in turn posit virtually limitless vulnerabilities, does not reflect the realities of contemporary terrorist behavior and operations. “This kind of analysis,” Brian Jenkins recently warned in testimony before Congress, “can degenerate into a fact-free scaffold of anxieties and arguments – dramatic, emotionally powerful, but analytically feeble.”⁴⁵ Similarly, at the same congressional hearing, another expert, John Parachini, counseled that the “apparent over reliance on worst-case scenarios shaped primarily by vulnerability assessment rather than an assessment that factors in the technical complexities, motivations of terrorists and their patterns of behavior seems to be precisely the sort of approach we should avoid.”⁴⁶ The main weakness in such an approach is in the axiomatic assumption that any less serious incident can be addressed equally well by planning for the most catastrophic threat – ignoring the fact that the higher-probability/lower-consequence attacks⁴⁷ might present unique challenges of their own.

Finally, this approach may be the least efficacious means of setting budgetary priorities and allocating resources and indeed assuring the security of our country. This was precisely the point made by Henry L. Hinton, Jr., the Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, when he testified before Congress in March 1999. “The [most] daunting task before the nation,” he argued,

... is to assess – to the best of its ability – the emerging threat with the best available knowledge and expertise across the many disciplines involved. The United States cannot fund all the possibilities that have dire consequences. By focusing investments

⁴⁴ This same argument has been made repeatedly by Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives in (1) “Combating Terrorism: Observation on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism,” 11 March 1999; and (2) “Combating Terrorism: Observation on the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism,” 20 October 1999; as well as by John Parachini in “Combating Terrorism: Assessing the Threat” and Brian Michael Jenkins in their respective testimony before the same House subcommittee on 20 October 1999.; and the Hinton testimony “Combating Terrorism: Observation on Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives,” before the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs and Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Appropriations, GAO/T-NSIAD-99-12, General Accounting Office Washington, D.C., 16 March 1999.

⁴⁵ Jenkins, “Testimony,” 20 October 1999, p. 4.

⁴⁶ Parachini, “Combating Terrorism: Assessing the Threat,” 20 October 1999, p. 17.

⁴⁷ A higher probability/lower consequence event is considered to involve the discreet, rather than massive, use of a chemical, biological, radiological or conventional weapon; whose effects would be geographically limited in both scope and actual physical destructiveness and that would most likely be aimed at inflicting fatalities numbering in the tens or twenties rather than the thousands (even though the number of injured requiring medical treatment could number in the thousands). The use of this term is meant to differentiate from lower probability/higher consequence events whereby a larger chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon would be used with intent of causing massive damage, extending over and affecting a widespread geographical area and resulting in perhaps thousands of fatalities and tens of thousands of injuries. As the former attack is regarded as relatively easier to execute in terms of the technological knowledge and sophistication, logistical support, and organizational assets required, based on patterns of terrorist activity and behavior, this is regarded to be the more likely type of threat. This assumption, however, is not meant to exclude the possibility of lower probability/higher consequence incidents occurring, nor to ignore the need for appropriate preparedness and emergency response measures to counter the range of potential terrorist threats across a broad spectrum of assumed severity.

on worst-case possibilities, the government may be missing the more likely threats the country will face. With the right threat and risk assessment process, participants, inputs, and methodology, the nation can have greater confidence that it is investing in the right items in the right amounts. Even within the lower end of the threat spectrum – where the biological and chemical terrorist threat currently lies – the threats can still be ranked and prioritized in terms of their likelihood and severity of consequences. A sound threat and risk assessment could provide a cohesive roadmap to justify and target spending. . . .⁴⁸

Moreover, at a time when the U.S. is especially preoccupied with these “high-end” terrorist threats involving mass destruction CBRN weapons, the series of apartment building bombings that occurred in Russia and Dagestan during August and September 1999 is a salutary reminder of how terrorists can still achieve their dual aim of fear and intimidation through entirely conventional means and traditional methods: using bombs to blow things up. This fact has important implications for America’s – and indeed also other countries’ – counter-terrorism preparedness. Given the limited resources and constrained capabilities typical of most terrorists, they perhaps reflexively shun weapons and tactics that either cannot be relied upon completely or that pose such enormous complexities in terms of their employment (e.g., achieving effective dispersal or dissemination) as to border on the unappealing, if not useless. For this reason, it can be said that terrorists remain essentially content with the limited killing potential of their handguns and machine-guns and the slightly higher rates that their bombs can achieve. In other words, they seem to prefer the assurance of the modest success provided by their more conventional weapons and traditional tactics to the risk of failure inherent in more complex and complicated operations involving CBRN weapons. Indeed, of the more than 9,000 incidents recorded in *The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism* since 1968, fewer than 100 evidence *any* indication of terrorists plotting to attempt to use chemical, biological or radiological weapons or to steal, or otherwise fabricate on their own, nuclear devices – much less actually to carry out such attacks. As one critic has observed in connection with the current concern over terrorist use of biological agents: “Nasty people and the ingredients for bioterrorism were all in place over a decade ago. Why now the drumbeating?”⁴⁹ Indeed, since the beginning of the century little more than a dozen terrorist incidents in fact have occurred that resulted in the deaths of more than a 100 persons at one time: an arguably infinitesimal number given the total volume of terrorism that has occurred worldwide within past quarter century, much less one hundred years.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Hinton, “Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives,” GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, 16 March 1999, pp. 4–5.

⁴⁹ Daniel S. Greenberg. “The Bioterrorism Panic,” *Washington Post*, 16 March 1999.

⁵⁰ These include a bombing in Bessarabia in 1921; a 1925 bombing of a crowded cathedral in Sofia, Bulgaria; a largely unrecorded attempt to poison imprisoned German SS concentration camp guards shortly after World War II; the crash of a hijacked Malaysian passenger plane in 1977; the arson attack at a Teheran movie theater in 1979 that killed more than 400; the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon that killed 241; the 1985 inflight bombing of an Air India passenger jet that killed all 328 persons on board; the simultaneous explosions that rocked an ammunition dump in Islamabad, Pakistan, in 1988; the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in 1988 that killed 278 persons; the 1989 inflight bombing of a French UTA flight that killed 171; the inflight bombing, as in 1989, of a Colombian Avianca aircraft on which 107 persons perished; and the aforementioned 1993 series of bombings in Bombay, the 1995 explosion at the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, and the two American embassy bombings in East Africa in 1998. As terrorism expert Brian Jenkins noted in 1985 of the list upon which the preceding is an expanded version: “Lowering the criterion to 50 deaths produces a dozen or more additional incidents. To get even a meaningful sample, the criterion has to be lowered to 25. This in itself suggests that it is either very hard to kill large numbers of persons or very rarely tried.” See Brian M. Jenkins, *The Likelihood of*

There is another relevant paradox affecting terrorist behavior. Terrorists have long been seen as far more imitative than they are innovative. However, to date, no similar or copycat act of terrorism, which at the time was thought might likely follow in the wake of the 1995 sarin nerve gas on the Tokyo subway, has materialized. In this respect, the Tokyo incident has been the exception rather than the rule in terms of terrorist behavior. “This fact gains significance,” Brian Jenkins recently observed, “when we note that past terrorist and criminal innovations – airline hijackings, political kidnappings, malicious product tampering – were promptly imitated. And terrorist attacks involving chemical and biological agents, if they do occur, are likely to remain rare events – they will not become the truck bomb of the next decade.”⁵¹

Finally, it should be noted that as serious and potentially catastrophic as a terrorist CBRN attack might prove, it is highly unlikely that it could ever completely undermine the national security, much less threaten the survival of a nation like the U.S. or indeed most other Western countries. This point should be self-evident, but given the rhetoric and hyperbole with which the threat of CBRN terrorism is frequently couched, it requires reiteration. Even Israel, a comparatively small country in terms of population and landmass, who throughout its existence has often been isolated and surrounded by enemy states, and subjected to unrelenting terrorist attack and provocation, as the renowned French scholar Gérard Chaliand cogently points out, has never regarded terrorism as a paramount threat to its national security and longevity, worthy of profligate budgets or the diversion of disproportionate resources and attention. In addition it should be noted that even in the wake of the intense concern that followed the 1995 Tokyo nerve gas attack, the Japanese government did not fall, widespread disorder did not ensue throughout the country, nor did society collapse. There is no reason to assume that the outcome would be any different in the U.S. or in any other Western democratic state in the event of a similar terrorist attack involving a chemical or biological weapon. To take any other position risks surrendering to the fear and intimidation that is precisely the terrorists’ timeless stock and trade. There is a thin line between prudence and panic. The challenge, therefore, in responding to the threat of potential terrorist use of CBRN weapons is to craft a defense that is not only both cost effective and appropriate, but that is also sober and practical.

6 THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION ON FUTURE PATTERNS OF TERRORISM

BRYNJAR LIA

6.1 Introduction

There can be little doubt that current globalisation processes have a profound impact on our society, its economy and increasingly also its social and political structure.⁵² Globalisation has

Nuclear Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, P-7119, July 1985), p. 7.

⁵¹ Jenkins, “Testimony,” 20 October 1999, pp. 2-3.

⁵² See Brynjar Lia & Annika S Hansen, *Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism: Patterns and Prediction* (FFI-RAPPORT-2000/01704, Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, FFI, 2000) 134 pages, and Brynjar Lia & Katja Skjøelberg, *Why Terrorism Occurs: A Survey of Theories and Hypotheses on the Causes of Terrorism* (FFI-RAPPORT-2000/02769, Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, FFI, 2000) 41 pages.

most often been associated with increasing economic interdependence, but obviously it contains far more comprehensive and far-reaching processes. The argument here is that globalisation alters those societal conditions, which either encourage or discourage the occurrence of terrorism. Put simply, *globalisation has an effect of future patterns of terrorism.*

The literature on terrorism has not dealt with globalisation in any systematic manner. Most references to globalisation in the research literature point primarily to one or two factors associated with globalisation and which, it is argued, will aggravate terrorism in the future. For example, the evolution of the Internet and new communication media is said to enhance the capacity of terrorist organisations to co-ordinate operations, to recruit members, to spread hate propaganda, to communicate across borders, and to get access to lethal technology, such as recipes for weapons of mass destruction on the world wide web. Finally, the expansion of information technology to all spheres of life has provided terrorist organisations with ‘cyber weapons’, it is argued. Hundreds of articles, books and policy papers argue that terrorists may soon be capable of launching devastating attacks by attacking a country’s information infrastructure.

In addition to the cyber-terrorism scenario, globalisation is also said to have contributed to the rise of the so-called ‘new terrorism’, that is the emergence of a new brand of terrorist organisations which are organising themselves in transnational networks, are motivated by a religious imperative, prefer mass-casualty attacks, and strive towards acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Globalisation is a complex process, however, and its impact is more diverse than current research literature suggests. I shall argue that the prediction of future patterns of terrorism can be much improved if researchers focused more on long-term shifts associated with the globalisation process, and stopped relying on past patterns of terrorism only. We should look more into ‘futuristic’ studies outside the realm of terrorism studies, and we have to pay more attention to theoretical studies of *the causes of terrorism*. Theories on the conditions causing terrorism should be a key element in any predictive study and must be applied systematically.⁵³

The Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare Project (TERRA) at FFI has developed a novel approach to study future patterns of terrorism and asymmetric threats. We have developed a set of propositions or likely scenarios within five main areas: international relations, the global market economy, demographic development, ideological shifts and future technology. These scenarios are analysed in terms of their impact on the causes of terrorism, using existing theories on the societal causes of terrorism as research tools for the analysis.⁵⁴ The outcome of this analysis is a number of research based forecasts for the occurrence of terrorism. In this short paper we will briefly sketch some of the main scenarios and explore their potential impact on future patterns of terrorism. Finally, we present three main hypotheses or forecasts

⁵³ We concede that extrapolation of terrorism trends is a useful method for short-term prediction, yet it should be complemented by alternative models, which are more sensitive to long-term shifts. The current study is the first step towards creating new research strategy for analysing future long-term shifts in terrorism patterns.

⁵⁴ I.e. societal conditions under which terrorism is more likely to occur. The model is not supposed to predict fluctuations in the level of terrorism, based on individual and group level considerations. See our study Brynjar Lia & Katja Skjølberg, *Why Terrorism Occurs: A Survey of Theories and Hypotheses on the Causes of Terrorism* (FFI-RAPPORT-2000/02769, Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, FFI, 2000) 41 pages.

regarding the future of terrorism. Our conclusions are tentative and I welcome comments, criticism and opinions that you may have on this issue.

6.2 Forecasts and Predictions

6.2.1 Ideological Shifts

Our first proposition is that *the future ideological landscape will become less uniform and will change more rapidly than before*. The collapse of the bipolar world order around 1990 has had a profound effect on the ideological landscape. Without a superimposed dichotomy between the capitalist and communist world, new forms of ideologies and belief systems have proliferated more rapidly in the 1990s. We believe that radical ideologies will spread in various mutations even more widely than before, aided by the new communication media. Yet no single ideology will be able to capture an entire generation like Marxism in its Maoist version was able to. Instead, we will continue to see the mushrooming of extremist ideas and “para-ideologies,” borrowing ideas and ideological substance from a wide variety of sources, including the growing range of new religions. Processes of fragmentation and syncretism will be the rule in the landscape of extremist thinking. As a result, we will probably witness *a further decline of ideological socio-revolutionary terrorism*. In the fluid landscape of new and competing ideological undercurrents, *single issue terrorism* may rise in more dramatic forms than we have seen so far.

A second proposition is that *the number and strength of ‘counter cultures’, in particular religious movements and cults, will continue to grow. New movements will rise and spread more quickly than before*. One recent study of religion and globalisation argues that “modernity and globality do not result in the disappearance of religion”. Instead, it may be replaced by “a highly diverse ecology of religious culture”.⁵⁵ Characteristically, religious revival has been much stronger *outside* the mainstream churches than within them. One has witnessed an explosion of ‘new religions’, and it is assumed that millenarianism will continue after 2000 because few millenarian groups attach any special significance to the date 2000. Religious revival outside mainstream churches and the proliferation of new cults and religious counter-cultures suggests that *religious terrorism will be a significant factor in future forms of terrorism*. Religious terrorism tends to be more lethal, and we therefore may expect *a rise in mass casualty terrorism*.

6.2.2 The Global Market Economy

Turning to the global market economy, our third proposition is that by and large *there will be larger economic inequalities inside states* in the future. Inequality within states has been rising since the early eighties, a trend that is strengthened by differences in education, income, and access to information. The globalisation process favours highly skilled and educated individuals, while the less educated, unskilled workers tend to fall further behind in terms of income and purchasing power. Globalisation also promotes the individualisation of the labour market, with a subsequent weakening of the trade unions. *These two factors may set the stage*

⁵⁵ See for example Peter Beyer, *Religion and Globalization*, p.225.

for more ideological terrorism over the long run. Studies of European terrorism have demonstrated that ideological terrorism tends to occur more frequently in states with high levels of economic inequality and where trade unions are weak. It depends, however, on the rise of new and powerful radical socialist ideologies.

Our fourth proposition is that *many governments will face reduced legitimacy due to a loss of control over economy.* Most literature on globalisation points to the fact that the “rise in power of the financial markets, together with their increasingly international nature, has reduced the power of individual national governments.” Few observers have gone so far as to predicting the disappearance of the nation-state and the emergence of either supranational communities or a world ruled by transnational companies. There is little doubt, however, that power is increasingly being transferred to actors other than states, and transnational corporations are one of the states’ foremost challengers. A recent study argues that “TNCs have the ability to evade government attempts to control financial flows, to impose trade sanctions or to regulate production. [As a result,] the sovereignty of most governments is significantly reduced ...[and] it is beyond the powers of national governments to regulate these companies.” Is social justice possible in a truly global economy? In the worst case, the effects of the policies of powerful TNCs will provide the focus for the formation of protest movements for whom the TNCs are the ultimate symbol of turbo-capitalism and global injustice. Terrorism is usually directed against various symbols of power and authority. Given the weakening of the state and the growing size and visibility of TNCs, we may predict a future shift in focus for terrorist groups away from states and symbols of the state towards businesses and TNCs.

Our fifth proposition is related to the grey or black part of the global economy: transnational organised crime. We suggest that *the extent of this phenomenon will continue to increase in the future.* For the last three decades illegal drug trade has become the major source of income for organised crime, and it has transformed local and regional mafias into global gangs. As a result of the crackdown on illegal immigration, for example, the illegal market of human trafficking has become the domain of sophisticated organised crime groups. Global crime is “a fundamental actor in the economy and society of the Information Age.”⁵⁶ The operations of criminals and other non-legitimate groups have become more complex, spread over a wider geographical area and increased in scale, because improvements in communications have made it easier to transfer people, money, weapons and ideas on a transnational basis. As we have already heard at this seminar, Russian crime fighting organs primarily hope that they will be able to limit *the growth rate* of organised crime and prevent its expansion to new spheres, rather than bring about an actual reduction in organised crime. Research literature suggests that transnational organised crime and terrorism are closely related, and a trend towards convergence between the two has long been observed. A continued rise in transnational organised crime and economically motivated terrorism appears to be one of the darker aspects of current globalisation processes.

⁵⁶ See especially Manuel Castells, *The Information Age* Volume I-III (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996, 1997, 1998).

6.2.3 Our Technological Future

Our sixth proposition is related to technology and terrorism and is very straightforward. Most of the states in the OECD-world may be characterised as interconnected network societies dependent on information technology for communication, production and services. We believe that because of the cost-effectiveness of interconnected information systems, it seems highly unlikely that the current trend towards increased interconnectedness will be reversed. It does not necessarily follow, however, that future terrorist attacks will be directed against these information systems. The relationship between terrorism and technology is extremely complex, and there are few straight-forward theories in this field. Terrorists are generally conservative in their choice of weaponry and technology. Terrorism is more often than not a political communication strategy, a 'theatre' in which attacks are choreographed to effect maximum psychological effect on various audiences. *So far there have been no serious cyber terrorist attacks reported, satisfying a meaningful definition of the term.* The threat of cyber terrorism has hence been constructed mainly on perceived vulnerabilities, rather than on past experiences. We have documented elsewhere that *civil infrastructure has seldom been a preferred target for political terrorists*, and that those terrorist attacks which have affected civilian infrastructure primarily were meant to target people, not the infrastructure itself. In civil wars, however, insurgents and guerrilla movements have often targeted domestic civilian infrastructure. On the other hand, contagion is characteristic of terrorism patterns, that is, new tactics and methods are quickly emulated and replicated by other groups. We may therefore experience a sudden shift toward cyberterrorist strategies, if a terrorist group is successful in carrying out dramatic and spectacular cyberterrorist attack.

Our seventh proposition is also related to technology: we suggest that *the mass media will be far more diversified and interactive in the future than today.* We may expect that in the future, mass information production will become far more advanced and diversified than today. New communication solutions are developing, which can be tailored to fit individual consumers' special interests and preferences. The revolution in news and mass media production will in one way or another affect the interaction between electronic mass media and terrorism. The surge of international terrorism in the late 1960s is widely assumed to be connected to the unfolding media revolution, which for the first time in history made live reporting possible, transmitting scenes of hijacking directly from the scene to a global audience.

We may expect a potential shift from a model where producers 'push' information out to the public to one where consumers 'pull' only what they want, when they want it. Even the technology to produce 'digitalised paper' may soon be available on the market, further undermining the notion of a newspaper as a standardised and mass-produced item. One consequence of this is a growing fragmentation of the news market and subsequent lower potential for capturing the attention of a global audience through acts of violence. This shift is likely to impact on future patterns of terrorism, but one may foresee two opposite outcomes. A more diversified media may push radical groups towards more lethal and spectacular terrorism in order to capture attention in a desensitised global media audience. Or the outcome may be the opposite: terrorism as a vehicle for communication will be seen as ineffective. Various forms of netwars and cyber propaganda campaigns may replace some forms of political violence.

6.2.4 International Relations Into the Future

Our last set of propositions are more specifically related to politics and international relations. We expect a gradual development of regional power centres and a relative decline in the US global hegemony, but no return to intense bipolar military and ideological rivalry. Studies show that the character of the international system is significant in accounting for the level of international terrorism. A system characterised by strong bipolar hegemony and a high level of bipolar conflict in world politics appears to be more prone to international terrorism than a more unipolar or multipolar system, unchallenged by an ideological and militarily powerful counter-core. Very few researchers believe in a return to the bipolar Cold War world and the rise of a new superpower capable of seriously challenging the United States during the next two decades. The absence of a new bipolar confrontation will prevent international terrorism from becoming an instrument of war between two global rivals. The theory does not predict, however, that the decline in international terrorism that followed the end of the Cold War will continue. Empirical studies also strongly suggest that a number of terrorist organisations have become more transnational and less dependent upon state sponsorship. The positive effects of the end of bipolarity may therefore turn out to be short-lived.

Our ninth proposition deals with proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We believe that there will be a few more nuclear powers in the world, and biological and chemical weapons programmes will continue, primarily in the Middle East and North Korea. In the future, WMD-related information and technology will probably be more accessible, and the control of dual-use technology will prove increasingly difficult in a more global and open economy. The risk of increased proliferation stems from the increased level of education in areas like physics, chemistry and biology, and the availability of information on WMD on the Internet. A serious proliferation threat arises when a WMD-capable state collapses or is torn apart by civil war and insurgencies. Globalisation will probably contribute to the growth in the number of weak states and governments in the developing world. It is not far-fetched to predict a scenario that the central government in states which today have some WMD-capabilities, first and foremost North Korea, Libya, Syria, and Iraq, will suffer a partial or total collapse, and their coercive capabilities and weapons arsenals will end up in the hands of individuals and non-state actors, similar to the events in Albania in 1997. It is one of the great ironies that the current US- and Western-sponsored efforts to topple these 'rogue regimes' may inadvertently add to the potential for a collapsed state situation in these countries, and hence a privatisation of their deadly weapons.⁵⁷

Collapsed States have far-reaching implications for the future of terrorism. Collapsed states such as Lebanon in the 1980s and Afghanistan in the 1990s have often served as safe havens for a wide range of terrorist and insurgent movements and a major exporter of international terrorism. Our tenth proposition is that new collapsed states will be a distinct possibility, especially among those emerging from totalitarian rule and with ethnically heterogeneous populations. A traditional explanation for the emergence of collapsed states in the post Cold War world was that with the withdrawal of superpower backing in terms of military and

⁵⁷ If for example a sudden and dramatic drop in price of petroleum products, caused for example by new revolutionary energy technology, will put severe and unprecedented strains on these rogue regimes, dramatically increasing the prospects of state collapse.

economic assistance, a number of client regimes came under pressure and some succumbed. Another explanation is that globalisation itself has brought increased potential for lucrative illegal or semi-legal transnational trade, which weakens the state economically vis-à-vis sub-state actors. Thus, economic incentives add to other grievances and strengthen the centrifugal forces inside weak states. Alternatively, the state may be transformed into inherently unstable criminal state entities or warlord-dominated zones of influence. Such patterns of trade sustain the political economy of internal wars and perpetuate situations of state collapse. This is part of the expansion of what has been called ‘contraband capitalism’. Such patterns of state transformation will probably have a significant effect on the development of transnational terrorism.

Our eleventh proposition is that multilateral institutions, international treaties and regimes will play an increasingly more important role in regulating relations between states. There can be little doubt that the international system is far more multilateralist and interdependent than ever before, despite great regional differences. Recent studies have demonstrated a dramatic expansion of international regulations, treaties and conventions, compared to national legislation in most parts of the world. One example is the former free trade regime (GATT), which initially included some 20 states and has now been superseded by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), with a membership of more than 130 states. After China’s recent entry into the WTO, the organisation virtually encompasses the entire world economy. One major effect of the increased multilateralism is that it reduces the attractiveness of international terrorism as a foreign policy tool. Moreover, growing multilateral co-operation will probably also enhance law enforcement and counter-terrorism co-operation across national borders, thereby reducing both terrorist and insurgent groups’ capabilities and their room for manoeuvre. The continuation of the multilateralist trend is one of the good pieces of news.

Our last proposition is that we expect Non-Governmental Organisations to play a more important role in international politics. The word ‘transnational’ has been coined by academics in order to assert that “international relations are not limited to governments.” NGOs are usually seen as one of the new and powerful players among the new transnational actors challenging the authority of the nation-state in world politics. Over the past 15 years there has been a remarkable increase in the number and size of NGOs. According to a recent study, there are some 10,000 single country NGOs that have significant international activities, and 4,700 international non-governmental organisations. Example: In Kigali in 1994, some 175 international NGOs operated, while there were 200 in Zagreb, 200 in Mozambique, and 600 in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the autumn of 1997. The growing transnational NGO community constitutes a new and increasingly powerful mouthpiece for disaffected groups and represents a valuable channel for voicing political and economic grievances, which may otherwise have produced political violence. Hence, the growing NGO community may indeed contribute to diminishing the prospects for revolutionary terrorism. Growing access to a world-wide NGO community, sympathetic to their causes but not their means of struggle, may well encourage terrorist and insurgent groups to pursue a political track rather than armed campaigns and political violence.

6.3 Conclusion

In this paper we have discussed a number of trends which both encourage and discourage the occurrence of terrorism. What do we actually make out of all these contradictory trends? We may single out a few salient features, which are relevant for us in our discussion about terrorism as a security policy challenge in Norway. First of all, there appears to be a trend towards *more lethal forms of terrorism*, and we may witness a more rapidly shifting landscape of terrorist and extremist groups in which unknown and amorphous loosely organised groups may emerge. Secondly, we may also discern a gradual blurring of domestic and transnational terrorism. Terrorist organisations will become *more transnational* and may shift more quickly from one region to another. We may also expect a greater *privatisation of terrorism* with regard to targets and sponsorship.

On rare occasions transnational terrorism may transform into a more strategic challenge. This is particular so when weapons of mass destruction are involved. From being almost exclusively a law enforcement task, we may expect that terrorism in rare cases will be what we may term '*a low-probability high-consequence event*', and the handling of such cases may demand significant resources from the National Defence. The main lesson for Norway is that even if Norway still is a traditional low-risk country in terms of terrorist attacks, *we do need to have a capability to handle short periods of very lethal forms of transnational terrorism*. It is the responsibility of policy makers to ensure that such events can be handled properly.

7 CONCLUDING REMARKS

As a research topic, terrorism can be approached in various ways, and the seminar papers are indicative of this. They highlight some of the elements that have attracted most attention in current debates on terrorism among scholars, researchers and politicians. During the Cold War, terrorism was most often viewed within the framework of confrontation between East and West, or it was seen as a product of the struggle for independence or self-government by various nationalities and ethnic groups. The left-wing terrorism that afflicted Western Europe from the 1970s onwards, although not a direct function of East-West confrontation, could also be interpreted within the ideological framework of the Cold War.

In contrast, one of the constants in descriptions of post-Cold War terrorism has been its elusiveness – we know less about who the perpetrators are, what they want, or what means they are willing to use to get it. The perceived peculiarity and unpredictability of the new terrorism has often resulted in speculation and exaggerated threat assessments. There is little doubt that terrorism has changed. Terrorists have changed their behaviour to make use of new opportunities or to avoid new hazards. But as before, it is possible to point to political and economic conditions that are causing and shaping terrorism, and as before, terrorists can still be expected to operate within certain basic modes of human behaviour, where costs are weighed against risks. And financial, technical, operational and other constraints will continue to limit terrorists' options, no matter how irrational their aims may appear. The seminar papers serve to illustrate this and to challenge some widespread assumptions. Some very topical questions are addressed:

Must the use of force in peace operations lead to more international terrorism? The answer appears to be 'no'. Those supported military by force, like the Albanians in Kosovo, have little reason to resort to terrorism outside the area of conflict. The threat of terrorism as a way to strike back against a superior intervening force, as was expected from Yugoslavia, has turned out to be exaggerated, not only in the case of Kosovo. Potential terrorists may conclude that such terrorism would not serve their cause – public opinion in the target state(s) is perhaps more than what many analysts assume, or practical problems may be harder to overcome than expected.

How should we approach the problem of right-wing violence? Such violence has been on the rise for some time, but experience shows that the problem can be seriously reduced through the implementation of quite practicable measures well-known to sociologists, politicians and police officers.

Motives behind terrorism may be hard to grasp. But they may also be quite simple. Greed lies behind most of the terrorism and violence that has struck the new Russia. In this sense, Russia exemplifies something that has been spotted as a trend in terrorism, namely that economic motives are becoming more important for a number of terrorist groups and organisations. Much has been said and written about a convergence of terrorism and organised crime. More than anything, terrorism in Russia emerged out of the collapse of the Soviet state and the extreme opportunities that arose for profit-making. It is the tool of an exceptionally strong organised criminal community, which is the result of unbridled greed, corruption and insufficient police efforts. The same dynamics are behind terrorist activity in many parts of the world. Fighting organised crime is an important step towards curbing terrorism.

In the West, no terrorist threat scenarios have attracted more attention from politicians, analysts and ordinary citizens than attacks involving biological and chemical weapons. These scenarios tend to concentrate on what is technically possible in the way of making and using CB-weapons. But what is possible may still be extremely difficult to pull off for all but the most sophisticated and resourceful organisations, like Aum Shinrikyo. In fighting terrorism, we are better served by assessing not only theoretical possibility, but equally the relative difficulty of making and using such weapons, and the probability that terrorist organisations with the necessary capabilities actually will. The process leading up to the application of CB-weapons in terrorist actions is extremely complicated. The chances of disrupting it are multiple. Makers and executors of anti-terrorism policy should exploit these vulnerabilities by applying a multi-faceted approach and target all these weak spots simultaneously.

As is the case with CB-terrorism, there is a tendency to focus on worst-case scenarios in assessments of how the forces of globalisation will affect the occurrence and appearance of terrorism. There is little doubt that globalisation will offer terrorists new opportunities. But as the last seminar paper brings out, there are also trends that can be expected to hamper terrorism. Moreover, terrorism will continue to be shaped by the same forces that mould all societal phenomena. Although we cannot predict exactly what terrorism will be like, a systematic study of more overall trends in politics, economy and technology and the societal consequences they may have, can give good indications as to what we should prepare for. With the expansion of transnational relations, globalisation provides no assurance for small countries with no domestic insurgent groups that their history of being low-risk countries will

continue. In addition, intelligence becomes more important in an age of growing information exchange. The effect of distant conflicts will more probably have an impact, perhaps not so much through direct acts of terrorism, but more in terms of support activities for insurgent and terrorist organisations. In a more globalised world, Norway cannot rely comfortably on its splendid isolation, but will have to consider new ways of handling a rapidly changing threat environment with the necessary realism.

8 ABBREVIATIONS

BW	Biological Weapons
CB	Chemical and Biological (Weapons)
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (Weapons)
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FSU	Former Soviet Union
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corps
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
MVD	Russia's Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
R&D	Research and Development
ROC	Russian Organised Crime
TNC	Transnational Corporations
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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