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# A new beginning – the Faryab survey in post-ISAF climate (Wave 7)



Elin Marthinussen and David Nordli





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## English summary

Wave 7 of the Faryab Survey was conducted in April 2013. The questionnaire used in the survey has been developed by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) in co-operation with the Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team Maimanah (PRT Maimanah). It consists of 53 questions covering three main areas: Security, development and governance, in line with both the Norwegian and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) strategies. In total, 1389 people in Faryab between 18 and 75 years of age were interviewed.

About half of the respondents (52 %) believe things are going in the right direction in Faryab today, while 30 % say the opposite. This result does not follow the negative trend seen in earlier waves on this subject. Unemployment is clearly stated as the biggest problem in Faryab, as it has been through previous waves.

58 % reply that they are satisfied with the security situation. This result does not follow the negative trend seen in earlier waves. The Afghan National Police is considered an important security provider, and the impression of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) is still good.

The overall perception of the government is still good, and the results from wave 7 run counter to the negative trend from the past four waves. Nevertheless, the good impression is somewhat contradicted by the fact that corruption amongst the government officials is stated as a problem.

Looking at the Pashtuns especially, we see that this ethnic group is more negative to the situation than the average in Faryab. This applies to development and social services, the security situation as well as governance/authorities issues. One reason for this might be that the Pashtun villages have a poor living standard compared to Faryab overall, with 97 % of the Pashtun respondents in this wave living with poor roads and poor or no access to water and electricity (one day a week or less).

Despite the significant number of respondents in the survey, every poll suffers from limitations and biases. This is especially relevant in conflict areas, for instance because there might be limitations in the areas available for the pollers, or respondents may be afraid of expressing their real opinions.

## Sammendrag

Faryab survey wave 7 ble gjennomført i april 2013. Spørreskjemaet brukt i undersøkelsen er utviklet av Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt (FFI) i samarbeid med det norsk-ledede *Provincial Reconstruction Team Maimanah* (PRT Maimanah). Meningsmålingen består av 53 spørsmål som dekker tre hovedområder; sikkerhet, utvikling og styresett, i tråd med både den norske og den NATO-ledede *International Security Assistance Force* (ISAF) sin strategi. I alt ble 1389 personer i Faryab intervjuet. Disse var mellom 18 og 75 år.

Omtrent halvparten av respondentene (52 %) mener ting går i riktig retning i Faryab i dag, mens 30 % sier det motsatte. Dette resultatet følger ikke den negative trenden som ble sett i de tidligere målingene. Arbeidsledighet anses som det største problemet i Faryab, og det har det vært i alle de sju målingene.

58 % svarer at de er fornøyde med sikkerhetssituasjonen. Dette resultatet følger ikke den negative trenden som ble sett i tidligere målinger. Det afghanske politiet er ansett som en viktig sikkerhetsaktør, og inntrykket av de afghanske sikkerhetsstyrkene er fortsatt godt.

Det generelle inntrykket av styresmaktene er fortsatt godt, og resultatene fra wave 7 følger ikke den negative trenden fra de fire siste målingene. Likevel blir det gode inntrykket svekket av at korrupsjon blant offisielle styresmakter blir sett på som et problem.

Pashtunere er mer negative til situasjonen enn gjennomsnittet i Faryab. Dette gjelder for alle tre områder: sikkerhet, utvikling og styresett. En årsak til dette kan være at de pashtunske landsbyene har dårlig levestandard i forhold til snittet i Faryab. 97 % av de pashtunske respondentene som ble intervjuet i denne meningsmålingen, lever med dårlige veier og dårlig eller ingen tilgang til vann og elektrisitet (én dag i uken eller mindre).

Til tross for at et betydelig antall respondenter har blitt intervjuet, har alle meningsmålinger avgrensninger og usikkerhet knyttet til seg. Dette gjelder spesielt for målinger i konfliktområder, blant annet fordi enkelte områder kan være utilgjengelige og noen respondenter kan være redde for å uttrykke sine virkelige meninger.

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## Preface

As part of the project “Analysis support to military operations” (ANTILOPE), the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) has deployed operational analysts with the Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Afghanistan since December 2008. The PRT was terminated in September 2012 as part of the transition process.

PRT Maimanah has been one of 28 PRTs across Afghanistan and part of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). One of the main tasks for the analysts was to carry out comprehensive progress assessments regularly. This included both civilian and military issues. In order to embrace the Afghan society in the assessment, FFI has in cooperation with PRT Maimanah developed a survey to be held in the Faryab province.

The current report documents the main findings of the seventh wave of the survey, completed in April 2013. We have focused on the trends over time rather than the single results from wave 7. However, it is important to keep in mind the potential biases when dealing with results from surveys in conflict zones.

Wave 7 is the first of the Faryab Survey series to be conducted some time after the end of PRT Maimanah and the ISAF mission in Faryab. It is this transition which is referred to as “a new beginning” for the people of Faryab. We hope that the results of this survey will contribute to the assessment of effects of the Norwegian and international engagement in Faryab.



# 1 Introduction

Norway has been the lead nation of Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Maimanah<sup>1</sup> in the Faryab province from 2005 and until the termination late September 2012.<sup>2</sup> The PRT has been part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and was a joint military-civilian unit. The mission statement was in line with the general ISAF mission statement:

*In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan [GIROA], ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, [...], and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.*<sup>3</sup>

As part of this contribution, a strategy for the Norwegian civilian and military effort in Faryab was developed by the Norwegian Government [1]. The main goal in the strategy was to support the Afghan government in its effort to ensure stability, security and development. The strategy also emphasized *afghanisation*, meaning that the Norwegian effort, both in terms of security, development and good governance, should be based on Afghan values. The current survey reflects how observable the efforts have been to the population of Faryab, in line with the ISAF mission statement above.

## 1.1 Transition phase

Afghanistan is now well into transition – the process where security responsibility is gradually transferred from ISAF to Afghan leadership [2]. The process was agreed upon between the Afghan Government and NATO at the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, and formally began in July 2011. In order to start the transition phase in an area, four main criteria need to be satisfied. The criteria are [2]:

- Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) are capable of shouldering additional security tasks with less assistance from ISAF
- Security is at a level that allows the population to pursue routine daily activities
- Local governance is sufficiently developed so that security will not be undermined as ISAF assistance is reduced
- ISAF is postured properly to thin out as ANSF capabilities increase and threat levels diminish

The Faryab province started the transition phase in 2012, and PRT Maimanah was terminated late September 2012.

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<sup>1</sup> Maimanah is the provincial capital of Faryab.

<sup>2</sup> In June 2012, the PRT was replaced by the Transition Support Group Faryab (TSG-F), and 28 September the TSG-F withdrew from Faryab.

<sup>3</sup> See: <http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html> for reference and further details.

## 1.2 Assessments

Assessments of the current situation and the development in the Afghan society are necessary in order to analyse the value of the international effort in Afghanistan. This has been important during the transition phase in order to know if and when the four main transition-criteria are fulfilled. And it is equally important to assess the situation after the transition in order to see if the situation is sustainable.

In assessing the current situation and the development, and in line with the afghanisation approach, it is important to include the population and the view of their own situation. What does the population of Faryab think of the situation? What are the biggest challenges in the province?

The Faryab Survey is an extensive survey conducted in the province in order to better understand the population and their perception of the situation. It has been carried out twice a year since the first wave in April 2010 [3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8]. The latest wave, wave 7, was conducted in April 2013, about six months after the termination of PRT Maimanah, in order to capture people's perception of the situation in the province after the withdrawal of ISAF.

## 1.3 Outline of the report

This report consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of the Faryab Survey in general and the seventh wave in particular. This includes the sampling method. Chapter 3 gives the demographics for wave 7. This covers the age, gender and ethnicity distribution, the living standard and literacy level. Chapter 4 presents the margin of error of wave 7 and the uncertainties of the survey. The main findings of wave 7, and comparisons of the results with previous waves, are presented in Chapter 5. Province level results are also compared to the women's and Pashtuns' perceptions on the same matters. The last chapter gives the conclusions.

## 2 Faryab Survey

	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Wave 5	Wave 6	Wave 7
Field Dates	April 2010	Oct/Nov 2010	April 2011	Oct 2011	Apr/May 2012	Oct/Nov 2012	April 2013
Sample Size	1069	1182	1208	1388	1449	1433	1389

The Faryab Survey has been conducted the past three years by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR), for the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). The agency utilises civil Afghans to conduct interviews based on a questionnaire. The interviewers are approximately evenly divided male and female, with a mix of ethnicities to match the respondents. Quality controls are carried out by the central office in Kabul in order to assure that the standards are maintained.

The questionnaire employed in the survey has been developed by FFI in cooperation with the now terminated PRT Maimanah. It is an extensive survey that consists of 53 questions, in addition to batteries of supplementary questions, covering three main areas: Security, development and governance. This is in keeping with both the Norwegian and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) strategy. On average, an interview takes about 32 minutes to complete. Only minor modifications have been made to the questionnaire employed across the seven waves of surveying.

The current report covers the main findings and trends, and does not go into detail on each question in the questionnaire.

## 2.1 Wave 7

Country: **Afghanistan**

Field dates: **14–20 April 2013**

Research provider: **ACSOR-Surveys**

Study: **Faryab, wave 7**

Sample size: **1389 (1050 excl. boosters)**

Number of interviewers: **51**

Faryab Survey wave 7 was conducted in April 2013, approximately six months after the withdrawal of international forces from Faryab. It has a sample size of 1389 respondents. It is divided into a main bulk of 1050 respondents, which is representative of the entire province, and four extra samples from areas of interest, which are called boosters.

During and since the last wave in October 2013 (wave 6), a number of incidents have occurred that may affect the results of the current wave. A selection of these is:

- 28 September: International forces withdraw from Faryab, and Camp Maimanah is handed over to the Afghan National Army (ANA)
- 23 October: ANSF kill Taliban's shadow governor in Pashtun Kot, Mullah Yaar Mohammad, and 63 other insurgents [9]
- 26 October: A suicide bomb is set off outside the Eid Gah Mosque in Maimanah. 48 people are killed, and more than 60 people wounded [9]
- 30 November: One of the alleged masterminds behind the mosque bombing attack, Shokrullah, is killed in Almar district [10]
- 22 April: It is reported that as many as 800 insurgents are engaged in fighting operations against ANSF, in Qaisar and Ghormach. At least 88 insurgents, four police officers and two soldiers were killed, with on-going fighting [9]
- It has been assessed that it is likely that the number of incidents in Faryab has approximately been doubled in the beginning of 2013 compared to earlier time periods [11]

- Over the past six months, the following districts have been seen as insecure areas by NGOs, who often did not operate in them during this time period: Ghormach, Almar, Qaisar, Pashtun Kot<sup>4</sup>

The factor that probably has the single largest influence on the results of wave 7 is the withdrawal of international forces. This is the first survey in the Faryab Survey series that takes place a considerable amount of time after the withdrawal, meaning the new situation is likely to have been established as the new normal prior to this wave.

## 2.2 Interview sample

The respondents are selected using a multi-stage random stratification process that has four layers:

- Province – the interview sample is distributed based on the urban/rural characteristics in the province
- District – the sample is distributed between the province districts based on the population estimates for each district
- Settlement – a simple random selection of the known settlements in each district (neighbourhoods in the cities).<sup>5</sup> In each settlement, a predefined number of interviews will take place – normally 10
- Household – a random walk method is used to select the households in which the in-depth interviews will take place

There were two constraints in the final selection of respondents:

- The respondents had to be 18 years or older, and
- The sample should have approximately 50 % male and 50 % female respondent participation

In total, 1389 people from Faryab were interviewed in wave 7. The sample includes four boosters:

- Booster 1 (53 respondents) is a geographic area of interest. This area has been one of the focus areas for the former PRT Maimanah.
- Booster 2 (190 respondents) is based on an ethnic area of interest. It consists of Pashtun villages in five different districts in order to better cover the Pashtun perception.
- Booster 3 and 4 are intercept interviews of people from Kohistan district (48 respondents) and Ghormach district (48 respondents). These interviews had to be done in

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<sup>4</sup> The districts are not listed in any specific order. The information is provided by the Norwegian Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan; Norwegian Church Aid and Norwegian Refugee Council.

<sup>5</sup> There is no population data on settlement sizes, and therefore the sample cannot be distributed based on settlement sizes.

neighbouring districts due to security restrictions (Ghormach) and transportation restrictions (Kohistan).<sup>6</sup>

## 2.3 Analysis

The main analysis in Chapter 5 of this report uses data from the **main bulk** of interviews. The data is weighted according to the size of the different districts, in order to get a representative result. The boosters are not included as this will change the distribution and the ethnical profile, and will not give comparable results for the seven waves.<sup>7</sup> The Pashtun booster is used to compare the results for the Pashtuns with the overall results for Faryab (Section 5.6).

The boosters from Kohistan and Ghormach will not be analysed in-depth in the current report. Only the main differences to the main bulk will be presented. This is due to the small sample sizes of these two boosters. These are statistically too small to make inferences to the larger population.

The interviewer conducting the survey assesses each respondent's comprehension of the survey. This assessment has four categories, where the lowest category covers those who have difficulty understanding most of the questions, even with help from the interviewer. For past waves, these respondents have been removed from the analysis in order to minimise the margin of error caused by misunderstandings and the like. In wave 7, as with the two previous waves, no respondents needed to be removed due to poor comprehension of the questions.

## 3 Demographics

This chapter summarises the demographics for wave 7.

### 3.1 Age distribution

The respondents in the main bulk of the survey ranged between 18 and 75 years of age (Figure 3.1). Similarly to past waves, the age distribution shows peaks at the ages 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, and so on. This is partly due to the estimation of age by the interviewer, which occurs when the respondent does not know his or her own age. Their age is then largely estimated to a round number. However, this only accounts for a small proportion of the respondents. The pronounced peaks may therefore indicate that many do not know their real age and estimate it to a round number themselves.

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<sup>6</sup> Unlike standard intercept interviews done on the street where you contact, for instance, each fifth passer-by, the single selection criterion has been respondents from Kohistan/Ghormach willing to be interviewed. The actual interviews were usually done in nearby Samawars (tea-houses, restaurants) or at some secluded place in the open.

<sup>7</sup> In earlier analyses of the results from waves 1 through 4 [3, 4, 5, 6], the data for Kohistan and booster 1 were included. The current report calculates all results from waves 1 through 7 in the same way in order to provide consistency. This implies that some minor deviations may be found in some numbers when comparing the results with past reports.

The average age is 35, meaning that the respondents are generally quite mature by Afghan standards. This average has been almost identical for all waves of surveying, ranging only from 34 to 37.




Figure 3.1 Age distribution of the Faryab Survey wave 7.

### 3.2 Gender

The main bulk of the survey had 55 % male and 45 % female participation. This is identical to wave 6. ACSOR utilises female interviewers exclusively to interview female respondents.

### 3.3 Ethnicity

The ethnicity distribution of the main bulk of wave 7 is:

- 73 % Uzbek
- 12 % Tajik
- 7 % Pashtun<sup>8</sup>
- 7 % Turkmen
- 1 % Other ethnicities

Figure 3.2 shows the ethnicity distributions of the seven waves. The ethnicities in wave 7 are in line with the ethnicity distributions for waves 1 through 5. Wave 6 was an exception from this trend, in that it had 20 % Pashtun. However, this is not seen as a weakness in the current report, as the Pashtun minority opinions are still captured in the Pashtun booster (see Section 5.6)

<sup>8</sup> This is exclusive the booster in Pashtun villages. When this booster is included, there are 25 % Pashtuns.






Figure 3.2 Ethnicity distributions of the seven waves.

A population census has not been conducted in Afghanistan since 1979. Since then, millions of people have been displaced. The ethnicity profile in Afghanistan therefore relies on estimates. The ethnicity distribution of wave 7 is slightly different than the estimated ethnicity profile of Faryab [12]. For instance, it is stated in the Faryab provincial profile that 13 % of the population speak Pashto, while only 7 % in the survey consider themselves to be Pashtun. Given that the provincial profile gives the right distribution, this would indicate a slightly underrepresented Pashtun proportion in wave 7. It is known that there is a majority of Pashtuns in some of the more insecure areas. As such, it is reasonable to assume that the lower proportion of Pashtuns in the survey is due to an avoidance of such areas for security reasons.

### 3.4 Survey coverage

The interviews took place in all of Faryab’s 14 districts except the Kohistan district due to transportation issues. Figure 3.3 shows the survey coverage. We would also like to conduct interviews within the Ghormach district of Badghis province, which was transferred to the former PRT Maimanah’s area of responsibility in 2009. Unfortunately, due to security issues, this has not yet been possible. As described in Section 2.2, Kohistan and Ghormach were nonetheless covered through intercept interviews in neighbouring districts.




Figure 3.3 Survey coverage of wave 7, April 2013. In addition, intercept interviews of Ghormach (Badghis province) and Kohistan respondents were conducted in neighbouring districts due to security and transportation issues.

### 3.5 Living standard

The interviewers made an assessment of the living standard for each respondent. The standard is divided into five categories:

1. High quality road, access to water and electricity 6 to 7 days per week
2. Good road, access to water and electricity 4 to 5 days per week
3. Fair road, access to water and electricity 1 to 3 days per week
4. Poor road, access to water and electricity 1 day per week
5. Poor or no road, no or very infrequent access to water and electricity

Figure 3.4 shows that 71 % of the respondents fell into the two poorest categories. These respondents live in areas with no or poor roads, and with access to water and electricity a maximum of 1 day per week. This is a slightly improvement seen in the last year and a half. The relative sizes of categories 4 and 5 have been inverted since October 2012, with category 4 now being the major category. However, only 10 % of the respondents fell into the top two categories with good roads, and access to water and electricity 4 to 7 days per week.




Figure 3.4 Assessed living standards. The standard of roads, water and electricity accessibility is categorised into 5 categories (1 being the best; 5, the worst).

### 3.6 Literacy and education

When it comes to literacy, 25 % replied that they can read and write. This is in keeping with the average level throughout the Faryab Survey series. The average literacy rate in Afghanistan is 28 % [13]. The literacy among the respondents in Faryab corresponds to the education level (Figure 3.5): 75 % say they are illiterate, and 76 % reply that they have no schooling.




Figure 3.5 Highest level of education of the respondents.

## 4 Biases and margin of error

One of the key aspects of the Faryab Survey is the large number of respondents. The size of the sample reduces the margin of error to an acceptable level, also when looking at subsets of the total sample, below province level. On the province level, the stated sampling error is 2.6 %.<sup>9</sup> There are, nevertheless, challenges specific to polls in conflict zones that increase the margin of error [14, 15].

<sup>9</sup> 2.6 % is the stated sampling error by ACSOR. The sampling error applies if the respondents are sampled randomly. The employed random stratification process (Section 2.2) will increase the sampling error.

## 4.1 Random sampling

The randomness of the sampling is a key challenge. This is a challenge for surveys in general, but in particular for surveys in Afghanistan due to the poorly documented demography, bad infrastructure and security risks. A truly random sample is impossible to achieve in Afghanistan because there does not exist an exhaustive list of residents or households. The respondents are therefore selected using the stratification process described in Section 2.2. A number of villages per district are randomly selected proportional to the estimated population size of the districts, with some adjustments in order to have a minimum number of respondents per district. In each village, a number of respondents are selected – usually 10. Since the sample is not totally proportional to the population size in each district, relative weights are assigned to the respondents. Data from the Central Statistical Office was used to compute these weights.<sup>10</sup>

## 4.2 Accessibility

Some of the villages may be replaced due to inaccessibility. This might be due to poor security or roads. In other words, some of the most unsafe areas and underdeveloped villages (at least relative to infrastructure) will not be included in the survey (see Section 3.4). This will, to some extent, affect the questions about development and security. On the other hand, the fact that a village is assessed to be impossible to reach, or too dangerous to travel through, is in itself an indication of the development or the security situation of the province.

Only 2 of the original 154 randomly selected villages in wave 7 had to be replaced due to the villages being under Taliban control. This is marginal and will therefore not affect the results significantly. The same has been the case in the last two waves. Prior to this, between eight and twenty villages were replaced due to poor security or accessibility.

The fact that only a marginal proportion of the sampling points have been replaced indicates that the slight improvement of assessed living standards (Section 3.5) reflects a real improvement, at least perceived, rather than that more developed areas have been sampled.

## 4.3 Misunderstandings and alike

Furthermore, there are biases inherent in the survey because people may misunderstand questions or answer what they think is expected by them. They may not remember correctly or have the knowledge to answer, or they may deliberately answer wrong, or refuse to answer. There are also cultural norms that could affect the answers. For instance, Afghans may feel bound to answer according to established dependencies, be it governmental or anti-governmental institutions. We have reduced the biases by using civil Afghans who understand the Afghan culture to do the in-depth interviews, and by removing respondents who do not understand the questions (Section 2.3). Where biases remain, their effects are assumed to be constant throughout all the waves of surveying. We have therefore emphasised the trends over time rather than simply the status in Faryab in April 2013.

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<sup>10</sup> <http://cso.gov.af>

## 5 Main findings

The subsequent sections in this chapter summarise main findings from April 2013, wave 7 of the Faryab Survey.<sup>11</sup> The findings are first presented on their own showing the population's perception of the situation in Faryab half a year after the withdrawal of ISAF from the province. They are then compared to the previous six waves tracing the progress of the situation from the presence of military forces to transition and finally the withdrawal.

The findings are categorised into the general situation (Section 5.1) and the three main areas of the survey – security, development and governance (Sections 5.2 through 5.4). The main findings for Faryab are also compared to women's and Pashtuns' perception on the same matters (Sections 5.5 and 5.6).<sup>12</sup>

### 5.1 General situation

The Faryab Survey attempts to measure the population's perception of its own and Faryab's situation in general. In the survey, the respondents are asked if they think things in Faryab, in general, are going in the right or wrong direction. The result in April 2013 show that about half of the respondents, 52 %, believe things are going in the right direction in Faryab today, 30 % say things are going in the wrong direction, while 18 % say that the province is going some in the right and some in the wrong direction.

Figure 5.1 shows the result on this question throughout the seven waves. The previous results have implied a negative trend where the number of respondents saying things are going in the right direction has decreased and, at the same time, the number of respondents saying things are going in the wrong direction have increased. The results in April 2013, wave 7, do not follow this negative trend. While 52 % now say things are going in the right direction, 44 % stated the same six months earlier in October 2012 (wave 6). Thus, half a year after the withdrawal of PRT Maimanah, it seems like the population is more positive about the situation in Faryab compared to what they were during the transition phase.

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<sup>11</sup> The results are calculated as a percentage of those who have an opinion. The proportion of respondents replying *Refused* or *Do not know* is very small and does not affect the results. They are therefore removed.

<sup>12</sup> A comparison of the young respondents' perception (18-21 years old) and the main findings for Faryab has been carried out. There were not many significant differences, and so, these are not included in this report as separate analyses.




Figure 5.1 In which direction do you think things in Faryab today are going?

## 5.2 Security

The perception of security in Faryab is stated directly through a question on how satisfied the respondent is with the security situation. In April 2013, 58 % reply that they are somewhat or very satisfied with the situation. When asking about how it is today compared to a year ago, 17 % say the security situation has improved the last year, 61 % say it is the same, while 22 % express that it has become worse. This is a significant improvement from the transition phase, and runs counter to the negative trend seen in the previous waves. Figure 5.2 shows the result throughout the seven waves on this question.




Figure 5.2 How satisfied are you with the security situation?

It is interesting to note that this increase in perceived security also runs counter to a reported increase in the number of incidents (kinetic and non-kinetic events) in Faryab during the first quarter of 2013 compared to the same period in 2012 [11]. This can be explained by several different factors. Firstly, the incidents could be concentrated in one or a few areas, and will

therefore not affect the majority of Faryab. Secondly, it could indicate that the incidents are handled in a good manner, i.e. ANSF and other security providers in general are becoming increasingly capable to handle the security. And thirdly, an increase in number of incidents is not equivalent to an increase in the number of large-scale attacks. An incident covers all types of kinetic and non-kinetic events and could simply be a threat by telephone, not affecting the general population.

The results in Figure 5.2 may indicate a seasonal variation, but not with the underlying negative trend as seen earlier. The respondents are relatively more positive to the security situation in April surveys (wave 1, 3, 5 and 7), while they are more negative in October surveys (wave 2, 4 and 6). This seasonal variation might appear due to a more active fighting season during summer, i.e. prior to the October surveys, compared to during the winter.

The respondents saying things are going in the right direction in Faryab (Figure 5.1) were asked to give the main reason for why they think so. 45 % of these respondents justify this optimism by saying the security has improved or that the Taliban no longer exists in their area (Figure 5.3).




Figure 5.3 Main reasons for why things are going in the right direction. (Note: This was a single-answer question.)

In the survey, respondents are also asked what the biggest problem in their local area is. Only 6 % respond that lack of security is the biggest problem in April 2013 (see Section 5.3 and Figure 5.9). This is lower than the 14 % responding the same in October 2012, indicating again an improved security situation in the province.

### 5.2.1 Key security actors

In regard to the transition phase, the military forces of the PRT Maimanah operated as a partner to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). That means it was primarily ANSF that planned and led operations, with the PRT acting only in a supporting role. The objective of this concept was to train and guide the Afghan security forces and at the same time help them to provide

security in the Faryab province. The Faryab Survey attempts to measure the population’s perception of the key security actors in its local districts, especially when it comes to ANSF.

In April 2013, and about six months after the withdrawal of ISAF, 59 % of the respondents consider the Afghan National Police (ANP) to be the most important security provider in their districts (Figure 5.4), whereas 11 % express the same about the Afghan National Army (ANA). The reason why the ANP is considered to be the most important is probably not due to a better impression of the police compared with the army (as stated later in this section), but due to their area of responsibility: the ANP is recruited locally and continuously operates in the province as a whole, while the ANA is focusing on the problem areas. Thus, the ANA has less visibility compared to the ANP, and the security is worse in the areas where the ANA operates.

Comparing the waves, the result shows that the proportion saying the ANP provides security is fairly steady and fluctuates around 60 %. This is a positive finding, given that it is the police that should have the main responsibility for domestic security in Afghanistan. The proportion saying that the ANA provides the security has had an underlying negative trend, but has had a slight increase the last year.

33 % respond that the people themselves provide security in their area, and 21 % respond that the elders or the Shuras provide security in their area (Figure 5.4). This may be a result of cultural aspects, but it may also indicate that the national security actors are not present in these areas or that they are not seen as doing a good enough job. The latter may be supported by the fact that about 43 % of the respondents believe that the ANP is unprofessional and poorly trained (Figure 5.6, third graph).




Figure 5.4 Who provides security in your district? (Note: This is a multi-answer question, i.e. the respondent is free to answer more than one actor as the security provider.)



### The Afghan National Police

All in all, the respondents have a positive view of the Afghan police. 80 % believe that the police are leaving a good impression on the people (Figure 5.5). This is a marked increase since October 2012, and contradicts a steady negative trend. In addition, 89 % agree that the ANP is honest and fair to the population, which is consistent with the results from the past three waves (Figure 5.6). The confidence in the ANP is confirmed through another question: 87 % say they will report crimes to the police.




Figure 5.5 The impression of the Afghan National Police.

57 % of the respondents agree that the ANP has sufficient forces in their area, but 49 % of the respondents believe that the ANP cannot operate on their own and need support from international forces. Still, on the other hand, 82 % agree that the ANP helps to improve the security (Figure 5.6).



Figure 5.6 Responses on four statements related to ANP.

Even though the respondents seem to believe that the police help to improve the security and that they are honest and fair, they also believe the ANP are corrupt: 65 % respond that corruption is a problem amongst police officers in their area. This discrepancy might be due to several reasons, especially cultural factors. The expectations of the ANP might be low, the population might be uncomfortable in criticising the authorities, corruption is part of how the society functions and may not be considered a problem, and so on.

### Corruption

The question regarding corruption in the survey is based on a Western definition of corruption; payment for services the recipient is not entitled to by law. In a society like Afghanistan without a functioning tax system, collection of money by the representatives of the local authorities falls into the definition of corruption. Therefore, corruption by the Western definition may be accepted and it also may be considered a good thing, by indicating that the local authorities are eager in doing their job.

### The Afghan National Army

All in all, the respondents have a good impression of the Afghan army (Figure 5.7). 78 % believe that the army is making a good impression in the province. Concomitant with the result for the ANP, this is an increase since October 2012, and does not follow the negative trend seen in the previous waves. In addition, 88 % agree that the ANA is honest and fair to its citizenry,

which is consistent with the results the last year (Figure 5.8).<sup>13</sup>




Figure 5.7 The impression of the ANA.

46 % agree that the ANA has sufficient forces in their area. 79 % believe the army helps improve the security, but at the same time, 47 % believe that the ANA cannot operate on their own and need support from international forces.



Figure 5.8 Responses on four statements related to the ANA.

<sup>13</sup> Corruption amongst the ANA was not included in the questionnaire.

### 5.3 Development

In the survey, the respondents are asked what the biggest problem in their local area is. This is an open-ended, single-answer question, meaning the respondent is free to reply whatever he or she feels like. As illustrated in Figure 5.9, the biggest problem in the province is by far unemployment (28 %). Poverty comes up as the second biggest problem with 11 % saying this is the biggest problem. On third place, 10 % say that lack of electricity is the biggest problem in their local area.




Figure 5.9 The biggest problem in the local area.

Table 5.1 below shows the top five biggest problems in the respondents’ local area throughout all seven waves of surveying. Unemployment has consistently, and by far, been no.1 throughout all the waves, and has always stood out with a much higher proportion. The subsequent issues do not distinguish themselves as much (Figure 5.9). Still, lack of water, and poverty, have recurred within the top five biggest problems throughout all the waves.

Interestingly, lack of security (6 %) falls outside of the top five list of biggest problems, having been halved from the corresponding result in October 2012, where it for the first time was the second biggest problem. Again, this might indicate an improvement in the population’s perception of the security in the province.

	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Wave 5	Wave 6	Wave 7
N° 1	Un-employment	Un-employment	Un-employment	Un-employment	Un-employment	Un-employment	Un-employment
N° 2	Lack of electricity	Lack of water	Illiteracy	Lack of water	Lack of water	Lack of security	Poverty
N° 3	Lack of water	Poverty	Lack of water	Lack of security	Lack of electricity	Poverty	Lack of electricity
N° 4	Poverty	Illiteracy	Poverty	Poor roads	Poverty	Lack of water <sup>14</sup>	Poor roads
N° 5	Corruption	Corruption	Lack of electricity	Poverty	Illiteracy	Illiteracy	Illiteracy

Table 5.1 The five biggest problems in the local area throughout all waves of surveying.

### 5.3.1 Basic infrastructure and public services

The respondents' basic infrastructure and access to public services are assessed by both the interviewers and the respondents themselves. The interviewers specifically assess the respondents' road conditions and access to water and electricity (Section 3.5). The respondents assess how satisfied they are with the basic infrastructure and public services (Figure 5.10). The respondents are also asked if they believe the situation, with regard to these issues, have improved or not, and what they think will happen with these services in the year ahead.

The availability of jobs in general and for women in particular, is the subject which the respondents are most dissatisfied with. This is concomitant with previously stated results (Section 5.3). In April 2013, 70 % are dissatisfied with job opportunities in general, and 70 % are dissatisfied with job opportunities for women. In addition, only 13 % and 10 %, respectively, express that these conditions have improved the last year. One year ago, in April 2012 (wave 5), 78 % and 67 % replied that they were dissatisfied with job opportunities in general and for women, respectively.

<sup>14</sup> Lack of water is the sum of those who lack clean water and water for irrigation.




Figure 5.10 How satisfied are you with the...?

The topics the respondents are most satisfied with are security at schools (71 %), availability of clean water (71 %), and availability of education for children (68 %). The satisfaction with availability of education for children runs counter to the negative trend that has existed for this parameter since the first wave in April 2010. Indeed, the corresponding level of satisfaction in October 2012 was 52 %. The satisfaction with the security situation is fourth highest on the list with 58 %, up from 42 % in October 2012. This is also counter to a consistent negative trend on this parameter since the first wave in April 2010 (Section 5.2).

Overall, the proportion of dissatisfaction is still substantial, although it has decreased since past waves. This is a concern as insurgents can exploit the situation for increased recruitment and support. This is particularly a concern in relation to the great dissatisfaction of job opportunities.

Thinking about the year ahead, the respondents are significantly more optimistic now than in October 2012, and approximately equally optimistic as the respondents in April 2012. For instance, 65 % believe the availability of drinking water will improve in the year ahead, compared to 57 % in October. Also, 46 % believe that the security situation will improve in the year ahead, whilst the corresponding proportion was 29 % in October.

It is possible that the decreased optimism in October 2012 was largely explained by fear of what the situation would be without the presence of international forces, but that optimism now has improved six months later after the people of Faryab have seen that things are not progressively

worsening after the withdrawal of international forces. An alternative explanation is that optimism is subject to seasonal variation, as the equivalent result in April 2012 (wave 5) was also 46 %.<sup>15</sup>

### 5.3.2 Reconstruction

The respondents saying things are going in the right direction in Faryab (green line in Figure 5.1) were asked to give their reasons as to why they thought so. The largest proportion of these respondents has, since April 2011, replied that this was due to reconstruction, or development of the province (e.g. 25 % in wave 5; 31 % in wave 6). In wave 7, 23 % believe that it is due to reconstruction, but the largest proportion believes that this is due to improved security (32 %).

On another question, 35 % say that aid projects (to the benefit of the community) have been implemented in their area in the last year. This is approximately equivalent to the corresponding values in waves 4 and 5, and demarcates wave 6 as a clear low-point (24 %) with regards to perceived presence of aid projects. However, there is still a considerable way to go to reach the levels of waves 1 to 3, where about half the respondents said aid projects had been implemented in the last year (high-point of 63 % in wave 3, April 2011).

The respondents who knew of aid projects were asked to mention which kind of projects these were, and they were allowed to mention two projects. In total, 39 % say that these projects are bridges, while corresponding numbers for construction of wells, construction of roads, vocational projects (tailoring) and schools are 38 %, 35 %, 32 % and 28 %, respectively. These are the same type of aid projects that are mentioned in all the previous waves as well, although not always in the same order.

## 5.4 Governance

The overall perception of the government on various levels has been good throughout all seven waves. In April 2013, when asked to rate the performance of various levels of government, 72 % and 66 % expressed that the provincial government in Maimanah and the district authorities, respectively, did a somewhat or very good job. This is the highest point both these parameters have been on since April 2011, after which they have seen a consistent negative trend. Although there has always been a majority who believed that these two levels of authority performed somewhat or very well, it is positive that the negative trend has been replaced by increased optimism.

However, the apparently good impression of the provincial government is somewhat contradicted by the fact that 78 % state that corruption is a moderate to big problem amongst the provincial government officials. This is the same situation as seen when looking at the Afghan police (Section 5.2.1). Again, the Afghan definition of corruption may differ from the Western definition.

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<sup>15</sup> The question was not included before wave 5, and so there is not enough data to conclude on whether there is seasonal variation as a trend or not.

When asked who has the most influence in their local area – the government, insurgent groups or neither – 87 % reply that it is the government, and only 11 % that it is insurgent groups. Figure 5.11 below compares the results from all seven waves on this question. The results clearly run counter to an established negative trend for the government since wave 1, and government influence is at its highest since October 2010 (wave 2).




Figure 5.11 Who has the most influence in your mantaqa (local area)?

Over time, there has been a significantly negative trend when it comes to whether or not the respondents express that the provincial and district governors misuse their power. In April 2010, more than half the respondents stated that the provincial government officials never misused their power, whilst the corresponding number in October 2012 was only 22 %. In April 2013, however, the corresponding number has increased to 28 %.

When it comes to justice and the rule of law, 40 % would go to an Afghan state court if they had a dispute. 22 % would go to the local Shura/Jirga, and 29 % would not use any in the case of a dispute. This is a slight setback since 2012, and possibly signals an area in need of further attention.

### 5.5 Women

Afghanistan is considered one of the most dangerous countries for women to live in [16]. This is due to violence, lacking healthcare and poverty, amongst others. The Norwegian government states that the absence of participation of women in the society is one of the main obstacles to achieve stability and development in Afghanistan. The female perspective is therefore an integral part of the Norwegian aid to Afghanistan [17]. In order to capture the women’s perspective of the situation, the Faryab Survey includes about 50 % female respondents.

Comparing the female and male respondents, the survey show that significant fewer women can read and write compared to men. Only 18 % of the female respondents can read and write, while



31 % of the male respondents can (Figure 5.12). This is also seen when it comes to the level of education: 83 % of the women have no formal schooling, while the same applies for 69 % of the men.




Figure 5.12 Women and men answer: Can you read and write?

It is also seen in the survey that women use media less than men. This might be a consequence of the fact that fewer women read and write: Women in general read newspapers less often than men. They also listen to radio and use mobile phones less often than men do.

When it comes to women’s job and education opportunities, 70 % are dissatisfied with women’s opportunities in Faryab. Both genders are dissatisfied with the situation. The previous results have implied a positive trend on this subject (Figure 5.13). The results in April 2013 does not follow this trend. Looking a year ahead, about half of the respondents believe it will stay the same, while 28 % and 24 %, respectively, think the opportunities will become better and worse. Women are slightly more negative when looking a year ahead compared to men.




Figure 5.13 How satisfied are you with women’s job and education opportunities?

In general, the opinions of women and men in the survey are fairly similar with only minor differences. This similarity in opinions may be due to the fact that none of the women were alone with the interviewer during the interview.<sup>16</sup> Other persons present could be family members, friends or neighbours. Another reason might be that there is actually no significant difference of opinion between the genders.

One area where the opinions differ is the impression of the Afghan security forces. Women's impression of the ANA and ANP is positive. Still, they are generally slightly more negative compared to men's impression, and they agree to a larger extent that the security forces need support of foreign troops.

In addition, women are more negative when looking one year ahead. This includes most of the social services: They are more negative than men when it comes to availability of water, jobs, clinics, education for children and women, products at the market and road conditions.

## **5.6 Pashtuns**

The major ethnic groups living in Faryab are Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen and Pashtuns [12]. The Uzbeks is the biggest ethnic group and holds the most powerful positions in the province government and authorities. Due to ethnic tensions between the Uzbeks and Pashtuns, this has led to an unfair distribution of goods to the Pashtuns. The Faryab Survey includes a booster of respondents from Pashtun villages in order to better cover the Pashtun perception of the situation. This chapter compares the result from these Pashtun villages to the overall average in Faryab.

Generally, the Pashtuns are more negative to the situation compared with the average in Faryab. This applies regardless of whether the subject concerns development, security or governance issues. One of the reasons for this might be the living standard of the Pashtun respondents compared to the average in the province. Figure 5.14 shows the living standard for the Pashtuns and for Faryab as a whole in April 2013. Almost all of the Pashtun respondents in wave 7, 97 %, live with poor roads and with poor or no access to water and electricity (one day a week or less).

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<sup>16</sup> Women who speak their opinion may challenge the culture of what is acceptable in Afghanistan and may be afraid of speaking their mind freely.




Figure 5.14 Living standard comparisons between Pashtuns and Faryab (main sample).

The Pashtuns are more dissatisfied with their own situation and the development in their area than the overall population in Faryab. The Pashtuns' satisfaction with the situation is shown in Figure 5.15. (The corresponding numbers for Faryab are shown in Figure 5.12.) For most parts the Pashtuns are significantly more dissatisfied than the overall population of Faryab. The biggest differences are in the areas of electricity, water, security and education for children. This finding is not surprising given their relatively poor living standards. On the other hand, they are about as satisfied/dissatisfied as the average in Faryab.




Figure 5.15 How satisfied are the Pashtuns with the...?

The Pashtuns share the opinion with the rest of Faryab on who the most important security providers are in their area – the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the people themselves. However, the Pashtuns say to a lesser degree that the police is the security provider and to a bigger degree that it is the people themselves. Only 38 % stated that the ANP is an important security provider, and 44 % stated the people themselves. When it comes to ANP, this is a significant lower proportion compared to the last three waves where almost 80 % in October 2011, 58 % in April 2012 and 53 % in October 2012 stated that the ANP was an important security provider.

When it comes to the impression of the security forces, the Pashtuns are more negative than the average in Faryab. This applies for both the army and even more so for the police. 47 % of the Pashtuns have a good impression of the Afghan police compared to 80 % overall in Faryab. 69 % Pashtuns agree that the ANP is honest and fair to the Afghan citizens. This is a good impression of the police, although it is significantly lower than for Faryab in general where 89 % believe the same. Again, the numbers in April 2013 are more negative than in October 2012 when 63 % had a good impression of the ANP and 86 % agreed that the ANP was honest and fair.

Regarding the impression of the local governance, the Pashtuns are more negative compared to the average in Faryab. Figure 5.17 shows how the Pashtuns rate the District authorities' performance. 52 % say they believe the District authorities are doing a good job. This is 14 percentage points below the overall Faryab result. About the same is seen when it comes to the Province government.




Figure 5.17 How do you rate the performance of the District authorities?

## 5.7 Ghormach and Kohistan

The results of the booster samples from Ghormach and Kohistan will not be dealt with extensively in this report, due to two reasons. Firstly because there were only 48 respondents each from Ghormach and Kohistan. This is a very small sample size from which to draw conclusions on trends. Secondly because the responses from these two districts for most questions were not sufficiently divergent from the responses of the main bulk to warrant a separate section.

However, the responses from these areas were expected to differ from the main bulk in a few key areas – specifically security and development in Ghormach and Kohistan, respectively. The results support this hypothesis. For instance, 75 % from Ghormach are somewhat or very dissatisfied with the security situation, as opposed to 58 % of the main bulk being somewhat or very satisfied. For Kohistan, poor roads are reported to be a bigger problem than unemployment. These are both in line with the results from October 2012 (wave 6). It is also consistent with the inaccessibility of Kohistan reported by the interviewers (Section 3.4).

## 6 Conclusions

The Faryab Survey provides an insight into the population's perception of its own situation. Wave 7 is the seventh in line conducted in April 2013, about half a year after the withdrawal of the international military forces from the province. On many topics the results from April 2013 do not follow the negative trends as seen prior to the seventh wave.

About half of the respondents (52 %) believe things are going in the right direction in Faryab today, while 30 % say the opposite. This result does not follow the negative trend as seen in earlier waves on this subject, where for instance less than half of the respondents (44 %) believed things were going in the right direction in October 2012. And so, half a year after the withdrawal of PRT Maimanah, it seems like the population is more positive to the situation in Faryab compared to during the transition phase.

The survey tells how the people in Faryab stand regarding the four transition criteria (Section 1.1):

- **Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) are capable of shouldering additional security tasks with less assistance from ISAF**

The overall impression of the Afghan National Security Forces is still good. In April 2013, and about six months after the withdrawal of ISAF, 59 % of the respondents consider the Afghan National Police (ANP) to be the most important security provider in their districts. This is in line with the previous waves, where the result has fluctuated around 60 %. This is a positive finding knowing the ANP, as the main security provider, is now operating on its own.

Still, 33 % respond that the people themselves provide security in their area, and even more so in the Pashtun villages where 44 % say the same. In addition, 21 % respond that the elders or the Shuras provide security in their area. This has not changed much since October 2012, but show that ANSF is still not capable of providing security to *all* of Faryab.

- **Security is at a level that allows the population to pursue routine daily activities**

The perception of the security situation does not follow the negative trend as seen in earlier waves. In April 2013, 58 % reply that they are satisfied with the situation, as compared with less than half (42 %) in October 2012. A positive result in the spring time might be due to a seasonal variation, but it is a good result considering the withdrawal of the international forces six months prior to this wave. In addition, only 6 % consider lack of security as the biggest problem in their area. This is a positive finding knowing ISAF has withdrawn and no longer supports the security forces.

- **Local governance is sufficiently developed so that security will not be undermined as ISAF assistance is reduced**

The overall perception of the government is still good, and the results from wave 7 runs counter to the negative trend from the past four waves. 72 % express that the provincial government does a good job. And the proportion that states that insurgent groups have the most influence in their area has been halved since October 2012. In total, the results in April 2013 must be seen as good for the local government. Still, 78 % state that corruption is a problem amongst the provincial government.

When it comes to justice and the rule of law, 40 % would go to an Afghan state court if they had a dispute. 22 % would go to the local Shura/Jirga, and 29 % would not use any in the case of a dispute. This is a slight setback since October 2012, and possibly signals an area in need of further attention.

- **ISAF is postured properly to thin out as ANSF capabilities increase and threat levels diminish**

ISAF posture is not relevant after the transition.

The transition criteria aside: Unemployment is still considered the single largest problem in Faryab, continuing the consistent trend for all waves of surveying. Equally, people are dissatisfied with the job and education opportunities in the province especially for women.

Looking at the Pashtuns, this ethnic group is more negative to the situation compared to the average in Faryab. This applies consistently whether the subject is regarding development and social services, the security situation or governance/authorities issues. One reason for this might be that the Pashtun villages have much poorer living standards compared to Faryab overall, with 97 % of the Pashtun respondents in this wave living with poor roads and poor or no access to water and electricity (one day a week or less).

The results in April 2013 run counter to many negative trends seen prior to this wave. This applies to the perception on the situation in general, but especially for the security situation and governance. This is in line with other assessments of Faryab by several external actors in Afghanistan. It is still too soon to state that the trend has turned for the better. More studies are required to do so, either with in-depth analysis of the Faryab Survey together with other data sources and/or to conduct an eighth wave of the Faryab Survey to track the progress further.

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## Abbreviations

ACSOR	Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Force
ANTILOPE	Analysis support to military operations, FFI project 1229
FFI	Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
TSG-F	Transition Support Group – Faryab