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Violent Islamism in Turkey – an overview



Violent Islamism in Turkey – an Overview

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English summary

This report is a preliminary study of violent Islamism in Turkey, intended to serve as a starting point for future research. It surveys the existing literature, traces the broad historical trends, and profiles the main actors.

Militant Islamism in Turkey emerged in the 1980s, and since then a large number of attacks of different size and character have been executed by Turkish Islamists. Four organizations, known as al-Qaida, Hezbollah, IBDA-C and The Caliphate State, have had the highest level of activity during this period. These groups have different ideologies, organizational structures, and targeting preferences, but they are all Sunni Muslim, criticize the secularism of the Turkish state, and have perpetrated acts of violence. Several of the organizations have cooperated at different points in time, and a number of activists have moved between organizations.

Turkish Islamists are active on the Internet, using both regular web sites and social media, such as forums and Facebook. A chapter of the report is therefore dedicated to Turkish activity on the Internet, using examples to illustrate how different violent Islamist groups present themselves and communicate on the Internet. Finally, the report contains an extensive bibliography covering various aspects of violent Islamism in Turkey.

Sammendrag

Denne rapporten er ein førebels studie av valdeleg islamisme i Tyrkia. Målet er at rapporten kan fungere som eit startpunkt for vidare forskning.

Valdeleg islamisme vaks fram på 1980-talet i Tyrkia. Sidan då har ei lang rekke åtak av særskilte storleik og karakter blitt gjennomført av valdelege tyrkiske islamistar. Desse blir presenterte i ein kronologi i rapporten. Fire organisasjonar blir trekt fram som mest sentrale i denne perioden, her omtalte som al-Qaida, Hezbollah, IBDA-C og the Caliphate State. Desse fire har ulike ideologiske grunnlag, typiske mål og måtar å organisere seg på, men er alle sunnimuslimske, kritiske til den sekulære organiseringa av Tyrkia og står bak planlegging av og gjennomføring av valdelege åtak. Fleire av organisasjonane har samarbeida på ulike tidspunkt, og fleire medlemmer har valt å skifte organisasjonstilknytning.

Delar av aktiviteten til desse rørslene finn stad på internett, både gjennom tradisjonelle internettsider og gjennom meir sosiale media, som forum og Facebook. Eit kapittel av rapporten er via til tyrkiskspråkleg internetttaktivitet og viser døme på korleis ulike valdelege islamistgrupper presenterer seg sjølv og kommuniserer på internett. Til slutt inneheld rapporten ein bibliografi. Denne er ei liste over kjeldene som er brukte i denne rapporten, men inneheld i tillegg meir litteratur som kan vere relevant for dei som skal forske vidare på valdeleg islamisme i Tyrkia.

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Map of Turkey¹



¹ Source: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html>

1 Introduction

Unlike their Arab counterparts, Turkish jihadist networks remain understudied. In spite of growing activity by Turkish militant Islamists both domestically and abroad, the academic literature remains small and fragmented. This report is a preliminary study of violent Islamism in Turkey intended as a starting point for future research on this topic. It provides a brief overview of key actors and incidents as well as the relevant academic literature.

The report examines violent Islamism in Turkey from 1980 to 2011. It excludes non-violent Islamism as well as non-Islamist militancy. The activities of the Kurdish separatist group, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, PKK), will not be considered here.² However, the PKK and other actors are an important part of the political context and will be mentioned when appropriate. For example, the beginning of Section 4 offers a statistical comparison of the activity levels of different terrorist groups in Turkey.

The report is comprised of five parts. For context, it starts with a brief historical overview of political Islam in Turkey and of terrorism in Turkey. The next section introduces the most important actors, namely, al-Qaida, Turkish Hezbollah, The Great Eastern Islamic Raider Front (IBDA-C) and The Caliphate State. The third part offers a chronology of serious terrorist incidents perpetrated by Islamists in Turkey since 1990. The fourth section presents some of the main Turkish-language jihadist web sites. Finally, a bibliography covers the Turkish and English-language academic literature on jihadism in Turkey.

2 Sources

This study is based on open sources, mainly secondary literature, official documents and newspaper articles. Since most of the digital archives tend not to cover the 1980s and 1990s, more extensive information exists for the 2000s than for earlier periods. The *World News Connection* database containing translated newspaper articles from many countries, has been a central source of relevant articles. This database has been very useful in terms of effectively obtaining an overview of the news coverage of specific topics in different languages, translated to English. In addition, information has been gathered from different Turkish newspapers.³ Some newspaper articles of particular relevance to the study have been translated from Turkish by the author.

3 Background

Turkey has been home to a complex web of violent Islamist groups since the early 1980s (Steinberg 2009b). In 1991 the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) declared that

² The organization has also been known as KGK, KADEK and Kongra-Gel.

³ Mainly *Turkish Daily News* and *Today's Zaman*, two English-language Turkish newspapers have been the main sources in Turkish Media, but also newspapers in Turkish, such as *Milliyet*, *Cumhuriyet* and *Radikal*. The author has used search terms such as "terrorism", "al-Qaida" and "jihad" in order to find relevant articles.

ten such groups existed (Karmon 2003a: 42).⁴ Twenty years later there are many active groups, but none of those MIT mentioned are among the most important. The most active groups in the past decade have been al-Qaida, the Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front (IBDA-C), Turkish Hezbollah and the Caliphate State. Lately, al-Qaida has recruited from the member bases of both IBDA-C and Turkish Hezbollah. In addition, there are several smaller groups whose activity level and membership size remain unknown.

Since the early 1990s a number of large terrorist attacks have been planned or executed on Turkish soil. For example, in 1993, IBDA-C firebombed a hotel in Sivas during a culture festival, killing 37 people and injuring 56. One of the victims had been accused of planning to publish “Satanic Verses” by Salman Rushdie (Karmon 1997). Another prominent example is the alleged plan by the Caliphate State to crash a plane into the mausoleum of Atatürk during the 75th anniversary of the Turkish republic in 1998. According to some sources, the plot allegedly provided inspiration for Osama Bin Laden’s 9/11 attack three years later.⁵ The third and perhaps best known incident was the so-called November bombings executed by al-Qaida in Istanbul in 2003. The attack consisted of four bombs against British and Jewish targets which caused 58 fatalities.

In addition to these large-scale attacks, since the 1980s Turkey has been the scene of a considerable number of smaller, but serious, violent incidents involving Islamists. These include assassinations of intellectuals or journalists, shootouts against the police, or smaller car bombs and suicide bombs. The latest plot discovery was in July 2011, when the police revealed a planned attack against the U.S. Embassy in Ankara the same week as U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was scheduled to visit Istanbul.⁶ The incident list in Chapter 4 gives a more detailed overview of these incidents.

Turkish jihadists have also been active abroad. Several Turks went to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight, but these individuals do not seem to be of particular importance in Afghanistan nor did they recruit many followers in Turkey (Wigen 2009: 7). In 1993 Turks were represented in a group of people travelling to fight in Bosnia with the “Mujahidin Brigade” (*katibat al-mujahidin*) under commander Barbaros (Abu `Abd al-`Aziz) (Williams 2007: 158–159). In the early 2000s, Russian authorities referred to Turkey as a primary source of foreign fighters (Williams 2005b). A few Turks appear still to be fighting in Chechnya. For instance, in May 2011 an epitaph to the Turkish

⁴ These groups were the Turkish Islamic Liberation Army (IKO), the Turkish Islamic Liberation Front (TIK-C), Fighters of the Islamic Revolution (IDAM), the Turkish Islamic Liberation Union (TIKB), the World Shari`a Liberation Army (DSKO), the Universal Brotherhood Front-Shari`a Revenge Squad (EKC-SIM), the Islamic Liberation Party Front (IKP-C), Turkish Fighters Army (IMO), and the Turkish Shari`a Revenge Commandos (TSIK) (Karmon 2003: 42).

⁵ Moscow ITAR-TASS (2002), “Bin Laden reportedly planned to seize Turkey’s St. Sophia Cathedral”, 5 January. FBIS translated text; BBC News (2004), “Profile: The Caliph of Cologne”, 27 May, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1705886.stm>, (accessed 4 August 2011); BBC News (2005), “Cologne Caliph” jailed for life”, 20 June, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4113148.stm>, (accessed 4 August 2011).

⁶ Reuters (2011b), “Turkey Embassy Plot: 14 Jailed Over Alleged Al-Qaeda Plot To Attack U.S. Embassy”, 16 July, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/16/turkey-embassy-plot-14-jailed-alleged-plot_n_900587.html, (accessed 18 July 2011).

jihadist “Captain Abdullah” was published on a forum called “Martyr Calendar” (Şehadet Takvimi, a forum related to the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)), who allegedly fought for 16 years in Chechnya (Wigen 2009: 3).

In order to understand jihadism in Turkey, it is necessary to briefly sketch the political context in which it operates. This section begins with a brief introduction to Islamism in Turkey before moving on to the topic of political violence in Turkey.

3.1 Islamism in Turkey

Violent Islamists make up only a small fringe of the Islamist political landscape. The vast majority of Islamists in Turkey do not support the use of violence as a means of political change.

Political Islam in Turkey is shaped by the secularism principle, a cornerstone in both the constitution and the identity of the Turkish republic, where 99.8 percent of the population define themselves as Muslims (CIA 2011). Secularism has played this role since the Westernization reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the 1920s. In practice this has involved state control over religious matters, a ban of headscarves in universities and official work spaces, and a ban against the political use of religion. A consequence of this secularist model has been a limited space for Islamic discourse in politics. One party after another has been closed down for alleged anti-secular activities. The army has played a central role in “protecting the state from religion” and has intervened through several coups, most recently in 1980 and 1997 (Grigoriadis 2009: 1196–1197). Secularism is still a strong principle in Turkish politics, but the army has played a reduced role in policy making during the last decade after several reforms by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP). The so-called “Ergenekon case” has also affected the standing of secularism negatively. This involved secularist, ultranationalist forces, including army officers, using violence and planning to create chaos in Turkish politics in order to legitimize a coup against the AKP government.

Organized political Islam in Turkey goes back to the early 1970s. According to the Turkish scholar Birol Akgün (2002: 19–20), the first of many Islamist parties, the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, 1970–1971), was established as a reaction to the growing communist movement and economic modernization in Turkey during the 1960s. Islamist parties have been repeatedly closed down by the military for their use of religion in politics, such as the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, 1972–1980), the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, 1983–1998) and the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi (1998–2001) (Atacan 2005: 187–188). The parties have all been parts of what is referred to as the National Outlook (Milli Görüş) tradition, a movement created by adherents to the Nakşibendi order in Turkey (Atacan 2005: 188). These parties have shared a call for traditional values and anti-Americanism.

The party in government since 2002, the AKP, must be understood in this light. It is led by politicians with backgrounds from the closed Welfare Party. The AKP has refused to be called “Islamist”, and rather declared itself to be “conservative democratic”. Its political programme also contrasts former Islamist parties by not referring to the West and the East as binaries, but

rather embracing traditional “western” concepts such as human rights and democracy in their political ambitions. These concepts had earlier been deemed irrelevant for a Muslim society by the leading ideologues of the Welfare Party (Dağı 2004:140).

Table 2.1 presents the popularity of the Islamist parties among Turkish voters in elections to the Grand National Assembly between 1969 and 1999 (Akgün 2002: 20).

Year	Party Name	Percent of vote	Number of MPs
1969	Ind. Mov.	5.6	13
1973	MSP	12	48
1977	MSP	8.6	24
1987	RP	7.1	-
1991	RP-MÇP	16.9	43
1995	RP	21.4	158
1999	FP	15	111

Table 2.1 Election results of Islamist parties in Turkey, 1969–1999. (Ind. Mov. = Independents’ Movement of Erbakan, MÇP = Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi⁷).

Salafism, the Saudi-inspired puritanical and literalist current of Islamism, also has some followers in Turkey. According to Turkish terrorism expert Emrullah Uslu, there are around 5,000 Salafi Islamists in Turkey. Most of these do not support the use of violence, but some observers view them as potential sympathizers of al-Qaida. Several terrorist arrests have been made in cities with larger Salafi groups, such as Gaziantep, Konya and Istanbul (Uslu 2009b).

Growing popularity for Islamist parties in Turkey need not imply increased support for the use of violence. Opinion polls consistently show that al-Qaida enjoys minimal support among the Turkish population (Aras and Toktaş 2007: 1041).⁸

3.2 Political violence in Turkey

Political violence in Turkey is more than violent Islamism.⁹ A particularly violent period was the late 1970s, which saw more than 5,000 fatalities and earned Turkey an entry in datasets on civil war. Most of this violence was executed by extreme right-wing and extreme left-wing groups. The political instability was the backdrop of the military coup in Turkey in 1980 (Özbudun 2000: 35). According to Guido Steinberg (2009b: 2), Islamist violence began in the 1980s. He points to three key background factors: a growing Arab Islamist movement since the 1960s, the Iranian Revolution, and the Kurdish uprising which started in 1984.

⁷ The MÇP was a nationalist right-wing party in alliance with the RP in the 1991 election.

⁸ Aras and Toktaş (2007: 1042) refer to a Pew Global Attitudes Study from 2005, where “on global terrorism 24% supported the suicide bombings against the USA and its allies in Iraq. Regarding Osama bin Laden, 73% of the respondents do not have confidence he will do the right thing regarding world affairs and only 7 % have confidence in him as a world leader”. In comparison, 60% of the population in Jordan, 50% of the population in Pakistan and 26% of the population in Morocco had confidence in him as a world leader (Pew Research Center 2005).

⁹ For an introduction to Turkish terrorism in general, see Bal and Laciner (2001).

A search in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) for attacks in Turkey between 1980 and 2010 shows that violent Islamism historically accounts for only a fraction of terrorism in Turkey (see Figure 2.1).¹⁰ Among the groups in Figure 2.1, Turkish Hezbollah, IBDA-C and Al-Qaida are Islamist.

These numbers should be interpreted carefully. The data do not account for variation in the scope and seriousness of incidents. Moreover, many terrorism datasets suffer from incomplete reporting, especially from earlier time periods and non-Western countries.¹¹ A large amount of these incidents are attributed to unknown perpetrators. This illustrates that many terrorism cases remain unsolved on one hand and the limitations of the GTD database on the other hand. Readers of this report should thus bear in mind that missing information could lead to a somewhat distorted understanding of the level of terrorist violence in Turkey. However, despite such reservations, the data still give a rough sense of the activity level of the different organizations. They also illustrate that Turkey is a country with an extensive amount of violent incidents.




Figure 2.1 Terrorist attacks in Turkey, 1980–2010, by perpetrator group (GTD, 2011). Among these groups, Turkish Hezbollah, IBDA-C and Al-Qaida are Islamist.

Of 2,261 recorded incidents, the PKK was responsible for more than a thousand (1011). Al-Qaida was responsible only for six attacks in the same period, IBDA-C for 34 incidents, and Turkish Hezbollah for six incidents. The Caliphate State does not seem to be an organization represented

¹⁰ Global Terrorism Database (2011), available at <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>, (accessed 22 August 2011).

¹¹ For instance, the first day of the November 2003 bombings in Istanbul was registered as taking place on 14 November, while the correct day was 15 November. These bombings are registered under IBDA-C, and not al-Qaida. The bombs of the 20 November, on the other hand, were registered under both IBDA-C and al-Qaida, even though both attacks were presumably carried out by one and same group. See Global Terrorism Database (2011), “Incident Summary”, available at <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtid=200311140004>, (accessed 31 August 2011).

in this database. Many incidents have unknown perpetrators. The Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP/C), another important organization with a Marxist-Leninist ideology, is recorded as being responsible for 14 incidents. The Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK) is recorded as being responsible for 12 incidents and the Turkish Communist Party for 28.

Measured in number of incidents, overall terrorist activity in Turkey has decreased considerably over time. According to the GTD, only 261 incidents occurred between 2000 and 2010. Al-Qaida was responsible for six of these, IBDA-C for seven and Turkish Hezbollah for four. Among the non-Islamist groups, PKK was linked to 111 attacks, TAK to 12 and DHKP/C to seven (see Figure 2.2). Hence, although becoming relatively more prominent during the past decade, violent Islamism still only represents a small part of a broader picture of terrorism in Turkey.¹²




Figure 2.2 Terrorist attacks in Turkey, 2000–2010, by perpetrator group (GTD, 2011).

4 Actors

Several violent Islamist groups operate in Turkey. They differ in ideology, targeting patterns, activity levels and strategies. At the same time there is a certain amount of contact between them. This section briefly presents each of the four most important groups.

4.1 Al-Qaida in Turkey

Over the past decade, al-Qaida has become a well-known terrorist group in Turkey by conducting a small number of high-profile attacks, including the November 2003 Istanbul bombings, known to be the largest terrorist attack in modern Turkish history (Rodoplu *et al.* 2004). On 15 November 2003, car bombs struck two synagogues, Neve Shalom and Beth Israel, and were

¹² Global Terrorism Database, 2011.

followed five days later by attacks against the British Consulate and a British bank. The attacks killed 57 persons, and injured more than 400 (United States Department of State 2011).¹³ In comparison, the PKK, the largest non-Islamist terrorist organization in Turkey, has executed many attacks during the last decades, but each of these attacks has been of a smaller scale. On 19 October 2011 the PKK killed 26 soldiers in several ambushes, its largest attack in terms of the amount of fatalities caused since 1993, when a local PKK commander killed 37 civilians on a bus in Bingöl (Hale 2000: 200).¹⁴

Al-Qaida in Turkey appears to be more of a network of semi-independent clusters of activists than a hierarchical organization. It consists of a number of persons, organized into small cells, many of whom have been foreign fighters in Afghanistan, or maintain contacts with people who have spent time in that country for paramilitary purposes.

The report utilizes a narrow definition of al-Qaida. It regards people as belonging to the al-Qaida network only when they have been in direct or indirect contact with the core al-Qaida organization situated in Afghanistan or Pakistan after 1996.¹⁵

4.1.1 Ideology

Secular Turkey can be seen as the polar opposite of the ideology and vision of a new Caliphate expressed by al-Qaida (Brekke 2005: 105). After 9/11 2001, al-Qaida leader Osama Bin Laden referred to the abolishment of the Caliphate and the fall of the Ottoman Empire as evidence of the non-Muslim “humiliation and contempt” for the Muslim *ummah* (Aras and Toktaş 2007: 1040).¹⁶ This statement was in line with the writings of the famous jihad ideologue Abdallah Azzam (d. 1989), who stated that:

“So many people sold their country, their religion, and their people for a cheap price. For example Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who concluded an agreement with the British, allowing them to beat the four Turkish armies in Palestine, who abolished the Caliphate and fought Islam for the sake of a presidential chair. There are so many Kemalists in our nation who sold it for a piece of bread or a word of recognition or a glass or a prostitute.” (quoted in Karmon 2003b).

Present al-Qaida-leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has also criticized Turkey several times in recent years (Karmon 2003b). For instance, he condemned the Turkish government in June 2006 for its

¹³ Today's Zaman (2003a), “Turkey-Bombings”, 20 December, available at <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-4589-turkey-bombings.html>, (accessed 4 July 2011); Today's Zaman (2004), “Terror on Istanbul streets”, 13 December, available at <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-4463-terror-on-istanbul-streets.html>, (accessed 4 July 2011).

¹⁴ BBC (2011), “Kurdish rebels kill 26 Turkish soldiers in Hakkari”, 19 October, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15363865>, (accessed 15 April 2012)

¹⁵ A challenge found when applying this definition is the fact that there is not always much information about the individuals arrested for terrorist activity in Turkey. Sometimes the media writes that individuals with links to al-Qaida have been arrested. In these cases this report states that these individuals are al-Qaida members. In cases where the media writes that there are suspected links to al-Qaida, the individuals are referred to in that manner.

¹⁶ The exact phrase was “Our nation has tasted this humiliation and contempt for more than 80 years” (quoted in Aras and Toktaş 2007: 1040).

secularism and for cooperating with the United States and Israel.¹⁷ Four years later he threatened Turkey in a video. He compared the Turkish soldiers in Afghanistan with crusaders and said that they were “burning the villages, destroying the houses and killing the women and the children, occupying the lands of the Muslims, fighting the Shariah and spreading lewdness, debauchery and corruption”.¹⁸ These statements underline the ideological conflict between al-Qaida and the Turkish state.

Despite this antagonism, al-Qaida has never actually attacked the Turkish state as such. Due to lack of sources, it is difficult to say much about the ideology of Turkish al-Qaida members, but they appear not to focus on Turkey as a main target. Their former attacks point towards the United States, Israel and NATO as prioritized enemies (Cakir 2008). Al-Qaida plans to attack the Turkish Grand National Assembly have reportedly been met with internal opposition from members who did not want to target Muslims (Orhan 2005: 156).

The Turkish police have put considerable pressure on suspected al-Qaida sympathisers, as demonstrated by the large number of arrests in recent years.¹⁹ Some have argued that the Turkish government, led by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP), a party with Islamist roots, has affected the anti-terrorism work positively. The party is critical towards Israeli and U.S. policy in several areas. According to the Turkish scholar Sedat Laciner, this may have opened up legitimate channels of protest against the West, thus reducing the mobilizing potential of al-Qaida in Turkey, compared to less democratic states in the Middle East and Northern Africa (Laciner 2007). Work against violent Islamism might also be a matter of priority for the AKP government in order to create a distance between themselves and al-Qaida. The fact that the AKP is in power in a secular country, with little room for religion in politics, may have made it particularly careful to show adherence to the principle of secularism and distance itself from violent Islamists (Cline 2004: 331).

4.1.2 Activity level

Al-Qaida was not particularly visible in Turkey before 11 September 2001. In the 1990s, the organization cooperated financially with other terrorist groups in Turkey and helped smuggle people in and out of the country.²⁰ Louai al-Sakka, a Syrian citizen and prominent al-Qaida member in Turkey in the early 2000s, allegedly moved to Turkey in 1998 in order to help violent

¹⁷ Al Jazeera (2006), “Zawahiri hails Zarqawi in new video”, 23 June, available at <http://english.aljazeera.net/archive/2006/06/2008410145832816524.html>, (accessed 6 August 2011).

¹⁸ Today’s Zaman (2010a), “Al-Qaeda’s al-Zawahiri threatens Turkey”, 24 February 2010, available at http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?sessionId=647E39B641A8888A18310C9F3D49CAD0?newsId=202427, (accessed 8 August 2011).

¹⁹ For instance, in 2011, 14 were arrested in July (see Reuters 2011b), 10 were arrested in June (see The Associated Press (2011), “Turkish police detain 10 suspected al-Qaeda affiliates”, 7 June, available at http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&newsId=246491&link=246491, accessed 7 July 2011), 30 were arrested in April (see The Anatolia News Agency (2011), “Turkey-press scan on April 13”, 13 April, available at <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-240930-turkey-press-scan-on-april-13.html>, accessed 7 July 2011), and one was arrested in January (see Geo-Strategy Direct 2011).

²⁰ ABC News (2003), “Do Turkish Attacks Signal Terror Revival?”, 20 November, available at <http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=131455&page=1>, (accessed 3 August 2011).

Islamists cross the country. He has testified that in the beginning he provided medical support to Bosnia and Chechnya, but after a while he started training fighters from all over the world in Yalova, a mountainous area not far from Istanbul. Al-Sakka then came in contact with al-Qaida members and started sending jihadists to Afghanistan as well.²¹ The official 9/11 Report (2004: 174–175) also states that Abu Hoshar and Raed Hijazi recruited Turks to jihad camps in Afghanistan in the late 1990s.²² Hoshar and Hijazi were planning terrorist attacks against Western-related targets in Jordan before they were arrested in late 1999. Shortly before, Hijazi had sworn to do anything Bin Ladin ordered.

In 2001 several links between native Turks and al-Qaida were discovered. It was proclaimed that notebooks with instructions in Turkish had been found in an al-Qaida camp near Jalalabad, Afghanistan.²³ Later the same year five Turks were arrested on their way to fight alongside al-Qaida in Afghanistan.²⁴ In 2001 foreigners were also arrested by Turkish police because of links to al-Qaida (Cline 2004: 322).

Turkey's main function for al-Qaida seems to have been as a transit country for terrorists on their way to other countries, particularly after the Iraq war started in 2003 (Steinberg 2009).²⁵ It was also a country where jihadists came to remove some of their stamps from their passport before entering the United States.²⁶

In June 1999 it was reported that a group of militants had travelled from Iran to Turkey (Cline 2004: 322). In December of the same year, the first planned al-Qaida attack on Turkish soil was uncovered (Cline 2004: 322). Six individuals from Libya were arrested. They were supposedly linked to al-Qaida, and plotted an attack against the U.S. Embassy in Ankara (Cline 2004: 322).

In March 2002 three members of al-Qaida were arrested in Turkey. These individuals came to play important roles in pursuing violent Islamism in Turkey during the following years.

²¹ The exact role of al-Sakka remains unclear. Turkish police officials have stated that they suspect that he claims responsibility for more activities than those he has actually participated in. The Sunday Times (2007), "Al-Qaeda kingpin: I trained 9/11 hijackers", 25 November, available at

<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article2936761.ece>, (accessed 19 July 2011).

²² According to the 9/11 Commission Report, Abu Hoshar and Raed Hijazi recruited people in Turkey (The 9/11 Commission 2004: 175).

²³ Hürriyet (2001b), "Türkiye bağlantısı", 18 November, available at

<http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=37722>, (accessed 10 August 2011).

²⁴ To Vima 2003.

²⁵ According to a Greek newspaper, Northern Cyprus was a more fruitful location for al-Qaida in the middle of the 1990s. It was mainly used as a logistical centre. From 1992 to 1998, between \$500 and \$700 million was supposedly channeled by al-Qaida through Northern Cyprus on its way to the Balkans. The newspaper explained this by referring to President Rauf Denktaş' desire to attract money from the Arab world, which made him reduce the demands for checking the origin of the finances. To Vima (2003), "Greek Paper Considers Presence, Operations of Al-Qa`ida in Balkans", 26 November 2003, FBIS translated text.

²⁶ The Sunday Times, 2007.

All had been to training camps in Afghanistan.²⁷ They subsequently became involved in planning the Istanbul bombings in 2003. Two of them later became the leaders of al-Qaida in Turkey. Mehmet Yılmaz (also called Halid al-Turki) was the first to become leader, until he was killed in Iraq in 2007 (Cakir 2008). Then Mehmet Polat took over the leadership, until he was killed in Gaziantep in a shooting in January 2008 (Uslu 2009b).

The first al-Qaida attack plans in Turkey were revealed in April 2003, when the police discovered that 35 trained militants had entered Turkey from Iraq. At the same time Turkish police declared that Turkey was one of several countries²⁸ where al-Qaida might target “business centres, airports, humanitarian aid establishments and logistic depots”.²⁹

In 2003 the first and largest al-Qaida attack in Turkey hit Istanbul. It started with two car bombs outside two synagogues on 15 November. Five days later the British Embassy and a British bank, HSBC, were attacked by two more car bombs. In total 58 persons were killed and many hundreds were injured. Several organizations claimed responsibility for the attacks. The first of these was a murky and presumably Internet-based group called the Abu Hafs al-Masri brigades.³⁰ On 20 November a person called the Anatolia News Agency and claimed that both attacks were the result of collaboration between IBDA-C and al-Qaida.³¹ The alleged role of IBDA-C would be debated among observers, since the leader of the organization, Salih Izzet Idris, was in prison, but the links to al-Qaida were evident after the arrest and interrogations of suspects with al-Qaida backgrounds.³² Azad Ekinici, one of the participants, had earlier been questioned by Turkish police for activity in IBDA-C.³³ This supports the theory that IBDA-C and al-Qaida executed the attacks together. According to Cline (2004: 324), the most probable theory is that IBDA-C was not strong enough to stage the attack alone, but that IBDA-C members cooperated with al-Qaida.

After a while it became clear that one of the organizers of the attack, Habib Aktaş, had met Abu Hafs al Masri, a leading member of al-Qaida, in Afghanistan in 2001. Al Masri supported the attacks financially.

After the bombings, many arrests were made, reducing the size of the al-Qaida organization in Turkey for a while. Several of the plotters fled abroad. Ekinici went to Syria, before entering

²⁷ Turkish Daily News (2002), “3 al-Qaeda terrorists caught in Hakkari”, 1 March, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=3-al-qaeda-terrorists-caught-in-hakkari-2002-03-01>, (accessed 2 August 2011).

²⁸ The other countries were the United States, United Kingdom, Israel, Spain and Australia.

²⁹ The Courier Mail (2003), “Turkey issues al-Qaeda warning”, 22 April, available at <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/898179/posts>, (accessed 1 August 2011).

³⁰ Reuters (2003), “TEXT-Excerpts from alleged al Qaeda claim for Turkey blasts”, 21 November, available at <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1026300/posts>, (accessed 1 August 2011).

³¹ The Associated Press (2003f), “Turkey makes arrests in connection with suicide bombings; governments warn of more attacks”, 21 November, available at <http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=20031121&slug=webturkey21>, (accessed 6 July 2011).

³² The Associated Press, 2003f.

³³ Asia Times (2003), “Istanbul: The enemy within”, 22 November, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EK22Ak01.html, (accessed 8 August 2011).

Iraq.³⁴ Yitiz had met Aktas and Ekinici in Iran after the attack. He later testified that they had not been happy with the result of the bombings, and that Turkish and American ships on their way to Iraq would be a better target next time.³⁵ Ekinici was later identified as the planner behind a suicide attack in Iraq in 2004.³⁶

Statements from the arrested terrorists indicate that Osama bin Laden had wanted Turkish al-Qaida to attack two targets. The first was the NATO base close to Adana, Incirlik, which was an important logistical center for the Iraq war. The second was Israeli boats in Mersin. These instructions were not followed by the Turkish actors, mainly because of the high degree of security around these targets. Afterwards bin Laden expressed disappointment with the attacks, since they caused so many Turkish Muslim casualties (Williams 2005).

Members of the group led by Aktaş left for Northern Iraq to join Ansar al-Islam after their period in Afghanistan (Williams 2006). The group also had contact with Zarqawi in Iraq. An important man behind this contact was Louai al-Sakka, a Syrian who had spent much time in Turkey. He knew many individuals in the al-Qaida network, and had close ties to Zarqawi. Al-Sakka was central to the financing of the Istanbul attacks (Orhan 2010: 150).

The links to Zarqawi become clear when one looks at the fate of those who escaped Turkish prison after the Istanbul bombings. Ekinici later died in a suicide attack in Baquba, Iraq, in 2004. Both Baç and Habib Akdaş died in Fallujah, while Sadettin Akdaş and Kuş became imprisoned in Abu Graib (Orhan 2010: 150). Several entered Iran. Yusuf Polat was caught when he tried to go to Iran in December 2003.³⁷ Yitiz was caught when he tried to enter Turkey from Iran on 10 December 2003.³⁸ Aktaş went to either Georgia or Iran.³⁹ Another suspect, Hilmi Tuğluoğlu, fled to Syria.⁴⁰

In the period after these bombs, several plans were uncovered, but no attacks were carried out. One of the most extensive plots became known in 2005, when the apartment of Louai al-Sakka exploded. He had planned to fill a boat with explosives and crash into an Israeli cruise ship.⁴¹ Al-Sakka claimed to be an al-Qaida kingpin, and said during interrogation that he had been involved

³⁴ Anatolia (2004a), Istanbul Police Chief: No Evidence "Terrorist" Ekinici Died In Iraq", 29 January, FBIS Translated Text.

³⁵ Milliyet, 2003c.

³⁶ Milliyet (2004a), "Are They Those Traitors Again?", 4 August, FBIS Translated Text.

³⁷ The New York Times (2003), "Turkish Police Arrest Man in Bombing Case", 14 December, available at <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-4489-turkish-police-arrest-man-in-bombing-case.html>, (accessed 6 July 2011).

³⁸ The Associated Press, 2003d.

³⁹ Milliyet, 2003b.

⁴⁰ Anatolia (2003), "Turkey Sources: Tugluoglu Expresses Sorrow over Bombs, Links with Attacks Unveiled", 4 December, FBIS translated text.

⁴¹ CBS News (2009), "Israeli Cruise Attack Plot Exposed", 11 February, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/08/11/terror/main771152_page2.shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBody, (accessed 7 July 2011); The Washington Post (2006), "Out of the Shadows", 20 February, available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/19/AR2006021901336.html>, (accessed 22 July 2011).

in making the plans for 9/11 and 7/7.⁴² His attorney, Osman Karahan, has stated that al-Sakka helped prepare 9/11 in Bursa, a city a few hours from Istanbul.⁴³

Three years later, in 2008, a new, but very different, al-Qaida attack took place in Istanbul. Six men with backgrounds from training camps in Afghanistan started shooting outside the U.S. Consulate. There was a group of police outside the consulate, and a gun-battle between the two groups quickly erupted. Three policemen and three of the perpetrators were killed outside the building. The al-Qaida members were not able to enter the consulate.⁴⁴

The use of Turkey as a hub for transportation of al-Qaida personell appears to have decreased a little in recent years. The police arrested many alleged al-Qaida members in Turkey in the late 2000s. The alleged involvement by Turkish al-Qaida affiliates in robberies, notably of jewellery stores, in 2008–2009, has been interpreted by some observers as a sign of desperation (Uslu 2009a).

In 2009 it emerged that al-Qaida was using new recruitment methods in Eskişehir, such as real-life discussion groups (Uslu 2009b). Al-Qaida in Turkey also seems to have been recruiting individuals that were already members of another Islamist terrorist organization, such as Hezbollah and IBDA-C (U.S. Department of State 2011).

4.1.3 Organization

The background of the above-mentioned individuals can tell us a lot about the origins of Turkish jihadism. Notably, it sheds light on the fact that terrorists are radicalized as a result of both local and global influences. Al-Qaida activities in Turkey might be inspired by al-Qaida ideology, or based on knowledge from al-Qaida camps, but the details are decided at the local level. For instance, the Istanbul bombings in 2003 were based on a recommendation from bin Laden to attack Turkey, as long as they did not strike innocent Muslim Turks. Bin Laden suggested the American Incirlik NATO base as a target. The activists started planning such an attack, but changed their objective towards Jewish and British targets in Istanbul after discovering the security measures in place at Incirlik.⁴⁵ Hence, they ended up with a completely different attack than bin Laden had suggested, with many Muslim Turkish victims. It was still referred to as an “al-Qaida attack”. This illustrates that what is known as ‘al-Qaida’ in Turkey is highly decentralized.

The al-Qaida network in Turkey appears to have been organized in small cells. According to a Turkish newspaper, the attackers of the November 2003 bombings were also allegedly organized in different circles. The inner circle consisted of four members, the planners, named the *Imams*.

⁴² The Sunday Times, 2007.

⁴³ The Washington Post, 2006.

⁴⁴ BBC News (2008), “US consulate in Turkey attacked”, 9 July, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7497049.stm>, (accessed 19 July 2011).

⁴⁵ USA Today (2003), “AP: Bin Laden approved attacks in Turkey”, 17 December, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2003-12-17-bin-laden-turkey_x.htm, (accessed 3 August 2011).

The second circle consisted of ten suicide bombers. The members of both circles were divided in two teams. Azad Ekinci, from the inner circle, was the leader of the first team, whose members had earlier fought in Chechnya. Habib Aktas, also from the inner circle, led the second team, which had less experience of real conflict. The two teams met in Afghanistan in September 2001. The third circle, with 30 members, had a background in the textile industry and participated financially. Finally, a group of as many as 150 people allegedly helped with logistics.⁴⁶ The bombers had been planning the attack for two years. One of their preparation activities was watching videos from Afghanistan and Pakistan where Muslims were killed.⁴⁷

There are also groups consisting of “homegrown” jihadists, that is, individuals who have not been to Afghanistan or cannot be defined as al-Qaida members, but who are inspired by the ideology. For instance, in March 2004 two young Islamists bombed the Masonic Lodge in Istanbul. A waiter and one of the perpetrators were killed, while the other perpetrator was injured. They reportedly were inspired to execute the attack by al-Qaida (Cakir 2008).

4.1.4 Recruitment

Al-Qaida has managed to recruit Turks from almost all parts of Turkey. That said, many of the participants in the November 2003 attack were from the same city, Bingöl (Orhan 2010: 154). The city lies in the Kurdish part of Turkey, an area which has fostered many violent Islamists, particularly members of Turkish Hezbollah. From around 2000, this city saw the growth of a separate political movement with links to al-Qaida (Orhan 2010: 144).⁴⁸

The Turkish scholar Mehmet Orhan has studied the background of these al-Qaida members. Ekinci, Gökhan Elaltuntas and Uğurlu were all from Bingöl. None of the individuals mentioned came from families that shared the ideology of al-Qaida, nor had they been politically active before they radicalized. In Bingöl they started an Internet café in 2000, which became a centre for contact with jihadists elsewhere. This global networking was combined with local networking during picnics for jihadists in the Bingöl area (Orhan 2010: 146–147). The group members were secretive about their activities to the rest of the local community (Orhan 2010: 151).

The al-Qaida members have different backgrounds. Teachers, tradesmen and unemployed men have been arrested for al-Qaida activity (Cakir 2008). They also have different attitudes towards religious observance. On the one hand, Louai al-Sakka, one of the organizers behind the November 2003 bombs, surprised his interrogators in 2005, when he claimed that he did not pray and that he liked to drink wine and whisky.⁴⁹ However, other jihadists were indeed extremely concerned with following strict religious practice (Orhan 2005).

⁴⁶ Milliyet (2003b), “This is the Turkish Al-Qa`ida”, 4 December, FBIS translated text.

⁴⁷ Associated Press (2003e), “Turkey-Bombings”, 20 December, FBIS translated text.

⁴⁸ For an introduction to the background of the members of these groups, see Orhan, Mehmet (2010), “Al-Qaeda: Analysis of the Emergence, Radicalism, and Violence of a Jihadist Action Group in Turkey”, *Turkish Studies* 11 (2): 143-161.

⁴⁹ Der Spiegel (2005), “Syrian had inside knowledge of 9/11 and London Bombings”, 24 August, available at <http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,371201.00.html>, (accessed 1 September 2011).

New al-Qaida recruits often went abroad in the early 2000s, particularly to Afghanistan. The numbers of Turks in Afghan training camps are hard to verify, and it is difficult to gauge the evolution of the flow of fighters.

In 2002 the Turkish Interior Ministry declared that they knew of 14 German Turks who had been to Afghan al-Qaida camps, and that these Turks had similar names to known members of the organization called The Caliphate State.⁵⁰ In 2003 Turkish police stated that 450 Turks that had been to al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan. At this point, the Turkish police had only arrested ten of these. In addition, there were several Europeans with a Turkish background.⁵¹ The scholar Brian Glyn Williams (2011: 234), stated, after examining around 50 jihadist martyrdom videos from Afghanistan in 2007, that “it would appear that dozens of Turks, mainly from eastern Turkey, are fighting jihad and dying in Afghanistan”. In 2011 there were reportedly around 100 Turkish-speaking jihadists in the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan (The American Foreign Policy Council 2011).

Two of the key countries in the radicalization process of the bombers from November 2003 were Afghanistan and Pakistan. Several of the participants in these attacks, such as Mesut Cabuk, Azad Ekinci, Fevzi Yitiz and Feridun Uğurlu, had travelled to Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁵² Habib Aktaş went to Afghanistan in the period between 1997 and 2001, where he led a group of 20 Turkish jihadists (Williams 2006). According to Yitiz, Aktaş and Ibrahim Kuş met bin Laden in 2002.⁵³ Aktaş and Azad Ekinci both claimed to have met Ayman al-Zawahiri.⁵⁴ Yitiz received bomb training in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, in 1994. He claimed that one of the reasons that he had met with al-Qaida in Afghanistan was the organization’s offer to let him study the Quran for free.⁵⁵

Another important destination for Turkish jihadists was Chechnya. Ekinci and the rest of his group involved in the 2003 bombings had fought there. According to Williams (2008: 169), a stay in Chechnya seems to have increased the likelihood that a fighter would go on to join Turkish al-Qaida. Ekinci had also been to other countries, such as Iran, and he had learned about explosives in Pakistan (Kohlmann 2003).⁵⁶

⁵⁰ Anatolia (2002a), “Turkey: Interior Minister Yucelen on Bin Ladin-Kaplan-Hezbollah Connection”, 5 February, FBIS translated text; Hürriyet Daily News (2002), “14 Turks trained in Afghanistan”, 7 February, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=14-turks-trained-in-afghanistan-2002-02-07>, (accessed 29 November 2011).

⁵¹ Milliyet (2003c), “Wanted: 450 Al-Qa`ida Trained Turks”, 16 December 2003, FBIS translated text.

⁵² Asia Times, 2003; The Associated Press (2003d), “Bomb suspect says al-Qaida trained him”, 15 December, available at <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1041281/posts>, (accessed 3 August 2011).

⁵³ The Associated Press (2003b), “AP Exclusive: Bin Laden proposed attacks on U.S. military base in Turkey, but militants switched targets”, 18 December, FBIS translated text.

⁵⁴ Ananova (2003). “Bin Laden`s Right-Man Instructed Istanbul Bombers”, 2 December, available at <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1032672/posts>, (accessed 3 August 2011).

⁵⁵ USA Today, 2003.

⁵⁶ The Associated Press, 2003f; Ananova, 2003.

4.2 Turkish Hezbollah

4.2.1 Ideology

Turkish Hezbollah is a Sunni extremist organization which must not be confused with its Lebanese Shiite namesake. The organization was founded in 1979 in Diyarbakır in Turkey's southeastern region, and it was particularly active in the 1990s (Orhan 2010: 152; Aydınli 2000: 1). It combines religious ideology with Kurdish nationalism and aims to make Turkey an Islamic state (Ozeren and Van de Voorde 2006: 82). Huseyin Velioğlu was the leader of the violent wing of the organization between 1980 and 2000. He has stated that the strategy in this period was to be the only opposition to the government:

“There should be no other movements opposing the regime besides ours. Being the only alternative to the regime is a must in order to consolidate people's opposition to the regime in one alternative. After becoming the only alternative, the reckoning will be between the regime and this one alternative” (Çakir 2007:6).

As a result, both the government and competing opposition became enemies. In practice Hezbollah directed its attention towards competing groups. Both other Islamic groups and the PKK were treated as their main rivals (Aydıntaşbaş 2000).

Hezbollah long remained a secretive organization; for example, it did not publish many ideological documents during the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, its reluctance to attack the Turkish state itself spared it public scrutiny, and as a result, the organization was not very well-known to the public until Velioğlu, the leader, was killed in 2000 (Aras and Bacık 2002: 153; Center for Defense Information 2003).

After 2000 the organization became less secretive about its ideology, as demonstrated in a book from 2004 by an “I. Bağasi”, called *Hezbollah in its own words*. According to the *Associated Press*, intelligence reports claim that the author might be Isa Altsoy, the suspected new leader, who is based in Germany. The book refers to “imperialists and Zionists” as the principal enemy. A key declared aim is to establish an Islamic Kurdish republic in eastern Turkey.⁵⁷ However, Bağasi does not mention Hezbollah's use of violence (Çakir 2007: 15). In the 2000s Hezbollah also began publishing three magazines (*Gonulden Gonule Damlalar*, *Inzar* and *Mujde*), another indication of its new openness (Cağaptay and Uslu 2005: 2).

According to the Turkish scholar Kürşad Atalar (2006: 311, 315, 325), Hezbollah was ideologically inspired by the early- and mid-20th century Islamists Said al-Nursi, Shaikh Said and Said Havva.⁵⁸ The ideology of Hezbollah was universalistic in that it declared solidarity towards

⁵⁷ The Associated Press (2006), “Kurdish militant group “Turkish Hezbollah” issuing terror threats”, 21 December 2006.

⁵⁸ Said al-Nursi (1878–1960) was a Turkish intellectual who wrote an interpretation of the Quran. This created a movement, based on “Nurism”, working for a theocratic state (Ahmad 1991: 11). Shaikh Said (1865–1925) was the leader of a Kurdish rebellion in 1925 and a Naqshbandi sheikh. Said Havva was a central ideologue of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Said Havva's books, and in particular *The Cause of the Muslim Brotherhood* and *On Education* were important for Hezbollah's ideology.

all Muslims (Atalar 2006: 324). Nonetheless, it has defined only the “strategy of the Prophet” as the legitimate one in order to establish an Islamic state. The Hezbollah ideologues argued that the Koran contains instructions on how to do this, and that these instructions provide a three-stage bottom-up strategy. First, they will convince others, such as close friends and family. Then they can present their ideas to a larger audience, while keeping the organizational structure hidden. Finally comes the phase of jihad, where the aim is to eliminate the opposition against the Islamic state (Atalar 2006: 327).

For this reason, they argue, they cannot support Islamists organized in political parties, since party activism is an illegitimate strategy. Hezbollah has even maintained that it could use violence in the conflict against these groups (Orhan 2010: 152). Moreover, a section of Hezbollah, Menzil, also argued that it was sinful to pray in Turkish mosques, because they were controlled by the Turkish state. According to a member, this was a problem because: “Turkey is a secular state, and because its system is not based on the sovereignty of Allah” (quoted in Çakir 2007: 8).

In the 1980s Hezbollah was initially divided in two branches, which diverged in their opinion on when they should move to the phase of jihad. While Ilim (“science”) supported the use of violence, Menzil (“ranger”) argued for waiting. Menzil was more supportive towards the Iranian regime than Ilim (Aydıntaşbaş 2000). Ilim and Menzil also had different member bases. Menzil was more intellectual and its main adherents were in the cities. Ilim was more popular in the rural parts of Turkey (Çakir 2007: 8).

4.2.2 Activity level

In its early years, the organization cooperated with the PKK, and it used the latter’s training camps (Aras and Bacik 2002:150). Soon the relationship turned into rivalry, and Hezbollah was in violent conflict with the PKK from 1990 to 1995.⁵⁹ Hezbollah criticized the PKK on several grounds, such as being communist, killing Muslims and working together with Armenians (Center for Defense Information 2003). More than 500 individuals connected to the PKK, and around 200 members or sympathisers of Hezbollah, were killed in this period. The conflict ended after Ethem Barzani and Sheikh Osman from the Iraqi Kurdish Revolutionary Hizballah Party and the Kurdistan Islamic Movement in Iraq mediated between the two groups (Çakir 2007: 7).

Hezbollah also suffered internal conflict as the rivalry between Ilim and Menzil became violent in 1993, and more than 400 people were killed (Aras and Bacik 2002: 150).⁶⁰ Menzil lost several leaders and many affiliates in these fights, and in the decade that followed Ilim dominated Hezbollah (Çakir 2007: 8).

⁵⁹ Turkish Daily News (2000), “Hezbollah: The Susurluk of the Southeast”, 26 January, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=Hezbollah-the-susurluk-of-the-southeast-2000-01-26>, (accessed 7 July 2011).

⁶⁰ Turkish Daily News (1997), “The “Butcher of the South East,” Hezbollah, now threatens western Turkish cities”, 6 February, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=the-quotbutcher-of-the-south-eastquot-Hezbollah-now-threatens-western-turkish-cities-1997-02-06>, (accessed 1 August 2011); Turkish Daily News, 2000.

Besides the internal conflict and the rivalry with PKK, one of the main targets of Hezbollah has been religious leaders with theological views other than those of Hezbollah itself. Hence, between 1990 and 1993, the organization killed 22 imams (Aras and Bacik 2002: 151–152). Members of the organization also killed people for not paying zakat (Islamic tax) or for belonging to the wrong Islamic groups.⁶¹

The group also engaged in kidnapping for ransom. In order to raise funds, they kidnapped more than 200 businessmen in the last 6 months of 1999 (Center for Defense Information 2003). According to Aslı Aydıntaşbaş (2000), five arrested Hezbollah members were linked to the bomb attack in 1999 that killed Professor Mehmet Ahmet Taner Kışlalı.⁶²

Turkish police increased its activity against Hezbollah from 1998 (see Table 3.1), after discovering that Iran was organizing peace talks between the organization and the PKK. The same year 79 alleged members of the organization were arrested (Aydinli 2000: 1). After Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader, was imprisoned in 1999, the PKK was weakened, and the Turkish police changed its priorities, concentrating more on Hezbollah. Turkish security forces managed to infiltrate the organization. The leader, Huseyin Velioglu, was killed by Turkish police in 2000. Afterwards a large number of corpses were found in the area surrounding his and other safe houses (Williams 2005). More than 60 corpses were found in total (Aydıntaşbaş 2000). The police also found videos documenting the torture of these and other victims (Aras and Bacik 2002: 148).

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Incidents involving Hezbollah	9	214	387	418	67	96	31	23	50
Police operations against Hezbollah	0	80	156	475	483	356	524	900	1527

*Table 3.1 Activity level of Turkish Hezbollah and police operations against the organization, 1991–1999.*⁶³

Hundreds of activists fled to Iran in the period following the killing of Velioglu in 2000. Others went to Europe, Syria and northern Iraq. Several have claimed that the organization had a base of 20,000 affiliates (Çağaptay and Uslu 2005; Center for Defense Information 2003). More than 6,000 people have been arrested on suspicion of aiding Hezbollah.⁶⁴ The popularity of the organization was demonstrated in the funeral of Velioglu in 2000, where more than 1,000 mourners attended (Aydinli 2000: 1).

The activity of Hezbollah decreased after 2000, but it did not stop. The organization retaliated to the murder of Velioglu by killing the chief of police in Diyarbakir, Gaffar Okkan, and five of his

⁶¹ The Associated Press, 2006.

⁶² Despite IBDA-C had claimed responsibility for the attack (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2000).

⁶³ Based on numbers from the Anatolian Agency, a Turkish semi-official news agency, referred to in Çakir (2007: 9).

⁶⁴ The Associated Press, 2006.

bodyguards in 2001 (Çakir 2007: 9). In 2002 two Hezbollah members were killed by Turkish police in a fight where the militants threw hand grenades towards the police.⁶⁵ And in 2003, nine members were arrested, accused of establishing new safe houses for the organization in Istanbul, Ankara, Malatya and Elazig.⁶⁶ The same year 950 alleged Hezbollah members were released from prison (Cağaptay and Uslu 2005: 2).

After Velioğlu was arrested, Hezbollah started to change. The ideas of Menzil, with its less violent approach, seem to have become dominant again. In 2006 Hezbollah organized a demonstration against the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in Diyarbakir, a city with one million inhabitants, with more than 100,000 participants (Çakir 2007: 1; 13). Some of its female members have started wearing long coats and head scarves instead of black chadors covering the body from head to toe. The organization has also started working for improved welfare in the southeast of Turkey, based on the models of Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. Today the Turkish Hezbollah has close ties to legal Islamic groups such as Mustazaf-Der, an organization established in 2004, which works against poverty. A Turkish intelligence official stated in 2006 that he did not believe the organization would plan any large attacks, because this would have negative consequences for its member base in Turkey.⁶⁷

However, it does not seem that Hezbollah has abandoned violence completely. Turkish police arrested 40 individuals in Konya, Istanbul, Mersin and Diyarbakir in 2008, suspected of membership of the organization and of planning a terrorist attack. One of these individuals was suspected of being the leader of the organization.⁶⁸ In January 2011, several of the imprisoned Hezbollah members, including several leaders of the organization, were released. Afterwards, some Turkish government officials stated that they were worried that this would once again lead the organization towards a violent strategy.⁶⁹ A member of Hezbollah, Ubeydullah Durna, was killed in a demonstration in May 2011 in Hakkari. Following his death the organization sent out a threat warning of the consequences of a possible clash between the PKK and Hezbollah.⁷⁰ Durna was praised on Hezbollah web pages.⁷¹ Subsequently, the situation cooled down.

⁶⁵ Xinhuanet (2002), "Two Turkish Hezbollah Militants Killed in Operation", 7 March, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2002-03/07/content_304327.htm, (accessed 7 July 2011).

⁶⁶ Turkish Daily News (2003a), "One line on the news", 28 January, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=one-line-on-the-news-2003-01-28>, (accessed 28 November 2011).

⁶⁷ The Associated Press, 2006.

⁶⁸ Today's Zaman (2008b), "Police arrest more than 40 suspected Hizbullah members", 5 January, available at <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-130932-police-arrest-more-than-40-suspected-hizbullah-members.html>, (accessed 19 August 2011).

⁶⁹ Hürriyet Daily News (2011), "Release of Turkish Hizbullah members sparks controversy over its future", 9 January, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=release-of-turkish-hizbullah-members-sparks-controversy-over-its-future-strategy-2011-01-09>, (accessed 1 August 2011).

⁷⁰ Today's Zaman (2011a), "Hizbullah warns PKK against retaliation in wake of attack", 9 May, available at http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=243345, (accessed 3 August 2011).

⁷¹ Reuters (2011a), "Kurdish Hizbullah raises spectre of new conflict", 18 May, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/18/us-turkey-kurds-hizbullah-idUSTRE74H3ED20110518>, (accessed 3 August 2011).

4.2.3 Organization

The following description of Hezbollah's organization is largely based on sources uncovered in connection with the arrests in 2000; some of this information may be outdated.

Under Velioğlu's leadership, Hezbollah was organized according to religious principles. The leader was given the name "imam", while his closest associates were called "the Islamic Council" (Aydıntaşbaş 2000). Many of its members in Turkey were Kurdish. Even though the organization mainly recruited members from the rural districts, it consisted of a diverse group of people with different levels of education. Most of the members had a low or middle income (Atalar 2006: 316).⁷² Mosques were frequently used as sites for recruiting new members, partly as a venue to point out volunteer imams, since these were not officially identified by the mosques. In Diyarbakir Hezbollah controlled more than half of the mosques in 1994 (Atalar 2006: 328).

The organization also possessed safe-houses in different parts of Turkey where it hid its victims (Aydinli 2000: 1). In these safe-houses new recruits also underwent ideological instruction. The most promising students were then sent to military training camps, while others would fill support functions such as instructors for incoming recruits (Atalar 2006: 328). Fighting members were expected to leave their families and devote themselves completely to Hezbollah, without listening to music, going to the cinema or having a sexual life. They lived together in safe-houses under curfew. Even joke-telling was regulated (Atalar 2006: 324).

There have been many discussions about the Turkish state's relationship to Hezbollah. It seems clear that the Turkish government avoided doing anything about Hezbollah for several years because it could function as a force against the PKK. Several experts on Turkish terrorism have written that the Turkish state has supported Hezbollah in order to weaken the PKK (Orhan 2010: 152; Williams 2005). Halit Güngen, a Turkish journalist writing for the magazine *2000'e Doğru* wrote an article in 1992 suggesting that there was a training camp for Hezbollah members actually located on the territory of the Turkish military. Two weeks later he was killed.⁷³ Other observers have pointed to government arms flow to the province of Batman in the 1990s, much of which is allegedly unaccounted for and may have reached Hezbollah (Aras and Bacik 2002: 153).

In 1995 the Turkish government formed a parliamentary group to look at the relationship between Hezbollah and the Turkish government. Said Avundukluoğlu, a MP from the True Path Party, led the group. After the first discovery of bodies outside Velioğlu's house in 2000, Avundukluoğlu claimed that the commission had found close links between the two, but that the Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller, had refused to meet him in order to formally receive the findings. Avundukluoğlu claimed that Hezbollah had run a training camp outside of a Turkish gendarmerie base. Another member of the committee was quoted as saying that they had found out that the local police in Batman responded by giving privileges if people said that they were members of Hezbollah

⁷² For further information about the characteristics of the 3,000 people arrested for Hezbollah militancy between 2000 and 2001, see Atalar (2006).

⁷³ Turkish Daily News, 2000.

(Gorvett 2000). Several other politicians have spoken of a close relationship between Hezbollah and the Turkish government in the 1980s and early 1990s (Aras and Bacik 2002: 153–154).

Turkish Hezbollah also has an international presence. In 2006, the organization reportedly had several hundred supporters in Europe.⁷⁴ In the 1990s Hezbollah worked its way towards Europe by sending groups of members to ceremonies such as weddings and funerals in order to spread its propaganda (Cağaptay and Uslu 2005: 2).⁷⁵ Some of the Hezbollah members were also sent abroad for training. Several went to receive instruction in Iran and Afghanistan, particularly in the 1980s. A Turkish parliamentary report claimed that more than 400 young Turks had been sent by Hezbollah to Iranian training camps, information that has later been supported by statements of arrested Hezbollah members in court (Aydinli 2000: 1). In these camps recruits were taught how to use different types of guns, bombs and other explosives (Çakir 2007: 11). In 2000, arrested Hezbollah members reportedly said under interrogation that they had been trained by an organization called “Jerusalem Warriors”, an Iranian group which allegedly includes many ethnic Turkish members (Center for Defense Information 2003). These reports must be taken with a pinch of salt, given Iran’s pariah status in the West.

Despite the fact that Iran may have been used as a training site, leader Velioğlu’s relationship to the Iranian regime was complex. Hezbollah received support from Iran in its early years, and Menzil in particular had been pro-Iranian. In 2000, a Turkish newspaper published pictures of Velioğlu in a meeting with Iranian officials (Center for Defense Information 2003). Velioğlu had also been to Iran only a few days before he was killed (Aydinli 2000: 1). Despite this contact with the Iranian regime, Velioğlu was increasingly critical towards Iranian and Shi’ite ideology during his last years as leader. For instance, he had banned Iranian books from Ilim bookstores (Aydıntaşbaş 2000).

4.3 The Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C)

4.3.1 Ideology

The Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front (İslami Büyükdoğu Akıncılar Cephesi, IBDA-C) is a Sunni Islamist organization representing a curious mix of two ideological traditions: Trotskyist communism and Sunni Salafi-Jihadism (Nesser 2004: 96; Fighel 2003). The organization’s main enemy has been defined as the Turkish state, largely because of the latter’s secularism. Its aim is primarily to establish shari’a rule in Turkey, and secondly to establish similar rule in the rest of the world. The organization was created as a breakout organization from the National Salvation Party in 1985, but IBDA-C became far more radical than the National Salvation Party ever was (Center for Defense Information 2004). IBDA-C has expressed criticism towards the Iranian revolution (Fighel 2003). The organization has been actively spreading its ideology through published books, magazines and on the Internet (Center for Defense Information 2004).

⁷⁴ The Associated Press, 2006.

⁷⁵ Reuters, 2011a.

The IBDA-C ideology is based on the writings of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek and the development of this system of thought by Salih Mirzabeyoğlu. Kısakürek (1905–1983) was a Turkish poet and historian. Within the collection of more than 130 published books he presented his system of thought, called the “Great East”, and argued for Islamic purism and restoring the caliphate. According to Kısakürek, the correct practice of Islam was the only way to truth. He combined this religious view with anti-Semitism and strong opposition to Western imperialism (Center for Defense Information 2004; Fighel 2003; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2010–2011). Salih Mirzabeyoğlu has played a leading role in developing this ideology, particularly through his more than 50 published books.

4.3.2 Activity level

IBDA-C was mainly active in the 1990s and early 2000s. Its activity level and capability today is unknown, but seems reduced. The leader of the organization, Salih Mirzabeyoğlu, was arrested in 1998. In 2008 he was given a life sentence.⁷⁶ Another leading figure, Ali Osman Zor, was arrested in May 2011.

Most IBDA-C attacks have been against civilian targets. They have mainly used weapons with little risk for the perpetrators, such as Molotov cocktails and other types of explosives. Its largest attack was in 1993, when a hotel hosting academics was firebombed. 19 people died. Even though Mirzabeyoğlu had been arrested since 1998, his leadership of the organization was not interrupted. IBDA-C continued staging attacks during the following years, particularly against civilian targets such as discotheques, bars, churches, synagogues, journalists and brothels (Fighel 2003). IBDA-C has combined this activity with taking responsibility for several attacks others have executed (Gorvett 2004).

In 1999 12 members of the organization were arrested. They were charged with involvement in several bomb attacks, as well as having prepared several other bombs that had not been detonated.⁷⁷ The same year IBDA-C claimed responsibility for the murder of a Turkish columnist in the newspaper *Cumhuriyet*, and former Minister of Culture, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, putting a bomb on the windshield of his car.⁷⁸ Later, Turkish police linked five members of Turkish Hezbollah to the attack, which made IBDA-C involvement less probable (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2000; Aydıntaşbaş 2000). IBDA-C also claimed responsibility for a bomb in Istanbul in February 2000 (Fighel 2003). In the same period, three IBDA-C members, a headmaster, his wife and a teacher at a school, were arrested for making bombs (Maddy-Weitzman 2000: 594).

IBDA-C announced responsibility for the attack of the Turkish General Consulate in Düsseldorf in April 2001, an attack using hand grenades where nobody was hurt (Nesser 2004: 96). Two

⁷⁶ İhlas Haber Ajansı (2008), “IBDA-C lideri Salih Mirzabeyoğlu’na müebbet hapis”, 13 June, available at <http://www.ihha.com.tr/haber/detay.aspx?nid=25163&cid=13>, (accessed 9 February 2011).

⁷⁷ Anatolia (1999b), “Twelve Members of IBDA/C Captured in Istanbul”, 16 February, FBIS translated text.

⁷⁸ Cumhuriyet (1999), “Ahmet Taner Kışlalı”, 21 October, available at <http://www.cpj.org/killed/1999/ahmet-taner-kislali.php>, (accessed 22 July 2011).

years later IBDA-C took responsibility for the November bombings in Istanbul, in a joint statement with al-Qaida (see section 3.1.2). According to Cline (2004: 324), IBDA-C was probably not strong enough to stage the attack by itself, but IBDA-C members cooperated with al-Qaida. This theory was supported by the fact that Turkish police had earlier questioned one of the participants in the attack, Azad Ekinçi, for IBDA-C activity.⁷⁹

Four IBDA-C members were arrested in 2004 for killing a retired Colonel, Ihsan Guven, and his wife. Guven was the leader of a sect called “Dost” (“Friend”) (The Investigative Project on Terrorism 2007). Guven had earlier been referred to in IBDA-C propaganda written by Mirzabeyoğlu in 2003 as “pro-American”, a “pervert” and a “Jewish sympathizer” (Center for Defense Information 2004).⁸⁰ The arrested IBDA-C members stated that they had killed Guven because of Mirzabeyoğlu’s presentation of him as an enemy in the book, not on direct orders from Mirzabeyoğlu.⁸¹ According to a Turkish newspaper, IBDA-C members were also planning to murder Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, pop singer Celik (for supporting the Dost sect) and a businessman, Ishak Alaton (for being Jewish).⁸² The planning of the murder of Erdoğan had progressed far.⁸³ In addition, they had planned to attack a TV host in order to increase the coverage of their activity.⁸⁴ Later the same year another IBDA-C member was arrested for kidnapping Yakup Gendemli in 1999.⁸⁵

IBDA-C published a magazine in 2005 hailing terrorist attacks by al-Qaida. The magazine was named “Kaide” and was edited by a certain Ali Osman Zor.⁸⁶ This year an official report on terrorism commissioned by the Turkish government stated that IBDA-C was continuing to gain more supporters, even though it was less active than before.⁸⁷ In 2006 Turkish police arrested 18 individuals for IBDA-C activity (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2010–2011).

4.3.3 Organization

IBDA-C was organized in a similar manner to al-Qaida in Turkey, with small, independent terrorist cells throughout the country. Instead of acting based on commands, the groups identify their own targets. The groups often have between three and five members (Figchel 2003). In

⁷⁹ Asia Times, 2003.

⁸⁰ Hürriyet (2004c), “Illegal IBDA-C Org Claims It Murdered Ret Maj Guven, His Wife”, 5 May, FBIS translated text.

⁸¹ Milliyet (2004b), “IBDA-C Members Reportedly Confess To Murder of “Dost” Cult Leader”, 17 May, FBIS translated text.

⁸² Turkish Daily News (2004a), “IBDA-C Wanted to Kill PM Erdogan”, 18 May, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=ibda-c-wanted-to-kill-pm-erdogan-2004-05-18>, (accessed 3 August 2011). Hürriyet (2004a), “IBDA-C Murder Suspects Also Targeted PM Erdogan, Businessman Alaton”, 18 May, FBIS translated text.

⁸³ Hürriyet (2004b), “IBDA-C Murder Suspects Admit Dry Run Assassination of Erdogan at Rally”, 19 May, FBIS translated text.

⁸⁴ Anatolia (2004b), “Seven IBDA-C Militants Indicted for Murdering Cult Leader, Wife”, 14 June, FBIS translated text.

⁸⁵ Anatolia (2004d), “Turkey: Police Arrest IBDA-C Member in Kirikkale”, 27 June, FBIS translated text.

⁸⁶ Milliyet (2005b), “Turkish Daily Highlights Magazine Published by pro-al-Qa’ida Group in Istanbul”, 3 August, FBIS translated text.

⁸⁷ Hürriyet (2005), “Report Views Outcome of Turkish Counterterrorism Meeting”, 28 September, FBIS translated text.

practice, members have acted based on the ideological literature of their leader, Mirzabeyoğlu. One example of such an act was the murder of Col. Güven in 2004.⁸⁸

In the 1990s several IBDA-C members were training in a camp in Afghanistan, until the camp was destroyed by a U.S. attack in 1998.⁸⁹ IBDA-C has also sent several jihadists to fight both in Chechnya and against the Serbs in Bosnia.⁹⁰ IBDA-C has cooperated with al-Qaida, and sometimes also the PKK (Fighel 2003). In an interview in 2005, Ali Osman Zor, who is high up in the organization, claimed that IBDA-C did not have direct ties to al-Qaida, only strong sympathies.⁹¹ Zor fled Turkey in 2008 after being sentenced to 12 years in prison. He was arrested in Kirgizistan in May 2011 and extradited to Turkey three months later.⁹²

In the late 1990s IBDA-C moved closer to Ismailiğa, an Istanbul-based sufi sect under the Naqshbandi order. As a result, some Ismailiğa members joined IBDA-C, while others left. IBDA-C started using its magazine, *Furkan*, to spread its ideology (Maddy-Weitzman 2000: 593). IBDA-C also received financial support from the sect. After a while, the son-in-law of the leader of the sect, Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu, known as Mahmut Hodja, was killed. A retired imam was killed in the same incident.⁹³ It was expected that the son-in-law was going to assume leadership in IBDA-C after Hodja.⁹⁴

Compared to Hezbollah and al-Qaida, IBDA-C has relatively few non-Kurdish Turkish supporters (Fighel 2003). Most members have traditionally come from eastern Turkey.⁹⁵ The support from the Diaspora has been substantial. In 2001 the German Federal Office of Criminal Investigations estimated that IBDA-C had 500 to 600 German supporters and was active in eight cities in Germany (Nesser 2004:96). In 2003 Der Spiegel estimated that IBDA-C had around 600 supporters in Germany (Center for Defense Information 2004). It was also active in France, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, with more than 40 formal members in Europe in total (Nesser 2004: 96).

A suspect in the Ergenekon case told the police in 2011 that former IBDA-C member Okan İşgör had been hired by the Gendarmerie Intelligence Anti-Terrorism Unit (Jandarma İstihbarat ve

⁸⁸ Milliyet, 2004b.

⁸⁹ Asia Times, 2003.

⁹⁰ Asia Times, 2003; ABC, 2003.

⁹¹ Haber 7 (2005), "IBDA- C, şimdi El Kaide cephesinde", 2 August, available at <http://www.haber7.com/haber/20050802/IBDA-C-simdi-El-Kaide-cephesinde.php>, (accessed 7 July 2011).

⁹² Turkish Daily News (2011), "Kyrgyzstan extradites Turkish journalist to Istanbul", 11 August, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=kyrgyzstan-extradites-turkish-journalist-to-istanbul-2011-08-11>, (accessed 14 November 2011); Hürriyet Daily News (2011), "Illegal group's leader, Zor, found in Kyrgyzstan", 18 August, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=illegal-group8217s-leader-zor-found-in-kyrgyzstan-2011-08-18>, (accessed 14 November 2011).

⁹³ Sabah (2006), "Police Report From 2000 Links Ismailaga Sect to IBDA-C Terrorists", 11 September, FBIS translated text.

⁹⁴ Hurriyet (2006), "Turkish Daily Views Cases of Murder in Religious Communities", 29 October, FBIS translated text.

⁹⁵ ABC (2003), "Background to Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front", 21 November, available at <http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2003/s994580.htm>, (accessed 7 July 2011).

Terörle Mücadele, JITEM), and was working there in 2005. JITEM was an illegal armed organization within the Turkish state working towards a coup against the AKP government. İşgör had colleagues in JITEM that had been recruited from the PKK.⁹⁶ According to a police statement during the Ergenekon case, IBDA-C was only one of several terrorist organizations with which JITEM was allegedly in contact.⁹⁷

4.4 The Caliphate State

4.4.1 Ideology

The Caliphate State is a Germany-based organization which has defined the Turkish secular state as its main enemy. The Caliphate State began in 1984 as a splinter group of the *Welfare Party* in Turkey. Led by Cemaladdin Kaplan, the group aimed to create a mass movement for a new caliphate. After largely failing to do so, Kaplan was radicalized. Despite being Sunni, Kaplan established the Caliphate State in order to reinstate the caliphate based on a revolution similar to that of Iran in 1979 (Schiffauer 1997: 574). Kaplan had earlier been a member of another German Sunni organization, the Islamic Union Europe, but broke out after conflicts concerning Iran. The organization has had many names during its existence, such as *Kaplanlılar*, *The Anatolia Federal Islamic State* (AFID), *Islamic Associations and Communities Union* (ICCB), and *Islamic Community-Denominational Vision of Turkey*.⁹⁸

In 1992 Kaplan declared jihad on the Turkish state (Schiffauer 2002). The organization is critical of democracy as a political system. In a newsletter dated June 2001 the organization declared that “Democracy is a system of ignorance. For this reason democracy is not possible in an Islamic country”.⁹⁹

Schiffauer (2002) has identified two generations of Kaplanists in Germany. The first consisted of Turkish immigrants to Germany with little or no education. They found the same idea of Islamic unity in Kaplanism as they had met in the mosques in the Turkish villages they came from. Most of these members left the Caliphate State when the organization radicalized. The second generation was born in Germany to Turkish parents and was more open to the use of radical measures. Hence, according to Schiffauer, this second generation was attracted to the Caliphate State by the same radicalism that made the first generation leave.

⁹⁶ Today's Zaman (2011b), “Indictment on Şile weapons reveals Ergenekon links”. 3 March 2011, available at <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-237164-indictment-on-sile-weapons-reveals-ergenekon-links.html>, (accessed 19 August 2011).

⁹⁷ Today's Zaman (2011c), “WikiLeaks Turkey (3): an X-Ray of the “deep state””, 8 April 2011, available at http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=240469, (accessed 19 August 2011).

⁹⁸ Anatolia (2002c), “Turkey: Kaplan's Islamic State Organization Reportedly To Move To Netherlands”, 3 January, FBIS translated text; Anatolia (2002d), “Turkey: Person held said to be 2d in Command of Islamic Group Based in Germany”, 22 May, FBIS translated text; Anatolia (2002e), “Turkey sends letter to Germany on extradition of Islamist Metin Kaplan”, 20 June, FBIS translated text.

⁹⁹ New York Times (2002), “Germany May Extradite Islamic Militant to Turkey”, 26 May, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/26/world/germany-may-extradite-islamic-militant-to-turkey.html?n=Top%2fReference%2fTimes%20Topics%2fSubjects%2fT%2fTerrorism>, (accessed 29 November 2011).

4.4.2 Activity level

The organization was most active in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when it reportedly planned large scale attacks against symbolic Turkish targets.

Several of the plots allegedly had al-Qaida links. In November 1998 the Caliphate State reportedly planned to attack the Atatürk mausoleum in Ankara, Anıtkabir, during the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the Turkish Republic. The plan was to fill a plane with explosives and fly into Anıtkabir. Afterwards, the Caliphate State was planning to storm a mosque in Istanbul. According to Turkish media, Bin Laden was in contact with the organization before the plans were discovered.¹⁰⁰ However, these claims have not been independently confirmed.

Another plan was to occupy the Hagia Sophia museum in Istanbul and raise its own flag at the top of the building. This operation would be combined with the storming of a National TV studio from which a statement would be broadcast. According to a Turkish newspaper, but again unconfirmed by other sources, Bin Laden was supposed to have been involved in these plans as well.¹⁰¹ The mausoleum plot was echoed on 13 September 2001, when the Turkish Consulate General in Cologne received an anonymous message threatening an airborne attack on Atatürk's mausoleum.¹⁰² Although this was most likely an empty threat inspired by the 9/11 attacks two days earlier, it may have been issued by Caliphate State sympathisers, who are relatively well represented in Cologne.

In 2004 police discovered that the Caliphate State was planning to use letter bombs in its next attacks, and that these bombs were already prepared.¹⁰³ The last report of organizational activity in Turkey was in 2009, when 13 men were arrested in Konya for training young people in order to send them to Afghanistan.¹⁰⁴

In 2005 German prosecutors indicted three sons-in-law of Kaplan for breaking the ban on the organization in Germany. They had organized meetings and activists in Augsburg. Their income came from the revenue of a group of food stores the organization owned.¹⁰⁵ In March 2011, it became clear that the Caliphate State sent money to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). At least one of its members went to an IMU training camp in Waziristan in 2009.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁰ Moscow ITAR-TASS, 2002. BBC News, 2004. BBC News, 2005.

¹⁰¹ Hürriyet, 2002a.

¹⁰² Milliyet (2001), "Alleged Bin Ladin Plan To Attack US Targets in Turkey", 21 September 2001, FBIS translated text.

¹⁰³ Milliyet (2004c), "Report: Caliphate State Illegal Org Plans "Bomb Letter" Action Throughout Turkey", 3 June, FBIS translated text.

¹⁰⁴ Anatolia (2009), "Turkey: Police Operation Against Islamic Organization in Konya", 27 April 2009, FBIS translated text.

¹⁰⁵ Sueddeutsche Zeitung (2005), "Germany: Islamist Kaplan's Son-in-Law Indicted for Working for "Caliphate State"", 25 May, FBIS translated text.

¹⁰⁶ Focus (2011), "Germany: Followers of Former "Caliph of Cologne" Said Financing IMU", 3 March, FBIS translated text.

In July 2011 six men of Turkish and German descent were arrested for terrorist activities. One of them had been both a former mercenary in Chechnya and active in the Caliphate State until the organization was banned in Germany.¹⁰⁷

4.4.3 Organization

The organization was established in Germany with Cemalettin Kaplan as its leader. In 1995 Cemalettin Kaplan died. His less charismatic son, Metin Kaplan (“Black Voice”), took over the leadership (became “caliph” of the organization), but soon met competition from a rival, Halil Ibrahim Sofu (“Dr. Yusuf”), who declared that he was the “second caliph”. Kaplan announced a fatwa against Sofu, who was killed in May 1997. Kaplan was soon charged for “publicly calling for the murder of a person” and received a 4-year prison sentence.¹⁰⁸ He was deported to Turkey in 2004, where he was sentenced to spend the rest of his life in prison.¹⁰⁹ In 2010 the verdict was repealed, because the court decided that there was insufficient evidence that Kaplan was “changing the constitutional order”. Instead he was charged with “establishing and administrating an armed organization”, which carried between ten and fifteen years in prison.¹¹⁰

After Kaplan was arrested, his relative Hasan Basri Gökbulut became the new leader. Gökbulut left Germany and led the organization from abroad.¹¹¹ Gökbulut was caught by Iranian police in 2001, using the false name “Celal Akbaş”. In May 2002 he was deported to Turkey.¹¹² Today Kaplan’s son-in-law, Turgay C., plays a leading role in the organization.¹¹³

The Caliphate State has used both traditional and modern manners of recruitment. It published a magazine, Ummet-I Mohammed, in the 1990s, where it stated its connection with al-Qaida.¹¹⁴ It also owned the TV-channel HAKK TV in Germany, which also broadcast to Turkey. One of its messages was the recommendation of stoning adulteresses.¹¹⁵ The TV-channel was closed by German authorities in November 2001.¹¹⁶

Several members of the organization have been active on the Internet. One of the leading figures of the organization, Gökbulut, has been using the name “Hasan Hacıoğlu” on the website

¹⁰⁷ Sueddeutsche Zeitung (2011), “German Police Seize “Supporting Evidence” in Clampdown on Presumed Islamists”, 20 July, FBIS translated text.

¹⁰⁸ Hürriyet (2002b), “Turkey: Muslim Religious Leader Said To Instigate Murder of Rival in Berlin”, 24 September, FBIS translated text; Anatolia (2004c), “Turkey: Cicek comments on Cyprus, Constitutional amendments, Kaplan extradition”, 29 April 2004, FBIS translated text; Milliyet, 2004c.

¹⁰⁹ Anatolia (2005), “Metin Kaplan Sentenced to Life in Prison”, 21 June, FBIS translated text.

¹¹⁰ Today’s Zaman (2010c), “Supreme Court of Appeals annuls Kaplan’s life sentence”, 13 February 2010, available at <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-201419-supreme-court-of-appeals-annuls-kaplans-life-sentence.html>, (accessed 18 August 2011).

¹¹¹ Anatolia, 2002a.

¹¹² Anatolia, 2002d.

¹¹³ Focus, 2011.

¹¹⁴ Anatolia, 2002a.

¹¹⁵ Der Spiegel (2002c), “The Rear of the Republic”, 4 March, FBIS translated text.

¹¹⁶ Hürriyet (2001a), “HAKK TV, Broadcasting Reactionary Programs Against Turkey, Banned by Germany”, 20 November, FBIS translated text.

www.hilafet.org¹¹⁷ The organization also started its own centers of education for children in Istanbul, called “Mekteb”. By doing this it broke Turkish law, because the children did not follow the official curriculum.¹¹⁸ An important part of the organization’s activity has been the financing of militant Islamist groups abroad, such as jihadists in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Bosnia.¹¹⁹ It received money from several organizations, such as “Foundation Service of Charity” and “Sura Foundation”.¹²⁰

At its largest, the organization allegedly had 12,000 supporters.¹²¹ The organization was banned in Germany in December 2001, but has since continued to be active.¹²² In 2002 it moved its base to the Netherlands. The numbers of supporters and members diverge according to different sources. In total, the organization had around 200 members and 4,000 sympathisers in 2001, according to Dutch officials.¹²³ Between 1,100 and 1,500 of these were Turkish supporters in Germany. Many of these had German citizenship.¹²⁴ North Rhine-Westphalia was a region with a particularly large number of supporters.¹²⁵ Two years later, the number of German members was supposedly 750, according to German officials (Larrabee and Rabasa 2008: 29). As of 2012, there appear to be only a few hundred supporters left.¹²⁶

The Caliphate State was reportedly active in Bulgaria in the early 2000s, preaching for a group of Roma people in Pazardjik. The Bulgarians had been to the mosque of the organization in Cologne several times before the German government closed the mosque. In Germany they received cars and political material they could spread in Bulgaria.¹²⁷ According to one Bulgarian newspaper, there were links in Bulgaria between the Caliphate State and the ultranationalist Turkish organization the Grey Wolves.¹²⁸

4.5 Cooperation between the organizations

Despite diverging ideological starting points and strategies, several of the organizations cooperated. In this section, the four organizations are briefly compared before what is known about their cooperation is examined.

¹¹⁷ Anatolia, 2002d.

¹¹⁸ Anatolia, (2002b), “Turkey: Istanbul Police Arrest Members of “Kaplan” School Group”, 8 February, FBIS translated text.

¹¹⁹ Anatolia, 2002a.

¹²⁰ Anatolia, 2002c.

¹²¹ New York Times (2004), “Germany Deports Radical Long Sought by Turks”, 13 October, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/13/international/europe/13turkey.html?_r=1&n=Top%2fReference%2fTimes%20To%2fSubjects%2fT%2fTerrorism, (accessed 29 November 2011).

¹²² Der Spiegel (2002a), “Courier of the ”Caliph”?”, 15 April, FBIS translated text.

¹²³ Anatolia, 2002c.

¹²⁴ Der Spiegel (2002b), “Empty-Handed”, 1 July, FBIS translated text; Hürriyet Daily News, 2002.

¹²⁵ BBC News, 2004.

¹²⁶ Focus, 2011.

¹²⁷ One the members of the Caliphate State that was active in Bulgaria was Muamer Yeşelkurt. See Sofia BTA (2003), “Bulgarian Police Raid Islamic Fundamentalist Group in South”, 10 March, FBIS translated text.

¹²⁸ Sofia 24 (2004), “Details on Criminal Acts of Alleged Turkish Kaplan Sect Member in Bulgaria”, 13 September, FBIS translated text.

Al-Qaida and IBDA-C share a Sunni-Salafist ideology with the aim of creating a new caliphate combined with anti-Americanism (Fihel 2003). However, the communist perspectives of IBDA-C are not shared by al-Qaida. Both IBDA-C and the Caliphate State have traditionally been working against Turkey as a secular state and for a new caliphate. Hezbollah is also a Sunni organization, but more influenced by the Iranian revolution. Hezbollah has focused more upon competing opposition to the regime, even though it shares the criticism of both the Turkish state and the West articulated by the three other organizations.

The four groups diverge in their member composition. While Hezbollah has many Kurdish members from the southeast of Turkey, The Caliphate State consists mainly of people with Turkish ancestry living in Germany. IBDA-C also includes a large number of supporters based in Western Europe, and has relatively few members living in Turkey compared to the other organizations. Al-Qaida has a member base from all over Turkey, and has also actively recruited members from the other organizations during the last decade.

Turkish officials have warned on several occasions of possible cooperation between some of these organizations. In December 2001 the Turkish Interior Minister, Rustu Kazim Yucelen, warned U.S. and German authorities that the Caliphate State and Hezbollah might be planning a common attack. He stated that the two organizations already shared a mosque in Austria. The organization had agreed that the Caliphate State would provide the funds, while Hezbollah would provide people to execute the operation. Yucelen identified U.S. and NATO targets in Turkey as being particularly probable.¹²⁹

The Caliphate State diverges from al-Qaida by mainly targeting typically Turkish symbols. For instance, the planned attack by the Caliphate State in 1998 on the Atatürk mausoleum in Ankara an important monument for the Turkish state. Osama bin Laden is supposed to have been involved in several of the plans of the Caliphate State, but the actual extent of this involvement is unknown.¹³⁰ After the November bombings in 2003, several of the perpetrators stated during interrogation that Bin Laden had been critical of attacking Turkish Muslims. This makes an extended cooperation between the two organizations against traditional Turkish targets more unlikely in the future. However, the suspicion of a link between al-Qaida and the Caliphate State is supported by the fact that at least 14 Turks from Germany attended training camps in Afghanistan in 2002 and at least some of their names corresponded with the names of Caliphate State members.¹³¹

IBDA-C has focused mainly on typical civilian institutions, such as churches, intellectuals and journalists. Al-Qaida, on the other hand, has mainly attacked foreign targets (particularly American, Israeli and British) on Turkish soil. Lately, IBDA-C has turned in the same direction as al-Qaida, as shown by the attacks in 2003 and 2008. This could be explained by the fact that

¹²⁹ Milliyet (2001), "Report Warning About Possible Alliance Between Turkish Terror Groups Outlined", 19 December, FBIS translated text.

¹³⁰ Hürriyet (2002a), "Ladin Said Ordered Kaplanists to Raid St. Sophia Mosque", 5 January, FBIS translated text.

¹³¹ Hürriyet Daily News, 2002.

the IBDA-C leader, Salih Mirzabeyoğlu, is in prison. After his imprisonment, the organization seems to have been open to ideological adjustment and more pragmatism. In 2007 an al-Qaida member calling himself “Commander of Turkey” was arrested. In one of the messages he had sent to another arrested al-Qaida member, according to a Turkish newspaper, he wrote “Salid Mirzabeyoğlu is also close to us. Be prepared for battle”.¹³²

According to the Center for Defense Information (2003), individual Hezbollah members that had fled Turkey after the death of Velioglu formed connections with both al-Qaida and Ansar al-Islam in the early 2000s. One intelligence source has also stated that groups with affiliations to al-Qaida in London supported Hezbollah financially from 2004. Another intelligence source has claimed that Turkish Hezbollah members in Syria have assisted al-Qaida members wanting to enter Iraq (Cağaptay and Uslu 2005: 2–3). In 2005 a statement from the “Hizballah Community” on the Internet denied such a connection, saying “The Hizballah community does not have any type of organizational, political, or operational relationship with or cooperation with al-Qaeda” (quoted in Çakir 2007: 15). According to a newspaper, such cooperation was discovered in 2007, when Turkish police arrested Muhammed Yaşar (Uslu 2009b).¹³³

In 2005 Turkish media reported that bonds had been formed between Turkish terrorist organizations with contradicting ideologies in a prison in Kocaeli. Arrested terrorists from different organizations were put in the same cells, in order to prevent members of the same organizations communicating. Consequently, both IBDA-C and Hezbollah members claimed to have improved ties to terrorists of other affiliations, partly based on common anti-Americanism and anti-Imperialism.¹³⁴

5 Major incidents of Islamist violence in Turkey, 1980–2011

This section contains a chronology of incidents. The basis of the chronology is the incidents referred to in *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, a document published by the U.S. State Department every year up to 2004. From 2004 onwards, they have published *Country Report on Terrorism* every year, a publication with less information about specific incidents. This list has been compiled using incidents referred to in texts about the subject, both academic texts and newspaper articles. It has also been compiled incorporating some incidents from the Global Terrorism Database.¹³⁵

The incidents included are either executed or planned. In cases where an incident has been identified based on when it was treated in court, and the date of the incident has not been found, it is presented under the date or month of the court case.

¹³² Anatolia (2007), “Lawsuit Filed Against 'Al-Qa'ida's Commander in Turkey”, 22 January 2007, FBIS translated text.

¹³³ Southeast European Times (2009), “Police crackdown on Hizballah in Turkey”, 28 May, available at www.setimes.com, (accessed 7 January 2012).

¹³⁴ Milliyet (2005a), “CHP Deputy on Lefist-Islamist Alliance in Prisons”, 7 March, FBIS translated text.

¹³⁵ Global Terrorism Database, 2011.

5.1 The 1980s

1983

21 December. Bomb. Iraqi target. Islamic Cause Organization. A bomb exploded in the Macka quarter in front of the Iraqi Consulate in Istanbul. Three persons were injured. According to the Global Terrorism Database, an Islamic Cause Organization was suspected of executing the attack.¹³⁶

1986

Date unknown. Bomb. Jewish target. The Islamist Resistant Group (Hamas). A bomb exploded in the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul. 23 persons were killed. The perpetrators were not Turkish and claimed to undertake the attack as support for the Palestinian cause (Orhan 2005: 157).

5.2 The 1990s

1990

Date unknown. Assassination. Intellectual target. Islamic movement. A political scientist with liberal views, Muammer Aksoy, was killed by members of the Islamic Movement (later known as Hezbollah). This was the first attack by this organization (Karmon 1997).

1991

28 October. Car bomb. American target. Turkish Islamic Jihad/The Jerusalem Warriors. Victor Marwick, an American soldier serving at the Turkish-American base, Tuslog, was killed and his wife wounded in a car bomb attack in Ankara. An Egyptian diplomat was also injured. The Turkish Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack, which was a protest against a conference for peace in the Middle East held in Madrid (Rubin and Rubin Colp 2002: 359; U.S. Department of State 2001).

1992

Date unknown. Bomb. Jewish target. Lebanese Hezbollah. The Neve Shalom synagogue was attacked by a bomb made by Lebanese Hezbollah. No one was injured.¹³⁷

1993

24 January. Car bomb. Journalist target. IBDA-C/Islamic Liberation Organization. A Turkish reporter, Uğur Mumcu, was killed by a car bomb. He had covered the rise of Islamic radicalism, the drug trade and the PKK. Both IBDA-C and the Islamic Liberation Organization claimed responsibility for the attack (Karmon 1997).

¹³⁶ Global Terrorism Database (2011), “198312210002”, available at <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtid=198312210002>, (accessed 22 August 2011).

¹³⁷ The Associated Press (2003c), “Bombings at Turkish Synagogues Kill 20”, 15 November 2003, available at <http://research.lifeboat.com/turkey.htm>, (accessed 9 August 2011).

2 July. Firebomb. Intellectual target. IBDA-C. The Hotel Madimak in Sivas was firebombed during a cultural festival. 37 people were killed and 56 people were injured (Fihel 2003; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2010–2011; Fratta 2010: 366). Most of the victims were intellectuals, and one was accused of planning to publish “Satanic Verses” by Salman Rushdie (Karmon 1997).

1994

4 January. Assassination. Turkish target. Iranian state agents. A member of the KDP Central Committee in Iran was killed in Corum (U.S. Department of State 1995).

May. Bomb. Masonic target. Islamists with unknown affiliation. A bomb exploded in the Masonic Lodge in Ankara, a building belonging to the Freemason organization. Islamists claimed responsibility for the attack (U.S. Department of State 1995).

22 June. Bombs. Tourist target. Unknown group. In the holiday resort town of Marmaris two bombs exploded within a few minutes of each other. One person died. Eleven were injured (U.S. Department of State 1995).

11 September. Assassination. Menzil target. İlim. Fidan Güngör, member of the Menzil section of Hezbollah was kidnapped and killed in Istanbul by members of the İlim section of Hezbollah (Atalar 2006: 310–311).

October. Planned attack. Secular target. Hezbollah. Six members of Hezbollah were arrested, accused of planning to kill an Armenian woman because she owned a brothel employing Muslim women (Karmon 1997).

December. Car bomb. Intellectual target. IBDA-C. Onat Kutlar, a writer and cinema critic, was killed by a car bomb. IBDA-C claimed responsibility for the attack, and said that it was executed in order to spoil “the colonialist Noel [Christmas] celebrations” (Karmon 1997).

Date unknown. Assassination. Menzil target. İlim, Hezbollah. İhsan Yeşilırmak, the leader of a similar group to Menzil, the Fecr (dawn) group, was killed by members of İlim, Hezbollah (Atalar 2006: 310–311).

Date unknown. Attempted assassination. Jewish and Christian targets. IBDA-C. IBDA-C attempted to murder a Jewish businessman. The organization also attacked a Greek Orthodox Church (Aras and Toktaş 2007: 1045).

1995

January. Bomb. Turkish target. Maybe IBDA-C. The Atatürk mausoleum was attacked with a bomb. IBDA-C may have been responsible (Karmon 1997).

21 April. Car bomb. Iranian target. Unknown group. An illegally parked car was towed away from the front of the Iranian General Consulate in Ankara towards a parking lot, where it exploded and killed the tow-car driver (U.S. Department of State 1996).

June. Assassination attempt. Jewish target. IBDA-C. IBDA-C claimed to be responsible for the attempted assassination of a Jewish community leader in Ankara (Karmon 1997; U.S. Department of State 1996).

August. Bomb. Turkish target. Unknown group. Two bombs exploded in two trash cans in Istanbul. 2 people died and 32 were injured (Rodoplu, Ulkumen, Arnold and Ersoy 2003: 154).

1997

14 September. Hand grenade. Turkish target. Vasat. The leader of the Vasat organization, Shahmera Sari, threw a hand grenade into a book fair in Gaziantep. One person died and 25 were injured (Rodoplo, Arnold and Ersoy 2003).¹³⁸

2 December. Bomb. Christian target. IBDA-C suspected. A hand grenade was thrown at the Ecumenical Patriarchate Cathedral in Istanbul. One person was injured (UNHCR 1997).¹³⁹

22 December. Firearm. Civilian Target. A bus was attacked with firearms by an unknown number of perpetrators. 6 persons died.¹⁴⁰

1998

May. Landmine. Military target. Unknown organization. A military vehicle in Hatay was hit by a landmine. Ten persons were injured (Rodoplo, Arnold and Ersoy 2003).

June. Bomb. Secular target. IBDA-C. A brothel was attacked by a bomb. 12 persons were injured (Rodoplo, Arnold and Ersoy 2003).

29 October. Plans. Turkish target. The Caliphate State. Metin Kaplan was caught planning to crash an airplane into the mausoleum of Atatürk in Ankara on 29 October.¹⁴¹ This was the 75th anniversary of the Turkish Republic, and the mausoleum would have been filled with officials celebrating.¹⁴² The plans were revealed the day before the planned attack, when Turkish police

¹³⁸ Hürriyet Daily News (2009b), "Turkey: 50 People Detained in Operations Against Islamist "Vasat" Group", 27 April, FBIS translated text.

¹³⁹ Global Terrorism Database (2012a), "199712020010", available at <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtid=199712020010>, (accessed 8 January 2012).

¹⁴⁰ Global Terrorism Database (2012b), "199712220007", available at <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtid=199712220007>, (accessed 8 January 2012).

¹⁴¹ Deutsche Welle (2004), "Germany Deports Islamic Radical", 13 October 2004, available at <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1358926,00.html>, (accessed 13 July 2011); Moscow ITAR-TASS (2002).

¹⁴² BBC News, 2005.

arrested 23 suspected members of the Caliphate State.¹⁴³ They were, according to a newspaper, planning to attack the Fatih mosque in Istanbul later the same day.¹⁴⁴

1999

February. Hand grenade. Turkish target. Unknown organization. A coffee house was hit by a hand grenade. 17 persons were injured (Rodoplo, Arnold and Ersoy 2003).

April. Suicide bomb. Turkish target. Hezbollah. A 16-year-old girl was killed by a suicide bomb in Bingöl, Turkey. Twelve others were injured. According to terrorism researcher Evan Kohlmann, Hezbollah was behind the attack (Kohlmann 2003).

April. Suicide bomb. Turkish target. Unknown organization. A governor's car on the street was attacked by an Iranian suicide bomber in Yuksekova. Two persons died and eleven were injured (Rodoplo, Arnold and Ersoy 2003).¹⁴⁵

June. Plans. Turkish target. IBDA-C. The Turkish General Directorate of Security stated that they had received a tip saying that IBDA-C had plans to assassinate Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit (Karmon 2000).

July. Suicide bomb. Police target. Unknown organization. A suicide bomb exploded outside the police headquarters in Adana. One person died and 15 were injured (Rodoplo, Arnold and Ersoy 2003).

21 October. Assassination. Turkish target. Hezbollah. The organization attacked Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, a well-known journalist of a leftist newspaper, former Minister of Culture and a critic of Islamic fundamentalism. Kışlalı died from a bomb explosion (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2000; Sözen 2006).¹⁴⁶ According to Turkish officials, the bomb was wrapped in a newspaper, which had been placed on the windshield of his car. It exploded when he tried to remove the package.¹⁴⁷ IBDA-C claimed responsibility, but in 2000, Turkish police linked five Hezbollah members to the attack (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2000; Aydıntaşbaş 2000).

6 November. Plans. Turkish target. IBDA-C. IBDA-C had planned to bomb the celebration of the anniversary of the Turkish Institution of Higher Education (IBDA-C) (Karmon 2003a: 52).

¹⁴³ Anatolia, 2005.

¹⁴⁴ Anatolia (2004e), "Turkey's Erdogan Comments on Kaplan Extradition, Says Early for Assessment", 12 October 2004, FBIS translated text; BBC News, 2004.

¹⁴⁵ Anatolia (1999a), "'Terrorists' Explain Suicide Bombing Plan in Hakkari", 9 April, translated into English by FBIS.

¹⁴⁶ OSCE (1999), "Press Release: Journalist Ahmet Taner Kislali killed in Turkey", 22 October, available at <http://www.osce.org/fom/52218>, (accessed 22 July 2011).

¹⁴⁷ Cumhuriyet (1999), "Ahmet Taner Kislali", 21 October, available at <http://www.cpi.org/killed/1999/ahmet-taner-kislali.php>, (accessed 22 July 2011).

15 November. Plans. Turkish target. The police discovered that a group of 20 IBDA-C members were planning a large terrorist attack in Istanbul. Two of the arrested persons were well known to the Turkish public, such as the Professor in Theology at Istanbul University, Yasar Nuri Ozturk, and a writer named Fatih Altayli (Karmon 2003a: 52).

December. Kidnapping. Turkish target. IBDA-C. IBDA-C tried to prevent prison guards from entering their prison. IBDA-C took more than 100 hostages. As a result, 54 guards were injured (UNHCR 2001: 36).

December. Plans. U.S. Target. Al-Qaida. Six persons from Libya were arrested. They were supposed to have a link to al-Qaida, and were planning an attack against the U.S. Embassy in Ankara (Cline 2004: 322).

5.3 The 2000s

2000

January and February. Bombs. Turkish targets. IBDA-C. Government offices and secularist newspapers were attacked with four bombs in Istanbul. IBDA-C claimed responsibility for the attacks (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2010–2011; International Institute for Strategic Studies 2000).

11 January. Shooting. Police targets. Hezbollah. Three police officers were killed by Hezbollah operatives in a shootout in Istanbul (Kohlmann 2003). This led to the finding of 50 dead bodies in Hezbollah safe houses, mainly people that had disappeared or been kidnapped in the 1990s (Gorvett 2000). Later the number of victims rose to 156 (UNHCR 2001: 33).

October. Shooting. Police target. Hezbollah. A policeman was killed by Hezbollah members (UNHCR 2001: 35).

31 December. Bomb. Unknown target. Unknown organization, IBDA-C suspected. A bomb exploded in Istanbul. 10 persons were injured.¹⁴⁸

2001

24 January. Shooting. Police target. Hezbollah. More than 20 men from Hezbollah killed six policemen, including the police chief of Diyarbakır, Gaffar Okkan (Atalar 2006: 311; Kohlmann 2003). Okkan had received several threats from Hezbollah before the attack.¹⁴⁹

January. Plans. Turkish targets. The Caliphate State/al-Qaida. Turkish police announced that Bin Laden had ordered the Caliphate State to occupy the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul and put the Caliphate flag on top of the building. He had also ordered them to raid a Turkish TV station

¹⁴⁸ The Associated Press, 2003c.

¹⁴⁹ MSNBC (2001), "Police chief killed in terror attack", 24 January, available at <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/58971.asp>, (accessed 21 July 2011).

afterwards, in order to explain the events. The group had planned to execute the orders if Kaplan was extradited to Turkey.¹⁵⁰

17 February. Bomb. Turkish/American target. Unknown group. A bomb was found at a McDonald's restaurant in Istanbul. Nobody was injured. No organization took responsibility for the bomb (U.S. Department of State 2002).

15 March. Hijacking. Turkish target. Unknown group. A plane in Istanbul was hijacked to go to Saudi Arabia. Three Russians and one Turk were killed. No organization took responsibility for the hijacking (U.S. Department of State 2002).

26 March. Fire. Iranian target. Unknown group. A man poured oil on the ground in front of the Iranian Embassy in Ankara and set it alight. Nobody was injured. No organization took responsibility for the fire (U.S. Department of State 2002).

22 April. Hostage taking. Unknown target. Chechen group. 120 persons were taken hostage in Istanbul by gunmen from Chechnya. On 23 April all the hostages were released. Nobody was injured (U.S. Department of State 2002).

April. Hand grenade. Turkish target. IBDA-C. IBDA-C took responsibility for an attack with hand grenades on the Turkish General Consulate in Düsseldorf. Nobody was injured in the attack (Nesser 2004: 96).

April. Shooting. Police target. IBDA-C. Members of IBDA-C shot two policemen in Istanbul (UNHCR 2001: 36).

28 September. Bomb. Turkish/American target. Unknown group. A bomb exploded at a McDonald's restaurant in Istanbul. Three persons were injured. No organization took responsibility for the bomb (U.S. Department of State 2002).

October. Shooting. Police target. Hezbollah. Two undercover policemen were killed by Hezbollah.¹⁵¹

18 December. Shooting. Police target. The Caliphate State. A policeman was killed by two members of the Caliphate State when he tried to stop them on the street in order to check their identity cards.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ Hürriyet (2002a).

¹⁵¹ The Guardian/Wikileaks (2011), "US embassy cables: Turkey and terrorism", 18 January, cable dated: 2002-11-15, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/4338>, (accessed 21 July 2011).

¹⁵² Anatolia (2001), "Turkey: Suspected Police Killers Belong to "Kaplanist" AFID Organization", 22 December, FBIS translated text.

2002

18 November. Hijacking. Turkish target. Unknown group. A man with a knife tried to hijack an El Al airplane on its way from Tel Aviv to Istanbul, 15 minutes before landing. Security personnel managed to stop the hijacker. No organization was known to be responsible for the attack (U.S. Department of State 2003).¹⁵³

Date unknown. Plans. Turkish target. The Army of Jerusalem. Twenty-four members of the Army of Jerusalem were indicted for planning a coup against the Turkish state in order to establish Islamic rule in the country (The American Foreign Policy Council 2011).

2003

April. Plans. Turkish target. Al-Qaida. In early April it was revealed that al-Qaida had planned an attack using suicide bombers or other explosives later the same month. Potential targets were “business centres, airports, humanitarian aid establishments and logistic depots in Turkey, the U.S., England, Israel, Spain and Australia”.¹⁵⁴

11 June. Hand grenades. U.S. target. Hamas. Two hand grenades were thrown into the U.S. Consulate’s garden. Nobody was injured. The attack was in retaliation for an attempted Israeli assassination on a leader of Hamas (U.S. Department of State 2004b).

14 October. Suicide bomb. Turkish target. Unknown group. A suicide bomb exploded outside the Turkish Embassy in Iraq. Two persons were killed and at least 13 were injured.¹⁵⁵

15 November. Suicide bombs. Jewish targets. Al-Qaida. Two synagogues, Neve Shalom and Beth Israel, were bombed simultaneously by suicide bombers in pickup trucks. 20 persons died and more than 300 were wounded (U.S. Department of State 2004b). The original target had been the Incirlik base in southern Turkey, but the plans changed because of the security at the base.¹⁵⁶ The bombers were identified as Mesut Cabuk and Gokhan Elaltuntas from Bingöl, with links to Al-Qaida.¹⁵⁷

20 November. Suicide bombs. British targets. Al-Qaida. A British bank and the British Consulate were hit almost simultaneously by car bombs. 41 persons, including the British Consul, died. More than 560 were injured (U.S. Department of State 2004b). The Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front (IBDA-C) claimed responsibility for both attacks jointly with al-Qaida, a claim which was

¹⁵³ Chicago Tribune (2002), “Hijack attempt foiled aboard El Al jetliner”. 18 November. available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-11-18/news/0211180148_1_flight-attendant-cockpit-door-el-al, (accessed 8 January 2012).

¹⁵⁴ The Courier Mail, 2003.

¹⁵⁵ The Associated Press, 2003c.

¹⁵⁶ Today’s Zaman, 2003a.

¹⁵⁷ Today’s Zaman (2003b), “Turks Arrest Synagogue Bombing Suspect”, 30 November, available at <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-4276-turks-arrest-synagogue-bombing-suspect.html>, (accessed 4 July 2011); Fratta 2010: 365.

not believed by several experts (Gorvett 2004: 36–37).¹⁵⁸ The bombers were Feridun Ugurlu, who had earlier been with radical Islamists in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and Azad Ekinci.¹⁵⁹ An alleged operative in al-Qaida, Abu Mohammed al-Ablaj came with another claim that he was behind the bombings (Fratta 2010: 365).¹⁶⁰ The attacks were implemented on recommendation from Osama bin Laden. Muhammad Atef was another central al-Qaida member behind the attacks (Cakir 2008). According to Israeli media, one of the arrested Al-Qaida members, Harun Ilhan, said that the original plan had been to attack an Israeli cruise ship in Alanya. When the ship did not dock in Alanya, the perpetrators changed their target to the British Consulate in Istanbul.¹⁶¹

24 December. Threats. Western/Turkish target. Al-Qaida suspected. On 24 December Turkish police warned that attacks had been planned against Western targets in Turkey and the Akmerkez shopping center in Istanbul. These plans were seen as a continuation of the bombings in November. According to Turkish police, some of the alleged terrorists had entered Turkey from Syria, while others were planning to enter Turkey from the same country.¹⁶²

2004

9 March. Suicide bombs. Masonic target. Unknown Islamists. Two Islamists bombed the Masonic Lodge in Istanbul, which they referred to as a pro-Zionist target. The two Islamists were named Nihat Doğruel and Engin Vural, and they had no links to any organization, operating on their own. Two persons died and six were wounded (Cakir 2008).¹⁶³ Thirteen persons were charged for this attack (U.S. Department of State 2005: 54).

May. Assassination. Turkish target. IBDA-C. In May 2004 seven members of IBDA-C were indicted for the murder of Colonel Ihsan Güven, the leader of a sect named “Dost” (friend), and his wife (U.S. Department of State 2004a).

14 June. Bomb. Turkish target. Unknown organization. A small bomb exploded outside a bank in Kadıköy, Istanbul. One person was injured. The bomb had been placed in a garbage bin. No organization claimed responsibility for the attack. At the same time there was a meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, but this meeting was located 10 kilometres from the

¹⁵⁸ Today’s Zaman, 2003a; Today’s Zaman, 2004.

¹⁵⁹ Today’s Zaman (2003c), “Report: DNA Test Identifies Turk Bomber”, 24 November, available at <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-4200-report-dna-test-identifies-turk-bomber.html>, (accessed 4 July 2011).

¹⁶⁰ Today’s Zaman (2003d), “Turkey makes arrests in connection with suicide bombings: governments warn of more attacks”, 21 November, available at <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-4150-turkey-makes-arrests-in-connection-with-suicide-bombings-governments-warn-of-more-attacks.html>, (accessed 4 July 2011).

¹⁶¹ Jerusalem Post (2003), “Report: al-Qaida aimed to bomb Israeli passenger ship”, 27 December, available at <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1047332/posts>, (accessed 3 August 2011).

¹⁶² Turkish Daily News (2003b), “Police Warn of Terror Threat in Turkey”, 24 December, available at <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-4645-police-warn-of-terror-threat-in-turkey.html>, (accessed 4 July 2011).

¹⁶³ Al Jazeera (2004), “Bombers attack Istanbul Masonic Lodge”, 10 March, available at <http://english.aljazeera.net/archive/2004/03/20084914247975106.html>, (accessed 21 June 2011).

explosion. Two weeks later Turkey hosted a NATO summit in Istanbul, in which President George W. Bush participated.¹⁶⁴

May. Plans. Turkish/NATO target. The Caliphate State. In May 2004 it was discovered that members of the Caliphate State had prepared bomb letters. The police did not know which targets the organization had planned to send the letters to, but suspected that both Turkish and NATO targets were possible.¹⁶⁵

June. Plans. NATO target. Ansar al-Islam. In June 2004 Ansar al-Islam planned to attack the NATO summit in Istanbul. The suspects were said to have been insurgents in Iraq and members of Ansar al-Islam (Cozzens 2005).¹⁶⁶ The CIA supposedly told Turkish police that the plans were coordinated by a man with a false Yemeni passport, Muhammed Mustapha. He cooperated with a Yemeni, Muhammed Aziz. In the house of the suspects in Bursa the police found Al-Qaida training documents, CDs of Bin Laden and materials for making explosives (U.S. Department of State 2005).¹⁶⁷

2005

4 August. Plans. Israeli target. Al-Qaida. In Antalya Loa'i Mohammad Haj Bakr al-Sakka was suspected of planning a bomb attack on an Israeli cruise ship.¹⁶⁸ He had bought a yacht for \$6,000, which he was planning to fill with explosives and crash into the cruise ship. A bomb exploded by accident in his house on 4 August, which led the police to discover the plans (Cakir 2008). Al-Sakka had used plastic surgery to attempt to change his identity. According to Turkish police, al-Sakka had a central role in al-Qaida.¹⁶⁹

2006

February. Plans. US/NATO target. Al-Qaida. Members of al-Qaida were discovered to be planning a bomb attack on the Incirlik base.¹⁷⁰

17 May. Assassinations. Turkish target. Unknown group. A Turkish man entered a session of the Council of the State (Danıştay) and killed a judge. Four others were also killed. The man yelled

¹⁶⁴ Turkish Daily News (2004c), "Small bomb explodes, one injured", 15 June, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=small-bomb-explodes-one-injured-2004-06-15>, (accessed 4 June 2011).

¹⁶⁵ Milliyet (2003a), "Report: Caliphate State Illegal Org Plans "Bomb Letter" Action Throughout Turkey", 3 June, FBIS translated text.

¹⁶⁶ Turkish Daily News (2004b), "Security efforts for the summit: 301 arrests, 125 detentions and foiled bomb attacks", 29 June, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=security-efforts-for-the-summit-301-arrests-125-detentions-and-foiled-bomb-attacks-2004-06-29>, (accessed 1 August 2011).

¹⁶⁷ International News, "CIA tipped off Turkey over al-Qaeda plan to attack June NATO Summit", 20 May 2004, available at <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1139008/posts>, (accessed 3 August 2011).

¹⁶⁸ MSNBC (2006), "Al-Qaida suspect juggled aliases, faked death", 2 January, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10679796/ns/world_news-terrorism/, (accessed 4 July 2011).

¹⁶⁹ CBS News (2009).

¹⁷⁰ The Journal of Turkish Weekly (2006), "Al-Qaeda Planned Missile Attack on Incirlik Base", 19 February, available at <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/26206/al-qaeda-planned-missile-attack-on-incirlik-air-base.html>, (accessed 21 July 2011).

“God is great” or “I am God’s soldier” when he entered the room. Most commentators claimed that he acted as an Islamist. It was later concluded that he had links to the Ergenekon (Park 2008; Bacık, Gökhan and Salur 2007).

1 December. Indirect threat. Christian target. Al-Qaida. When the Pope visited Turkey on 1 December 2006 al-Qaida Iraq called the visit part of a “crusader campaign”.¹⁷¹ It was not a direct threat, but the statement said that al-Qaida was “confident in the defeat of Rome in all parts of the Islamic world.”¹⁷²

2007

18 August. Hijacked plane. Turkish target. Al-Qaida. Two men were sentenced to prison after hijacking a plane from northern Cyprus on 18 August. The men had ties to al-Qaida, and one of them had been to an al-Qaida training camp in Afghanistan in 2004. They used a fake bomb to force the plane go to Iran. Instead the pilots landed in Antalya and the hijackers surrendered.¹⁷³

Date unknown. Plans. Israeli target. Al-Qaida. According to Israeli media, members of al-Qaida planned to attack Israeli targets in Turkey in 2007 (Cakir 2008).

10 July. Bomb. Unknown target. Unknown organization. A packet exploded outside the District Governor’s office in the Bahçelievler district of Istanbul. Two persons were injured. The police did not know who sent the package.¹⁷⁴

11 September. Car bomb. Turkish target. Unknown organization. The police defused a large vehicle bomb in the Kurtulus district of Ankara. The car contained 580 kilograms of an improvised explosive device (IED). Afterwards, the police claimed that it was probably the PKK that stood behind the bomb. Others have pointed to al-Qaida in Turkey, based on the fact that the IED was the same as the one used in the November 2003 bombings, a device the PKK has never used (Jenkins 2007b).

2008

24 January. Shooting. Police target. Al-Qaida. Four members of al-Qaida and one policeman died after a shooting occurring during a raid against Islamist militants in Gaziantep on 24 January. Two of the militants were Mehmet Polat, who was involved in the November 2003-

¹⁷¹ The Namibian (2006), “Al Qaeda: Pope visit to Turkey part of anti-Islam campaign”, 1 December, available at http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=23330&no_cache=1, (accessed 21 July 2011).

¹⁷² Chicago Tribune (2006), “Al Qaeda criticizes pope’s trip to Turkey”, 30 November, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-11-30/news/0611300362_1_islamic-world-islam-and-violence-crusader-campaign, (accessed 21 July 2011).

¹⁷³ Today’s Zaman (2010b), “Report: 2 imprisoned for hijacking plane in Turkey”, 28 December, available at <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-230924-report-2-imprisoned-for-hijacking-plane-in-turkey.html>, (accessed 5 July 2011).

¹⁷⁴ Today’s Zaman (2007), “Bahçelievler explosion leaves 2 injured”, 11 July, available at <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-116463-bahcelievler-explosion-leaves-2-injured.html>, (accessed 21 July 2011).

bombings, and his son. They killed a policeman and wounded four others before they killed themselves (Bekdil 2008; Uslu 2009b).

9 July. Shooting. U.S. target. Al-Qaida. The U.S. Consulate in Istanbul was attacked by men with pistols and shotguns. Six persons were killed. Three of these were policemen and three were attackers. One culprit, Erkan Kargin, had earlier been to Afghanistan (Geo-Strategic Direct 2009; U.S. Department of State 2011; Uslu 2008).¹⁷⁵

21 July. Robbery. Turkish target. Al-Qaida suspected. Three men with Kalashnikovs attacked a jewellery store. Turkish police suspected that the men were al-Qaida members (Uslu 2009a).

December. Plans. U.S. Target. Al-Qaida. Turkish police arrested 22 members of al-Qaida and discovered plans to attack the U.S., Israeli and British Consulates in Istanbul (Uslu 2009a).

2009

27 January. Robbery. Turkish target. Al-Qaida suspected. Four masked men robbed a jewellery store in Istanbul. Turkish police also suspected links to a robbery two days afterwards, and that the incidents were organized by al-Qaida (Uslu 2009a).

29 January. Robbery. Turkish target. Al-Qaida. Four members of al-Qaida were stopped by undercover police while they were robbing a post office in Istanbul. One of them was killed, one was wounded and the last two escaped (Uslu 2009a).

February. Plans. Israeli and Turkish targets. Al-Qaida. The CIA warned Turkey and Israel that al-Qaida had plans to attack Israeli tourists in Turkey. They also suspected that al-Qaida planned to attack the airports in Istanbul, Izmir or Antalya (Uslu 2009b).¹⁷⁶

February. Plans. Jewish target. Al-Qaida suspected. 11 persons suspected of having links to al-Qaida were arrested. The police found plans to attack a rabbi in Bursa (Uslu 2009b).

August. Plans. Israeli target. Lebanese Hezbollah. In August 2009 Turkish officials discovered that Lebanese Hezbollah, in cooperation with Iranian intelligence, was planning to attack Israeli targets in Turkey as revenge for the death of Mugniyeh, a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative.¹⁷⁷

October. Plans. Western/NATO targets. Islamic Jihad League. In October 2009 50 persons were arrested in Batman, Erzurum, Istanbul, Konya and Van, suspected of being members of the

¹⁷⁵ BBC News 2008; Fox News (2008), "Al Qaeda Blamed for Terror Attack outside of U.S. Consulate in Turkey", 9 July, available at <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,378346,00.html>, (accessed 20 July 2011).

¹⁷⁶ Hürriyet Daily News (2009a), "Police detain 50 in al-Qaeda raids", 15 October, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=50-held-in-al-qaeda-raids-2009-10-15>, (accessed 18 July 2011).

¹⁷⁷ Haaretz.com (2009), "Turkish forces foil Hezbollah attack on Israeli target", 12 September, available at <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/turkish-forces-foil-Hezbollah-attack-on-israeli-target-1.2529>, (accessed 19 July 2011).

Islamic Jihad League, an organization with links to al-Qaida. The police discovered plans to attack Western and NATO targets in Turkey and Germany. The arrested persons were all suspected of having received training in Afghanistan (Geo-Strategy Direct 2009).

5.4 The 2010s

2010

January. Plans. Turkish/NATO target. Al-Qaida suspected. In January Turkish police arrested 160 men with suspected links to al-Qaida. An anonymous police source said that they found plans to attack Turkish police and Turkish soldiers in Afghanistan (Center for Strategic & International Studies 2010: 2).¹⁷⁸

1 February. Shooting. U.S. target. Al-Qaida. The U.S. Consulate in Adana was shot at. No one was injured. Two days later six persons were arrested, suspected of organizing the shooting. Officials reported that they had found al-Qaida documents in their flats.¹⁷⁹

October. Plans. NATO target. Al-Qaida. In late October five students with links to al-Qaida in Afghanistan were arrested in Izmir. One of the arrested men, named Abdulkadir Kucuk, was suspected of designing computer programs that could disturb the control over unmanned drones.¹⁸⁰ According to Turkish police, the leader of these students, called “Zekeria”, was in Afghanistan, fighting for al-Qaida. Turkish police claimed to have clear evidence that these persons were members of al-Qaida.

29 December. Plans. Turkish target. Al-Qaida suspected. On 29 December between eight and ten men were arrested in Bursa, Turkey. They were suspected of being members of al-Qaida, planning a terrorist attack before the New Year celebration.¹⁸¹

2011

21 January. Plans. Unknown target. Al-Qaida suspected. A man was arrested on 21 January, suspected of having links to al-Qaida and planning an attack on an unknown target in Adana. The

¹⁷⁸ Arabia 2000, “120 Detained In Coordinated Raids On Al-Qaeda Suspects in Turkey”, 23 January, International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, available at <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=f20d463a-a802-4806-affb-05b4b315b45c%40sessionmgr115&vid=2&hid=127&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWZwhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=tsh&AN=6FI1804535475>, (accessed 6 July 2011).

¹⁷⁹ SETimes (2010), “Turkish police arrest al-Qaeda suspects”, 4 February, available at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/newsbriefs/2010/02/04/nb-07, (accessed 18 July 2011).

¹⁸⁰ Reuters (2010), “Turkish police arrest 5 Al Qaeda suspects in Izmir”, 22 October, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/22/security-turkey-alqaeda-idUSLDE69L0PP20101022>, (accessed 7 July 2011).

¹⁸¹ Milliyet (2010), “Bursda`da El Kaide operasyonu: 8 gözaltı”, 29 December, available at <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/bursa-da-el-kaide-operasyonu-8-gozalti/turkiye/sondakikaarsiv/29.12.2010/1332374/default.htm>, (accessed 5 July 2011); Today’s Zaman (2010d), “Turkish police detain 10 al Qaeda suspects”, 31 December, available at <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-231177-turkish-police-detain-10-al-qaeda-suspects.html>, (accessed 5 July 2011).

man, named Waleed Abdullah Ebrahim Al Barghash, had already been charged for terrorism in Saudi Arabia.¹⁸²

February. Threats. Israeli target. Lebanese Hezbollah. In February 2011 Israel closed its embassy in Ankara due to terror threats from Lebanese Hezbollah.¹⁸³

April. Plans. US/NATO target. Al-Qaida. In April 2011 Turkish officials claimed that members of al-Qaida had planned an attack on the Incirlik base with rockets. The attack was supposed to be carried out by Abu Muhammad al-Kurdi and Salih Battal, two men from Syria (Jamestown Foundation 2011).

26 May. Motorcycle bomb. Turkish/Israeli target. Unknown organization. A bomb exploded on a motorcycle in Etiler, Istanbul. Eight persons were injured, two of them severely. No organization claimed responsibility for the attack. According to Turkish officials, this was a PKK attack. An Italian newspaper wrote that it was an attack by Lebanese Hezbollah which was supposed to hit the Israeli Consul General to Istanbul, Moshe Kimhi.¹⁸⁴

12 July. Plans. U.S. target. Unknown Islamists. 14 persons were arrested in Ankara, Bursa and Yalova, suspected of planning an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Ankara. The arrested persons were suspected of planning the revenge attack after the death of bin Laden, and they were also suspected of having links to terrorist groups in Afghanistan. A few days later U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Istanbul. 700 kg of ammonium nitrate, often used in explosives, was found in a raid on a house the same week, but the police did not say if there was a link between the explosives and the arrested men.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸² The Saudi Gazette (2011), "Turkish police arrest al-Qaida suspect", 23 January 2011, available at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/newsbriefs/2011/01/23/nb-09, (accessed 18 July 2011); Gulfnews (2011), "Turkey arrests wanted Saudi terrorism suspect", 23 January, available at <http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/turkey-arrests-wanted-saudi-terrorism-suspect-1.750812>, (accessed 21 July 2011).

¹⁸³ Israel National News (2011), "Four Israeli Embassies, Consulates Reported Shut Down", 17 February, available at <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/142397>, (accessed 2 July 2011).

¹⁸⁴ The Journal of Turkish Weekly (2011), "Istanbul bombing was Hezbollah attack on Israeli envoy", 18 July 2011, available at <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/119441/-39-istanbul-bombing-was-Hezbollah-attack-on-israeli-envoy-39-.html>, (accessed 18 July 2011).

¹⁸⁵ Huffington Post (2011), "Turkey Embassy Plot: 14 Jailed Over Alleged Al-Qaeda Plot To Attack U.S. Embassy", 16 July 2011, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/16/turkey-embassy-plot-14-jailed-alleged-plot_n_900587.html, (accessed 18 July 2011).

6 Internet activity

There is a large amount of jihadist web pages using the Turkish language. These are both pages made by violent Islamists in Turkey and pages constructed by violent Islamists from other countries, seeking to reach a new audience. This report does not aim to answer the questions about the background of these pages. It will instead give a descriptive introduction to some of the most important jihadist web pages in Turkish. This introduction is only to the main content of these pages, and tries to give at least a partial answer to basic questions such as: What are their names? How do they look? Who uses them? How are they used? Since this is only a brief introduction to a field where little research has been undertaken, there are more pages that should be looked into.

According to the scholar Brian Glyn Williams (2006), the focus of Turkish jihadists on Internet forums changed around 2005 from Russians as their main target, and Chechnya as the main battle, towards Israel and the United States as their main enemies. This report can neither support nor weaken this statement. As of 2011, the main trait is that Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and Chechnya are used as causes for involvement. The United States, Israel and the Turkish state are identified as main targets, while Russia is less often seen as a target on these pages. The pages are sorted based on type of page, whether it is a forum, an ordinary web page, a Facebook page or a YouTube page. Many of the pages change addresses frequently. For this reason I have saved all the pages to which I refer.

6.1 Web pages

6.1.1 Şeriat (Sharia)



حَاكِمِيَّتْ قَيْدِسْزَوْ شَرْطَسِيزْ آللهِ نَدِرْ

HAKİMİYYET KAYITSIZ ŞARTSIZ ALLAH'INDIR

in devleti yoksa onu kurtmak, varsa onu korumak, kadın-erkek h

Türkçe Arabic English Deutsch Kürtçe Bosnak

2 Muharrem 1433 28 Kasım 2011 Pazartesi

ANA SAYFA

Yenilikler
Hareketimiz
Haber/Yorum
Kitaplar
Bildiriler
Hutbeler
Fıkhi Meseleler
Veciz Sözlür
Vaazlar (Video-MP3)
İlahi/Marşlar
Resimler
D-I-A Dergisi

Müslümanlar olarak, bu zillet ve bu perişanlıktan kurtulma, dünya ve ahiret saadetine mazhar olmak ancak Saadet ve Hulefa-i Rasidin devrine dönmekle mümkündür!

1433 HİCRİ YILINIZ MÜBAREK OLSUN

HİCRİ TAKVİM TÜRKÇE- çıkmıştır...

HİCRİ TAKVİM ALMANCA- çıkmıştır...

HİCRİ TAKVİM NEDİR?

1432 HİCRİ YILBAŞI VE MÜJEDDİD



Günün Sohbeti

İslam Dini aynı z. devlettir!

The page is linked to the Caliphate State. The main page has pictures of both Metin and Cemalettin Kaplan.¹⁸⁶ One of the first links leads to a page saying “The memory of 12th October will not be erased”.¹⁸⁷ It was on this day in 2004 that Metin Kaplan was sent from prison in Germany to Turkey. In the text this is referred to as “blasphemy”, particularly because this happened during Ramadan. Another link goes to the page “Who are we?”. This page contains a large document explaining the fundamentals of the organization, which calls itself “Barbaros Hareketi” (“The Barbaros Movement”).¹⁸⁸ According to a presentation of this movement on an Islamist forum, this refers to the Barbaros Mosque in Cologne, a mosque where the Kaplans have been active.¹⁸⁹

The web page refers to eleven books one can download from the website.¹⁹⁰ It also presents announcements of the organization, as well as Friday prayers and Fatwas, written by Cemalettin Hocaoğlu. In some places Hocaoğlu signs with “Kaplan” in parentheses, combined with photographs of Cemalettin and Metin Kaplan.¹⁹¹ The second leader of “The Caliphate State”, Hasan Bahri Gökbulut, has been active on another site, www.hilafet.org, under the name “Hasan Hacıoğlu”.¹⁹² This address leads to the web page Şeriat.

¹⁸⁶ Seriat (2011a), “Ana Sayfa”, available at <http://www.seriat.net/>, (accessed 27 November 2011).

¹⁸⁷ Seriat (2011e), “12 Ekim Zihinlerden Silinmeyecektir!”, available at <http://www.seriat.net/hbr/09-10-11-%2012%20Ekim-Metin-Hoca%20TC%20teslim%20edildi.pdf>, (accessed 27 November 2011).

¹⁸⁸ Seriat (2011b), “Biz Kimiz?”, available at <http://www.seriat.net/hrk/Barbaros%20Hareketi%27nin%2028.%20Sene-i%20Devriyesi.pdf>, (accessed 18 August 2011).

¹⁸⁹ Ummah (2002), “The Elected Khalif of all Muslims-Khalif Metin Kaplan“, December, available at <http://www.ummah.com/forum/showthread.php?20039-The-Elected-Khalif-of-all-Muslims-Khalif-Metin-Kaplan>, (accessed 8 January 2012).

¹⁹⁰ Seriat (2011c), “Kitaplar”, available at <http://www.seriat.net/ktp/ktp.htm>, (accessed 18 August 2011).

¹⁹¹ Seriat (2011d), “Resimler”, available at <http://www.seriat.net/rsm/rsm.htm>, (accessed 18 August 2011).

¹⁹² Anatolia, 2002d.

6.1.2 Şehadet takvimi (Martyr calendar)



This page is professionally made. The centre of the front page contains a list of martyrs from Afghanistan and Chechnya. At the bottom of this page, it states that 1,055 people “like” Şehadet takvimi on Facebook. The front page has a link to a page introducing Şehadet takvimi as a “charity organization”. Here it presents its projects, such as providing support to orphans in Chechnya and the ship Mavi Marmara. The organization states that it cooperates with IHH (İnsani Yardım Vakfı).¹⁹³ Another link on the front page leads to a page giving account information, and says that it is “quick and easy” to send money to the organization and order a calendar.¹⁹⁴ The theme of the upcoming calendar of 2012 is “Martyrs in the Islamic world from Turkey”.¹⁹⁵

Two other top stories are salutes to two fallen mujahedeen, Bahattin Yıldız and Faruk Aktaş, who died in a “suspicious” plane crash in Afghanistan on 17 May 2010. The salute says that there had been prayers for close friends and family at the Youth Culture Center and Cemetery in Edirnekapı.¹⁹⁶ One of the articles has a link to a salute made by a representative of IHH¹⁹⁷, who

¹⁹³ Şehadet takvimi (2011a), “Ana Sayfa”, available at <http://sehadettakvimi.com/>, (accessed 28 November 2011); Şehadet takvimi (2011e), “Şehadet takvimi projeleri”, available at <http://sehadettakvimi.com/sehadet-takvimi-projeler.html>, (accessed 28 November 2011).

¹⁹⁴ Şehadet takvimi (2011f), “Sipariş bilgileri”, available at <http://sehadettakvimi.com/sehadet-takvimi-siparis.html>, (accessed 28th November 2011).

¹⁹⁵ Şehadet takvimi (2011i), “2012 Şehadet takvimi hakkında”, available at <http://sehadettakvimi.com/2012%20C5%9EEHADET%20TAKV% C4%B0M% C4%B0%20HAKKINDA-40-haber.html>, (accessed 28 November 2011).

¹⁹⁶ Şehadet takvimi (2011b), “Bahattin Yıldız Kabri Başında Dualarla Anıldı”, 18 May, available at <http://www.sehadettakvimi.com/Turkiye/236-BAHATTIN-YILDIZ-KABRI-BASINDA-DUALARLA-ANILDI.html>, (accessed 12 August 2011).

¹⁹⁷ The IHH is a charity organization, but there have been allegations that IHH has supported Hamas financially. IHH was banned in Israel in 2008 for having affiliations to Hamas (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008).

claimed to know Yıldız from charity work in Afghanistan, posted at the web site Timeturk.¹⁹⁸ One article refers to Osama bin Laden as “the young, brave man of the Islamic Umma, a courageous mujahedeen, the nightmare of the infidels, who became a martyr, as he wished for”.¹⁹⁹

Another main story is about the martyr captain Abdullah (Komutan Abdullah) who fell on 2 May 2011 after 16 years of fighting in Chechnya. The author of the text called himself “Ansar Yusuf Çalışkan”.²⁰⁰ It is possible to comment underneath the articles, but most of the articles have very few comments. The main page also linked to a video gallery, but this contained no videos.²⁰¹ A photo gallery contained pictures of three persons: Metin Yüksel (one of the first Islamist martyrs in Turkey), Samil Basayev (a jihadist in Chechnya) and Şeyh Ahmet Yasin (The founder of Hamas).²⁰²

6.1.3 Akademya (Academy)

¹⁹⁸ Şehadet takvimi (2011c), “Bahattin Yıldız ve Faruk Aktaş’ı özleme anıyoruz”, 17 May, available at <http://www.sehadettakvimi.com/Turkiye/235-BAHATTIN-YILDIZ-VE-FARUK-AKTASI-OZLEMLE-ANIYORUZ.html>, (accessed 30 August 2011).

¹⁹⁹ Şehadet takvimi (2011g), “Usame bin Laden şehid oldu”, 2 May, available at <http://www.sehadettakvimi.com/Afganistan/233-USAME-BIN-LADEN-SEHID-OLDU.html>, (accessed 12 August 2011).

²⁰⁰ Şehadet takvimi, 2011a.

²⁰¹ Şehadet takvimi (2011h), “Video Galeri”, available at <http://www.sehadettakvimi.com/video>, (accessed 30 August 2011).

²⁰² Şehadet takvimi (2011d), “Foto Galeri”, available at <http://www.sehadettakvimi.com/fotogaleri>, (accessed 30 August 2011).

Akademya is a web page related to IBDA-C. The front page contains a list of writers, where Necip Fazıl Kısakürek and Salih Mirzabeyoğlu are the first two writers mentioned.²⁰³ One of the top news stories is also that Mirzabeyoğlu is up for a new court hearing.²⁰⁴ This page was closed in January 2012.

6.1.4 Büyük Doğu (The Great East)

This is another professional page, related to IBDA-C, giving the impression of being a newspaper with “news” on the front page. In the top right corner of the front page is an address of an office in Malatya, Turkey. It also contains a list with presentations of the writers and a link to a Facebook group where 408 persons seem to “like” Büyük Doğu.²⁰⁵ Several of the top news articles on the front page are about the Ergenekon investigation in Turkey.²⁰⁶ Another top article is a commercial for a book about Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, written by Salih Mirzabeyoğlu.²⁰⁷ The main point of one article is that İlker Başbuğ, who was the Chief of the General Staff of Turkey

²⁰³ Akademya (2011a), “Ana Sayfa”, available at <http://www.yeniakademya.org/index.html>, (accessed 29 November 2011).

²⁰⁴ Akademya (2011b), “Mirzabeyoğlu'na yeniden yargılama”, available at http://www.yeniakademya.org/haber-117-mirzabeyoglu%E2%80%99na_yeniden_yargilama.html, (accessed 29 November 2011).

²⁰⁵ Büyük Doğu (2012a), “Haber”, available at <http://www.buyukdogu.net/>, (accessed 8 January 2012).

²⁰⁶ Büyük Doğu (2012e), “Kılıçdaroğlu'na soruşturma açıldı”, available at <http://www.buyukdogu.net/gundem/kilicdaroglu-na-sorusturma-acildi-h273.html>, (accessed 8 January 2012); Büyük Doğu (2012b), “Haberal için Demirel'e yalvarmışlar”, available at <http://www.buyukdogu.net/iktibas/haberal-icin-demirele-yalvarmislar-h271.html>, (accessed 8 January 2012).

²⁰⁷ Büyük Doğu (2012c), ““Hakkımda Yazılmış Tek Harika Kitap” Necip Fazıl Kısakürek”, available at <http://www.buyukdogu.net/buyuk-dogu/hakkimda-yazilmis-tek-harika-kitap-necip-fazil-kisakurek-h267.html>, (accessed 8 January 2012).

until 2010, had become a member of the Masonic community in Turkey.²⁰⁸ The Masonic Lodge in Istanbul has been attacked several times by Islamists (Cakir 2008; U.S. Department of State 1995).

6.2 Forums

6.2.1 Islam-tr

The screenshot shows the Islam-tr.net website forum page. The header includes the site logo and navigation links. The main content area features a banner for 'Hayırlı Bayramlar Bayram Tebriği Yazmak İçin Tıkla' and a list of forum topics under 'En Çok Okunan Konular' and 'En Çok Yanıtlanan Konular'.

En Çok Okunan Konular	Son Konular
1 Mucahidler ve Mazlumlar İçin Gece...	432,017 Ramazan Boyunca , Oruç Hakkındaki...
2 Görüntülü Takipli Kur'an Okuma ve...	134,411 Sakallı Bir Kimseye, "Papaza...
3 Son harften kelime türetmece	99,257 >>Ben Bir Güzel Gördüm...
4 Resimli Güzel Sözler	73,572 Hayırlı Bayramlar - Bayram...
5 SİGARA	71,341 Tevhidi medreseler.?
En Çok Yanıtlanan Konular	Taliban düşürdüğü helikopterin...
1 Son harften kelime türetmece	7,460 Bayram Gününün Adabı
2 Son Hececen Kelime Türetmece	4,060 Bayramsa bayramınız mübarek olsun!!!
3 !!!Gününi bi kelimeyle anlat !!!	3,121 Ayet ve Hadise Verilen Değer
	2,222 Fitir (fitre) Sadakası (Soruya Cevab)

This is a Sunni page. It has a forum with 9 themes, with several categories underneath.²⁰⁹ The most popular post in the categories has been read by 431,722 visitors, was published 8 May 2005, and is called “An invitation to night prayer to the Mujahedeen and the oppressed”, written by “Özcan Kaplan”. It says: “Let us pray that Allah frees the slaves in the world and for Muslim victory. (...) Let us be found in prayer for Allah to give us power for jihad to strengthen the Islamic towns of the countries of the false leaders (*tağutlar*), of those who are deprived after jihad and exodus (*Hicret*) and to wander around in the proud soil of those who put their minds to Allah”.²¹⁰

A man who calls himself Şeyh Abdullah writes that he can answer any question about Sunni Islam. The first example he presents on a question he can answer is “I want to participate in jihad.

²⁰⁸ Büyük Doğu (2012d), “İlker Başbuğ'un Mason Derneğine Üyeliği”, available at <http://www.buyukdogu.net/bd-haber/ilker-basbugun-mason-dernegine-uyeligi-h261.html>, (accessed 8 January 2012).

²⁰⁹ Islam-tr.net (2011), “Ana Sayfa”, available at <http://www.islam-tr.net>, (accessed 30 August 2011).

²¹⁰ Islam-tr.net (2005a), “Mucahidler ve Mazlumlar İçin Gece Namazına Dâvet”, available at <http://www.islam-tr.net/serbest-kursu/22-mucahidler-ve-mazlumlar-icin-gece-namazina-davet.html>, (accessed 30 August 2011).

How do I proceed?”. People have asked questions of many different types. Two popular posts include questions about religion in general: “Can I drink water while it is the call to prayer?” or “Can Christians and Jews go to paradise?”.²¹¹

6.2.2 Bir damla (A drop)

Yeni üyeler	En aktif üyelerimiz	En son aktif forum başlıkları					
Kullanıcılarımız	Joined	Kullanıcılarımız	Mesajlar	Konu	Tarih, Saat	Konuyu Başlatan	Forum
nedenimsin_41	30-08	eyvah	6165	Selamünaleyküm	27-08, 14:54	Engin Yılmaz	Tanışma
erkanakgul	29-08	ferhat	5311	Alper - Bize...	24-08, 23:33	enderhafız	İlahiler Ezgiler...
zekibo	29-08	yasemin01	4703	Mehmet Gökçe ...	24-08, 22:21	enderhafız	İlahiler Ezgiler...
rahmet31	29-08	elifbusra	4140	Mustafa Cihat ...	24-08, 21:27	enderhafız	İlahiler Ezgiler...
oicisler	29-08	nesli01	3184	Mustafa Cihat ...	24-08, 17:10	enderhafız	İlahiler Ezgiler...

This is a forum in Turkish with many categories. The front page has a link to a Facebook group called “İlahiler” (“The Divines”), which is liked by 597 persons.²¹² One of the categories is “Religious themes”, with a subcategory called “Martyrs and martyrdom”²¹³. One entry is written by “eyvah”, with a profile picture showing a man with something similar to explosives tied to his body. He has posted a poem about martyrdom, read by over 1,100 visitors.²¹⁴ Another entry by the same author, read by 776 visitors, quotes Abdul Aziz al-Moqrin (*Abdulaziz El Mukrin*), the leader of the al-Qaida group in the Arabian Peninsula from May 2003 to 2004. The quote reads:

“American supporters have today been devoted to their own false power. And this false power is starting to see its end. And the whole world knows this is coming. Now we are in labor pain for making this day of victory. Our brothers, wherever you are, they are, we are continuing to believe in the stroke against America and their supporters, the Fitna leading Jews.”

²¹¹ Islam-tr.net (2005b), “Şeyh Abdullah Yolcu Hoca Sorularınızı Yanıtlıyor”, available at <http://www.islam-tr.net/soru-cevap-bolumu/8-seyh-abdullah-yolcu-hoca-sorularinizi-yanitliyor.html>, (accessed 30 August 2011).

²¹² Bir Damla (2011), “Ana Sayfa”, available at <http://www.birdamla.net/forum/>, (accessed 5 August 2011).

²¹³ Bir Damla (2012), “Şehitler ve şehadet”, available at <http://www.birdamla.net/forum/sehitler-ve-sehadet-f121.html>, (accessed 7 January 2012).

²¹⁴ Bir Damla (2008), “Sükûtun çılgılığı, yetmiş iki ağıt kerbela”, available at <http://www.birdamla.net/forum/suk-tun-cigligi-yetmis-iki-agit-kerbela-t2816.html>, (accessed 7 January 2012).

He also quotes Commander Hattab in Chechnya, al-Banna, Malcolm X, Mustafa Chamran, Arif Güler, Aslan Maskhadov, Bilal Yıldızcı and Dudayev about martyrdom.²¹⁵

6.3 Facebook pages

6.3.1 Cihad ve Şehadet (Jihad and Martyr)



The screenshot shows the Facebook page for 'JIHAD ve SEHADET'. The page has 431 likes and 7 people talking about it. The main post is a video titled 'Onlar Ağlıyor..YA BİZ..BEĞEN^PAYLAŞ' with a duration of 3:27. The video is shared by 'Rahim Mouta ve Mevlüt Peksoy'. Below the video, there is a call to action: 'Bu sayfada bir şeyi beğenmek veya bir şey hakkında yorum yapmak mı istiyorsun?' with a 'Kaydol' button. The page also features a sidebar with navigation options like 'Duvar', 'Bilgiler', 'Fotoğraflar', and 'Arkadaşlarımı Davet Et'. The page is created on August 11, 2011.

This Facebook page named Jihad and Martyr (Cihad ve Şehadet) represents a Sunni Islamist group and contained a large amount of new videos, both when entered in August 2011 and January 2012.²¹⁶ Most of its content is referred to as jihad and martyrdom. One of its statements says: “This religion will always stand on its feet. To the one who falls of doomsday there is a group of Muslims that gets better, on the way it makes jihad and will never give up in war”.²¹⁷ There is also a video about a Turkish martyr. In January 2012 it has 431 followers on Facebook.²¹⁸

²¹⁵ Bir Damla (2011), “Şehidlerimizden”, available at <http://www.birdamla.net/forum/sehidlerimizden-t3184.html> (accessed 7 August 2011).

²¹⁶ Cihad ve Şehadet (2011), available at <http://tr-tr.facebook.com/pages/JIHAD-ve-SEHADET/223813240980996?sk=wall&filter=12>, (accessed 5 August 2011); Cihad ve Şehadet (2012), available at <http://tr-tr.facebook.com/pages/JIHAD-ve-SEHADET/223813240980996?sk=wall&filter=12>, (accessed 8 January 2012).

²¹⁷ Cihad ve Şehadet, 2011.

²¹⁸ Cihad ve Şehadet, 2012.

6.3.2 Hilafet Makamı (Caliphate Authority)

Hilafet Makamı Gefällt mir Seite erstellen

Regierungsinstitution · Konstantinopel, Istanbul, Turkey

Pinnwand Hilafet Makamı · Alle (Beliebte Beiträge)

Teilen: Beitrag

Schreib etwas ...

Hilafet Makamı
<http://www.seriati.net/hbr/08-12-11/c%F6z%FCm-ve-Kurtulusun-Yolu-hilafet.pdf>
<http://www.seriati.net/hbr/08-12-11/c%F6z%FCm-ve-Kurtulusun-Yolu-hilafet.pdf>
www.seriati.net

Gefällt mir · Kommentieren · vor 23 Stunden ·

Tek Yar, Tagutla Mucadele Timi und 2 anderen gefällt das.

Hilafet Makamı
<http://www.seriati.net/hbr/08-12-11/BIZ-KIMIZ-VE-NASIL-BIR-CEMAATIZ.pdf>
<http://www.seriati.net/hbr/08-12-11/BIZ-KIMIZ-VE-NASIL-BIR-CEMAATIZ.pdf>
www.seriati.net

Gefällt mir · Kommentieren · Gestern um 13:13 ·

1.049 gefällt das
99 sprechen darüber

Gefällt mir Alle anzeigen

Du möchtest angeben, dass dir diese Seite gefällt, oder einen Kommentar auf der Seite hinterlassen?

Um mit Hilafet Makamı interagieren zu können, musst du dich zunächst bei Facebook registrieren.

Registrieren

Facebook ist kostenlos und jeder kann sich registrieren. Du bist bereits ein Mitglied? [Melde dich an.](#)

This page is related to the Caliphate State. It has more than 1,000 followers and regularly posts videos of the Kaplans and about jihad.²¹⁹ The page has content in both German and Turkish.

²¹⁹ Hilafet Makamı (2012), available at <http://de-de.facebook.com/icchi>, (accessed 7 January 2011).

6.3.3 Cihad.biz



This Facebook page is related to a regular page called cihad.biz, which is no longer available. It was launched on 16 January 2012 with a declaration in Arabic and Turkish.²²⁰ The declaration stated that the main aim of this forum was to encourage believers to jihad. 42 Facebook-users “like” the page. The wall of the Facebook page says that it “likes” the IHH and has links to several pages in Turkish about jihad.²²¹

²²⁰ Jihadology (2012), “Statement of Declaration for new Turkish jihadi forum: Cihad.biz Yönetimi (Islamic Jihad Forum)”, 16 January, <http://jihadology.net/2012/01/16/statement-of-declaration-for-a-new-turkish-jihadi-forum-cihad-biz-yonetimi-islamic-jihad-forum/>, (accessed 22 April 2012).

²²¹ “Cihad.biz”(2012), available at <http://www.facebook.com/pages/Cihadbiz/223899437700435>, (accessed 22 April 2012).

6.3.4 Cihaderi (Jihadist)

facebook

Oturumumu sürekli açık tut

cihaderi.net | Facebook
http://tr-tr.facebook.com/pages/chaderine

Kaydol Facebook tanıdıklarınla iletişim kurmanı ve hayatında olup bitenleri paylaşmanı sağlar.

cihaderi.net Beğen Sayfa Ol

İnternet Sitesi

Duvar

cihaderi.net
2009-2010 yılında İSTANBUL -YALOVA-G.ANTEP-BURSA dan alınan 20'den fazla müslümanın mahkeme ve sorgu tutanağında bu sitenin ismi vardır. Mahkeme tutanağında geçen ifade "YASAL SERVER ÜZERİNDEN YAYIN YAPAN CİHADERİ.NET İSİMLİ SİTE VE BU SİTENİN YÖNETİCİSİ OLDUĞU BİLİNEN ..." diye geçmektedir.
26 Haziran, 02:17 · Beğen · Yorum Yap

cihaderi.net Bu ifadelere rağmen bu site açık tutulmakta ve yasal serverler üzerinden yayınına müsade edilmektedir. Aynı zamanda yöneticilerinin isimleri ve kimlik bilgileri dosyada olmasına rağmen bu kişilerin EL KAİDE oyunu oynamalarına müsade edilmektedir.
26 Haziran, 02:43

Selef Ebu Selef şerefsiz namussuz köpekleriftraç pislkler
26 Haziran, 06:43

cihaderi.net
CİHADERİ.NET SİTESİNİN YAYIN YAPTIĞI AKTİF BİLİŞİM SERVERLERİ VE BU HİZMETİ VEREN ŞİRKETİN İLETİŞİM BİLGİLERİ. BU MUNAFİK KARAKTERLİ KÖPEKLER YASAL SERVER ÜZERİNDEN YAYIN YAPIYORLAR VE NEDENSE !!!! TUTUKLANMIYOR YADA TAKİBATA UĞRAMIYORLAR.
Duvar Fotoğrafları

Benzer Facebook Sayfaları

Waynakh Online
750 kişi bunu beğendi.

One Love One Touch
579 kişi bunu beğendi.

HaberAyna
551 kişi bunu beğendi.

Daha Fazla

Duvar

Bilgiler

Fotoğraflar

Tartışmalar

Notlar

Hakkında

cihaderi.net isimli fasık sitenin asıl yüzünü ifşa ediyoruz

68
bunu beğendi

Bir Sayfa Oluştur

This Facebook page, named “Cihaderi” (“Jihadist”) has 91 followers, and was last updated in June 2011.²²² The members on the page discuss the fact that www.cihaderi.net has been closed, and this is presented as the reason why this Facebook page has been started. This is the only content of the page.

²²² “Cihaderi.net”, available at <http://tr-tr.facebook.com/pages/cihaderinet/198020530214513>, (accessed 8 January 2012).

7 Bibliography

The academic literature on violent Islamism has grown tremendously since 9/11. Much of this literature has dealt with the Arab world and the Afghanistan/Pakistan region. In comparison, the literature on Turkish violent Islamism is limited. Yet, there are some substantive scholarly works on the topic. This does not mean that there have not been good works on the subject. The Israeli scholar Ely Karmon (1997; 1998a; 1998b; 1998c; 1999; 2000; 2003a and 2003b) is much cited, after writing several texts about radical Islamism in Turkey.²²³ These texts are mainly about the late 1990s and early 2000s. They give a solid introduction to the most important groups and their ideological background in Turkey. Guido Steinberg (2009a and 2009b) is another scholar that has given a good introduction to violent Islamism in Turkey, and this analysis is more recent. Steinberg guides the reader through the most important violent Islamist groups, their international links and the activity level of the Turkish Diaspora.

Mehmet Orhan (2010) has written a newer account of the background of arrested al-Qaida members in Turkey, a useful tool in order to understand how the Turkish branch is organized and members are recruited. Brian Glym Williams (2005 and 2006; see also Williams and Erim 2011a and 2011b) have written several short articles for the Jamestown Foundation about jihadism in Turkey, and particularly about the links between Turkish jihadists and Afghanistan. Even though these works are short, they are based on broad empirical material.

The current bibliography has been compiled based on searches in several academic search engines.²²⁴ The author has searched for words such as “Turkey + jihad”, “Terrorism + Turkey” and “Islamism + Terrorism + Turkey”. The texts that seemed relevant to the study of violent Islamism in Turkey were then included. Afterwards, the author read some of these and searched for their sources. This has provided a larger collection of literature. Not all the texts in the bibliography have been read. This makes it possible that some of the texts are not as relevant as they seem. It has been particularly difficult to fully digest some of the Turkish texts, especially Turkish books.

²²³ See Karmon.

²²⁴ The following websites have been used for relevant articles:

- <http://catalog.loc.gov/>
- <http://library.harvard.edu/>
- <http://books.google.com>
- <http://isiknowledge.com/>
- <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?authtype=ip.uid&profile=ehost&defaultdb=t>
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Abbreviations

AFID	Anadolu Federal İslamı Devleti (The Anatolia Federal Islamic State)
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (The Justice and Development Party)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DHKP/C	Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (The Revolutionary People's Liberation Party – Front)
FP	Fazilet Partisi (The Virtue Party)
GTD	The Global Terrorism Database
IBDA-C	İslami Büyükdoğu Akıncılar Cephesi (The Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' Front)
ICCB	İslami Cemiyet ve Cemaatleri Birliği (Islamic Associations and Communities' Union)
IED	Improvised explosive device
IHH	İnsani Yardım Vakfı (Humanitarian Relief Foundation)
IMU	The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
JITEM	Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele (Gendarmerie Intelligence Anti-Terrorism Unit)
KDP	Partiya Demokrata Kurdistan (Kurdish Democratic Party)
MÇP	Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi (The National Work Party)
MIT	Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (The Turkish National Intelligence Organization)
MSP	Milli Selamet Partisi (The National Salvation Party)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PKK	Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (The Kurdistan Workers' Party)
RP	Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party)
TAK	Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan (The Kurdistan Freedom Hawks)